



AN EMERGENCY
NEWS BULLETIN
ON SOUTHEAST
ASIAN AFFAIRS

April-May 1968.. 50¢

VIET REPORT

PRE-WAR LATIN AMERICA

2 VIETNAM: The Table Turns

4 REVOLUTION & THE HEMISPHERE

..... *Ruth Shereff*

9 OLAS Resolutions

**10 GUATEMALA: Military Camp Under
Liberal Command**

..... *Jon Frappier*

14 A Priest Speaks Out *Blase Bonpane*

16 NEW MAN & NEW ORDER IN CUBA

..... *Mike Goldfield*

22 CAMPUS COUNTERINSURGENCY: Focus

Latin America . . . *Mike Klare* • *Carol Brightman*

23 INSURGENTS' GUIDE TO U.S. CAPITAL

IN LATIN AMERICA • *Lois Ravich* • *Edie Black*

26 A Peek Under the Statistical Rug

..... *Alex Georgiadis* • *Karen Spalding*

30 New Strategy in U.S. Investments

..... *Edie Black*

33 BOOK REVIEWS

James Petras • *Allen Young* • *Julie Nichamin*

One of the most politically debilitating tasks of the antiwar movement has been to penetrate the fog of Lyndon Johnson's deceptions. This has left its mark on all of us, and to the present day more Americans protest Lyndon's lies than protest the State canons to which he has tried to adhere (withall, in vain) in Vietnam. Thus in a campaign year we have fomented a political mutiny within the Democratic Party which nevertheless bears not the slightest promise of changing ships.

There was in March at least a symbolic moment of truth in American history when this conclusion appeared questionable—when the public interest was locked in basic conflict with the foreign interest of the Cold War State. Political survival, not to mention fiscal sanity and even military expediency dictated that the Administration finally extricate itself from the Vietnam war. Opposing this were only the overwrought Munich analogies of Messrs. Rusk and Rostow, the native greed of the defense establishment and professional picque from the Joint Chiefs—or so it seemed. Yet it was Mr. Johnson who appeared at the sacrificial altar on March 31, not the Vietnam war. It was Johnson the *Candidate* who demonstrated by his withdrawal from the race that—as Secretary Rusk informed Charles Mohr the next day in Washington—"he was determined not to be deluded or diverted by partisan considerations" in pursuing the war (N. Y. Times, 4/2/68).

It was not the "health" of the American political process that was vindicated on that day but its complete abjection before the shabbiest of State truths: that domestic controversy must not interfere with the pursuit of an aggressive U. S. military posture abroad. Accordingly, after Johnson's withdrawal the Democratic "peace" candidates have found it impossible (in Senator McCarthy's words) to achieve "a real political confrontation" with Administration policies. Clearly there is more power and purpose in the war camp than we realized.

Nothing dramatizes the deep entrenchment of this camp so well as the aftermath of Mr. Johnson's other announcement on March 31. While it was at once evident that the half-halt in the bombing marked a regression from the San Antonio formula for opening

talks with North Vietnam, nevertheless, the enormity of public relief in all quarters gave this gesture new seriousness. For example, on April 2 the *Wall Street Journal* had quoted Presidential associates to the effect that Johnson's probe was "so incomplete that it really could not constitute any prospect for peace." Much more specific were prospects for escalation: the mining of Haiphong harbor, the massive bombing of population centers, including Hanoi, the breaking of dikes . . . In short: "Without announcing it to the world the President [was] shaking a big stick at Hanoi." But despite these warnings, Wall Street trading soared to record levels and has continued to boom.

What really fed this optimism, of course, was North Vietnam's response. On April 3 Hanoi "flabbergasted" Washington officials by offering for the first time "to determine the unconditional cessation of U. S. bombing" in face to face talks. By choosing to take Mr. Johnson's opening seriously, Hanoi in effect *made it* serious.

Subsequent Administration actions have revealed the mingled contempt and terror with which Washington views a diplomatic resolution of even the most untenable part of the war. Whatever could force Hanoi to retrench has been done. After repeated promises to meet "anywhere anytime," Mr. Johnson now will meet only at one of ten U. S.-approved sites. After officials told newsmen at a State Department backgrounder that "enemy forces had carried out a general disengagement throughout South Vietnam in the past month"—not just from Khesanh—"but from Saigon, Nhatrang and Quinhon" (N. Y. Times, 4/16/68), Defense Secretary Clifford now claims that the enemy has not volunteered any pullback whatsoever. And today U.S. bombers are flying more daily missions over the North than ever before.

Typically, neither "peace" candidate has jumped on this new escalation, but is there any guarantee that when they do the present Administration will be constrained to reverse course? For that matter, what guarantee do we have that either a Kennedy or McCarthy administration would enforce the fundamental reallocations of national resources essential for change in

Vol. 3, Nos. 6 & 7

**VIET-REPORT
SPECIAL ISSUE**

April/May 1968

PUBLISHERS' ADVISORY BOARD

Harry Braverman • Whitney Ellsworth • Bernard Mazel
Judy Lerner • John Simon

Published by VIET-REPORT, Inc. All correspondence should be addressed to VIET-REPORT, 133 West 72nd Street, New York, New York 10023; telephone (212) 799-0870. Printed in the U.S.A. Subscription rates: \$4 per year in U.S., Mexico and Canada, \$7 for two years; \$5 and \$8 elsewhere. Single copies, 50¢. Copyright © 1968 by VIET-REPORT, Inc. Manuscripts must be accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope. All contributions represent opinion of authors, which are not necessarily those of VIET-REPORT.

Book stores and newsstands contact Eastern News Distributors, 155 West 15th Street, New York, N.Y.

VIET-REPORT appears 9 times a year. Application to mail at 2nd class postage rates is pending at New York, New York.

Editor: Carol Brightman
Special Issue Editor: Ruth Shereff
Associate Editor: John McDermott
Managing Editor: Beverly Leman
Latin American Affairs Editor:
Ruth Shereff
Office Manager: Edward Lieberman
Circulation: Vickie Cooper,
Alicia Kaplow

Layout and Design: Michael Klare
Editorial Staff Assistant:
Peggy Gerard

Staff: Peter Geismar, Patricia Parker, Harvey Schaffer.

Contributing Editors: Robert S. Browne, Staughton Lynd, Martin Nicolaus

Note: This Special Issue incorporates February and March 1968.

government policy? Their constituencies are demanding only that they halt the erosion of American prestige in Vietnam, not the postwar elements of that prestige—in short, the global web of military alliances and bases, plus the interventionary rights ensured by the export of capital development.

The real hope for an American end to the war still rests, as it always has, on the staggering endurance and unprecedented fighting skill of the Vietnamese who oppose us. It is the determined Vietnamese peasant who is providing us with the object lesson we need to rebuke the foolhardy principles of American welfare imperialism. It is his struggle which has expanded and prolonged the opposition at home—not the reverse. (On the other hand, it is likely that the multiple advances scored by the Front during the Tet offensive is what made Hanoi's unexpected compromise on peace talks possible; it may well take another major rout of U. S. and government forces in the South to knock the last legss out of Washington's resistance to a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam.)

When we turn from the American political scene to the battlefield, in fact, an end to the war seems more imminent. The guerrillas may yet drive the United States out of Vietnam in the coming year. In that case the nature, of the struggle facing us will finally crystallize; How do we drive the Vietnam policymakers out of authority in American life? A new president is needed to ratify the first exodus. But a new politics which challenges the institutional bulwarks of Cold War militarism is required for the second.

We should not deceive ourselves. Electoral politics represents a changing of the guard. If the need is to change the command it is necessary to block its supply or rebuke its mission. In the first instance that means cutting the government's warmaking monopoly on the

human, material and technical resources of this country; in the second it means disrupting the management of the national security complex inside the multiversities, the Congress, and the domestic operations of the great financial and industrial empires. In brief, it means tackling militarism not as a "foreign policy issue" at the polls, but as a direct manifestation of institutional life in America.

The irrelevancy of Kennedy and McCarthy to this kind of challenge is as evident as the irrelevancy of radicals at the ballot box. Yet this is precisely the point. It must be our positive contribution to show that the action needed for basic change in America must be carried on outside party politics and inside people's everyday lives—particularly where these lives are stunted by militarism—in the schools, the scientific professions, among the jobless, at the draft board, in the inner cities.

To even begin this kind of movement we need to enter more deeply into the workings of American society than we have before. Protest politics are not enough and come too late. We need to launch the struggle at the supply line. For *Viet-Report* this has meant that we concentrate on the sources of exploitation and aggression abroad, and today — with the spectacle of a brutalizing police action building inside our own cities—that we begin to engage the more deeply entrenched agencies of racism and political repression at home. Thus, in the last issue, we took on the "University at War"; in this issue—the agri-businesses, industries, financial institutions and the Military Assistance Program which are currently defining the preconditions for war in Latin America. And in the next issue (in time for the summer) we will lay bare the towering arsenal of weapons and strategies which the government is massing against revolted Americans.

The Editor

Why Latin America?

The war in Vietnam took the cover off a Pandora's box in the Pentagon and State Department. A peek inside revealed a formidable arsenal of new weapons. Some of the most esoteric—"incapacitating" chemical and biological agents, "democratic" elections staged for the voters back home, U.S. university-trained secret police and counterinsurgency scholarship—were first exposed in the pages of VIET-REPORT.

We soon learned that Vietnam was not an isolated case. Santo Domingo was next. The Americans moved in on a permanent basis with the election to the presidency of Joaquin Balaguer, Trujillo's former aide. While visiting that country one year after the American intervention, this editor made the acquaintance of the chief of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group and the chief of Psychological Warfare Operations. Both had been flown in from Saigon.

The U.S. democratic alternative to Communism in Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, soon had his counterparts south of the border: Costa e Silva in Brazil, Colonel Peralta in Guatemala, as well as Joaquin Balaguer. Meanwhile, American social scientists and military men were reappraising the whole of the Third World, especially Latin America, with an eye toward more effective pacification. As in Vietnam, the main object is to protect American hegemony, not to remedy the

misery in which the majority of people have to live.

In Vietnam, we were caught short. To place our readers ahead of events this time, we provide in this issue a primer on U.S. penetration in Latin America, including an Insurgent's Guide to the Care and Feeding of U.S. Capital in Latin America, plus an important case study and reviews....

A visit to Cuba, the only country in Latin America where the standard of living for the majority of people is not declining, provides a convincing argument for the alternative proposed by the slain Che Guevara and echoed by an increasing number of people on the continent—revolution. To most Americans this alternative remains a mystery. An editor's report from the revolutionary conference held in Havana last summer and an eyewitness account of recent developments in Cuba should help clarify the picture.

Opposition to the war in Vietnam finally led us to reassess official histories of American foreign policy interests in Asia. How many American boys will have to die before analysts decide to reappraise Latin American history? To ignore the parallels to Vietnam which prewar Latin America presents is to run the risk of standing by helplessly while America steps into another quagmire.

P.S.: In our next issue, VIET-REPORT will focus on still another front: Urban America.

— R.S.



The closing session at OLAS. Credit: Shereff

Revolution in the Hemisphere

A Report from OLAS

by RUTH SHEREFF

American sociologists talk about misery breeding revolution, thinking of the spontaneous generation of maggots in rotten meat. Likewise, much of the revolutionary propaganda in Latin America describes starvation, unemployment, lack of medical care, and oppression by the ruling class and military, as if these things by themselves are the cause. That conditions are miserable in Latin America goes without saying. It is the justification for revolution and the reason why people eventually will fight. But what surprised me in speaking to the delegates at the Conference of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) last August was the extent to which many of them had made a conscious political decision to turn toward revolution, based on the political situation that binds the continent.

Most of them had personally run the gamut of measures for change, participating in social work activities, elections, reform politics, even military coups. After nothing had shaken the power structure they decided to turn toward protracted guerrilla warfare, the method advocated by Fidel, who also at one time believed in electoral politics and the possibility of reform.

THE ARGUMENT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE: THE PEACEFUL MEANS ARE EXHAUSTED

THE IDEA that the peaceful means for change are exhausted is both a tactic and reality. It is a tactic because people will not fight unless they are convinced that no other road is open to them. That is why U.S. counterinsurgency experts try to emphasize token reform in their programs, in addition to military preparedness. Furthermore, as Che put it in his mes-

RUTH SHEREFF / Latin American editor, *Viet-Report*, has covered events in the Dominican Republic and in Cuba where she attended the OLAS Conference from July 31-August 10, 1967. A contributor to *Commonweal* and the *National Catholic Reporter*, she returns to the Dominican Republic in May and then on to Venezuela.

sage to *Tricontinental*, "It is absolutely just to avoid all useless sacrifices. Therefore, it is so important to clear up the real possibilities that dependent America may have of liberating itself through pacific means."

But he continued, "For us, the solution to this question is quite clear: ... we cannot harbor any illusion ... that freedom can be obtained without fighting."

Reform movements have been unable to maintain themselves in power or carry out their promises for a better life. The Cuban brief at OLAS reviewed this point extensively; one concrete example was: "the government of Joao Goulart in Brazil [which] proposed definite reform in the system of landholding and aroused support among the working people. The great North American monopolies in alliance with the landholding oligarchy and with the support of the professional army overthrew Goulart and prevented him from accomplishing the timid reforms that he proposed." There were many others. The coup against President Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic was carried out with the consent of the United States when it became apparent that he would allow political liberty to the left, that he was seeking aid in Europe, enacting land reform, separating church and state and refusing to honor unfavorable contracts that were signed during the time of Trujillo. (An amazing chronicle of these days is found in *Overtaken by Events*, by John Barlow Martin, the former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic.)

Seven other elected governments have been similarly overthrown since 1960. Always the pattern is the same. They have no armed power base to defend them when the military, who are dependent upon the United States, carry out a coup. And even when the governments stay in power, as did Frei in Chile and Betancourt in Venezuela, the power structure remains unchanged; the military remains the constant watchdog of the *status quo*. After the Cuban victory in 1959,

Viet-Report

U.S. military aid to Latin America doubled; after the Dominican revolt in 1965 it rose by 50% again. Reform movements have been helpless in this situation.

Furthermore, it was disputed at OLAS whether reform movements in themselves present any real alternatives to the voters. Perhaps until about fifteen years ago, there was a sector of the politically influential population (which in Latin America comprises the upper class, the landed oligarchy and more recently the industrialists and small middle class) that could be called nationalist and was organized in the populist Social Democrat and Christian Socialist Parties, parties that seemed to bear the promise of change. But a traditional reform government within a capitalist framework, the "leadership of the young emerging nations" as the *Times* puts it, is dependent upon an independent investor and merchant class determined to develop its own nation: what the Marxists call a "national bourgeoisie." The Cubans repeatedly pointed out the changing nature of this sector. In Latin America, each "so-called national bourgeoisie ... completely gives up its nationalist position, and attracted by the policy of mixed investments and promises of aid by the imperialists, gives up any aspirations to independence, content with survival under the protection of the 'alliance for progress.' Otherwise it would have to suffer the consequences of the 'dumping' pressure and ruthless competition from affiliates of yankee monopolies. Their historical prospects exhausted, faced by the specter of revolution, these bourgeoisie sectors become increasingly conciliatory toward imperialism and its traditional allies" (*Gramma* 10/8/67).

In other words, as the "national bourgeoisie" becomes increasingly dependent upon the United States, often through business partnerships, it can no longer be counted upon to defend the national interest in such matters as concessions to foreign companies and taxation, or even on the interventionary powers of the U.S. military mission. They fear revolution, particularly after seeing how Cuba nationalized industries right down to the last barber shop. Nor did the wealthy class ever invest in Latin America. The problem of "flight of capital" to U.S. and European investments reflect their own interest in secure profit as opposed to national development.

TWO of the guerrilla movements represented at OLAS, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) of Peru and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) of Venezuela (not connected) had broken away from the prominent reform Social Democratic parties of their countries. The case of the Venezuelan MIR illustrates the political development of a revolutionary group. The leaders of MIR had run the clandestine movement of the Acción Democrática Party during the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, while Rómulo Betancourt and other older members of the party were in exile. During their exile, the Acción Democrática leaders became involved with interests in the U.S., for example, the conservative international AFL-CIO movement. When they returned, they took over the party again, but abandoned many of their programs for radical change. The younger members who had run the party during the dictatorship broke away (and even Acción Democrática supporters acknowledge that to this day they have no following among the youth) and formed MIR, originally as an electoral party. It

was in response to President Betancourt's repression of the University leftist movement in 1961 that the MIR, jointly with the Communists, opened a rural guerrilla front.

Although it is not well known here in the United States, the Communist parties in Latin America have similarly been affected by defections on the part of the youth. Two of the groups presently involved in guerrilla warfare, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) of Venezuela and Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of Guatemala, were formerly the "fighting arms" of their respective Communist parties.

POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

COMMUNIST Parties (with the possible exception of the Dominicans) have adapted the Russian line on peaceful coexistence to a local policy of electoral politics. They seek legality after their long years of persecution, to effect their programs through means of elections, infiltration, strikes, etc. From the revolutionaries' viewpoint, there is no reason to believe that the Communists will have any more success than the Social Democrats. "Frei is going as far as the U.S. and the oligarchy will permit," one Cuban pointed out to me. "If the Communists win an election, they will either be overthrown by the military, or allowed to stay in office only if they don't enact their socialist program." Although not much is heard about the Chilean military these days, they are as strong as any other in Latin America. According to Jacqueline Lobaton, widow of the Peruvian guerrilla leader, the Communist parties, by participating in elections, give the appearance of options which really don't exist and lend a facade of liberalism to oligarchical governments.

Now that Russia is attempting to expand her trade in Latin America by offering technical and financial aid (credits) to the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and even Bolivia, the Latin American Communists have justified this aid, explaining that it will help the national bourgeoisie regain its independence from the U.S., making it capable later on of participating in the revolution. Again, the issue of the national bourgeoisie appears crucial. The Cubans reject the idea that the national bourgeoisie as a class can be revolutionary, particularly as far as confrontation with the United States is concerned. Above the objections of the Communist parties, Cuba pushed through a secret resolution condemning Russian aid to Latin America. Castro pointed out that the aid will only fortify the ruling class and enable them to divert funds to fight the guerrillas.

While the Communist parties in Guatemala, Colombia and Venezuela have supported guerrilla movements, the armed bands were only one part of their political operations, directed by the central committees in the cities, and were often used as a threat to gain legal recognition. This aroused the greatest indignation in Cuba. The situation became crucial in Venezuela several months before OLAS began. In 1965, the MIR had broken away from their joint guerrilla front with the Communists, opening their own and accusing the Communists of failing to support the insurgency. The Communists claimed that the guerrilla fronts were getting nowhere. At great risk, the Communist guerrilla leader, Douglas Bravo, came

down to the city to argue with the Party Central Committee. Getting no satisfactory response, he returned to the hills and continued the fight. In March 1967, Bravo was expelled from the Party, accused of trying to splinter the party, and his expulsion notice was printed on the front page of *Pravda*. Bravo's wife, Argelia, told me bitterly at OLAS that the Communists were seeking the easy way. After attempted military coups tried in 1962, they lost interest in overthrowing the state.

On March 13, 1967, Fidel directed a speech to the Venezuelan situation: "It is absurd and almost criminal to direct the guerrillas from the city.... And the guerrillas were not taken as a force capable of developing itself till it conquered the revolutionary power in countries such as ours, but as an instrument for agitation... for negotiation." He denounced the Communists for cutting the guerrilla's supply line, adding, "In Venezuela the guerrillas were constantly ordered to cease fire. It is insane! A guerrilla that does not fight does not develop; a guerrilla that calls a truce in combat is a guerrilla condemned to defeat."

At OLAS there was private criticism of the Guatemalan FAR for their connection with the Communist party, the Guatemalan Worker's Party. Francisco Prada of the Venezuelan FALN indicated to me that the Guatemalan force would not be able to advance their struggle till they broke free; this was finally done this past March. According to Nestor Valle, head of the Guatemalan delegation, FAR had supported the election of Mendez Montenegro, a liberal, in 1966, after five years of fighting in the hills, on the grounds that it indicated a national repudiation of the right wing. They even stopped fighting for six months to see if he would enact reforms. In breaking with the Communist Party, the FAR expressed explicit repudiation of this electoral stand.

While Russia addressed OLAS calling the Communist Parties the "Vanguard of the Revolution," OLAS bordered on declaring that the fight would be impossible under Communist control. At stake was a repudiation of not only the Communist's resort to methods which have already failed in the case of the Social Democrats, but their motives as well. The Third International has as one of its priorities the protection of the Russian Revolution. It was argued that the Communists often act as an extension of Russian foreign policy, thinking that this is the way to serve international socialism, rather than responding to local conditions. The resort to legal tactics and appeals to the native capitalist class is said to parallel the Russian stance once it adapted peaceful coexistence and began to gain entrance to the Western world through diplomatic channels and trade.

IMPLICATIONS OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"

"CASTRO is a madman," Eastern Europeans said in the swimming pools of Havana. "Trying to destroy the bridges being built between the East and West." But what can a *detente* mean to Cuba or North Vietnam who are struggling for their very existence? First, during the October 1962 missile crisis, Russia not only withdrew the missiles from Cuban soil, but did not demand a break in the U.S. economic blockade as a concession. Later, Russia refrained from confronting the United States over the bombing of North Vietnam, although she stepped up

material aid. If the guerrilla struggle gets underway in Latin America, it could presumably involve her in a confrontation in the hemisphere which she is trying to avoid most of all.

Cuba feels that only U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia is preventing Washington from paralleling the bombing of North Vietnam on her own soil. Officials indicated that in the case of attack from the United States, Russia might not come through with military backing.

AT PRESENT, however, economic strangulation seems to satisfy U.S. policy spelled out in a State Department Bulletin in 1963. "Domestically, isolation will keep the economy descending its present downgrade until it is clear to all that the glowing promises of a better life for all Cubans which proved so alluring at the outset of the July 26th Movement, can never be fulfilled by Castro and his cohorts, but must be sought by new leaders. And by increasing the costs to the Soviets of their maintenance of Castro... we are determined to convince Moscow that it is supporting a sure loser, and an expensive one at that."

Without Russian aid, evident everywhere, Cuba could not have survived: the trucks, fishing port, technicians, even canned milk on supermarket shelves. Cuban officials at OLAS told me they didn't think Russia would cut off aid as a result of the conference, although they didn't think it would be increased. Oil shipments for example, have not been increased to meet rising Cuban consumption. By encouraging revolution, Castro is undercutting Russian policy in the hemisphere. There may come a time when trade with the West is more important to the Soviet Union than maintaining a socialist island in the Caribbean.

At this point, Cuba sees her only hope for breaking isolation and increasing her security in revolution on the continent. And it seems she is extending as much aid as possible to Latin guerrillas by way of military training and intelligence, while the United States is diverted in Vietnam. In the event that Washington recognizes Havana—which seems unlikely in spite of recent feelers—the government would have to review her priorities: whether to raise the standard of living for her people through trade with the United States, or to continue to work for the liberation of the rest of Latin America and perhaps face attack as a result. Although the revolution would be set back if this support was withdrawn (one young Nicaraguan told me he went up to the hills only to discover he didn't know what to do there), nevertheless, it was made clear at OLAS that the guerrilla fighters have made their commitment as a result of the impossible conditions of their own nations. These conditions will not change. Cuba's stand articulates a way out, but it may be out of Cuba's hands.

THE CUBAN STRATEGY

THE Cuban strategy for guerrilla warfare must be seen in historical context. If purely internal power factors prevailed in Latin America, reform governments might have succeeded or leftists might have taken over long ago. In Guatemala in 1944, a student strike brought the liberal Arevalo government to power. Since then, U.S. training of military and police have taught governments how to deal with students—

and strikes. (The CIA executed a coup against Arevalo's successor in 1954.) Forms of violent struggle which do not approach the military confrontation implicit in protracted guerrilla warfare have also been tried. The classic example is the 1965 Dominican Revolt, a military coup and urban insurrection which sought to restore the constitutional presidency of Juan Bosch. Although the Constitutionals defeated the urban military garrisons within three days, their forces were geared only for a simple uprising and were concentrated in the city. The U.S. Marines landed, cordoned off and bombarded rebel zones. (Till then, Trujillo's military were considered the strongest in Latin America.)

"Victory over the native oligarchy can be relatively easy to achieve," the Cuban brief explained. "We will have a more complex stage when the government of the United States decides upon military intervention in the war of liberation.... Intervention in one country can succeed more or less immediately, according to the timing with which it is carried out... but if intervention is tried simultaneously in several countries, it cannot succeed. Thus the importance of widening the combat front. Thus the importance of preparing to develop the fight simultaneously."

THE military basis for proposed Cuban strategy is mobile guerrilla warfare—the most self-sufficient form of combat, carried out in the countryside in terrain less accessible to the forces of repression and hostile to the American invaders. (The Cuban brief acknowledged that guerrilla warfare was not feasible in countries such as Chile or Uruguay.)

If a coordinated strategy and timetable was planned at OLAS, it was probably done even outside the closed sessions. In the first place, the Communists represented there went along with the final resolutions (see page 9) more for the sake of unanimity rather than because they agreed. Second, not all the groups reflected the same level of development. There were student groups who seemed to have no concrete plans as to how their governments could be overthrown. The formation of groups committed to the revolutionary struggle follows its own pace, as individuals and sectors of political parties become convinced that peaceful means are exhausted in their own nation. Also, it is hard to predict when the revolutionary groups, still quite weak, will be able to gather enough military strength and popular support to defeat the state. Perhaps a major accomplishment of OLAS was hastening this pace through opening the debate over the position of the communist parties.

However, it is this debate which introduces new difficulties: the cutting off of the supplies and mass support which the Communist parties were willing to provide, and the increased possibility of retaliation. The CP's remain the most well-organized force on the left in Latin America, with cadres in all walks of life. It is the Cuban position that the groups following the "correct" line will eventually gather strength and triumph.

According to the Cubans, the guerrilla army comprised of urban radicals, students, and workers together with the rural unemployed, exploited agricultural laborers and peasants will provide the nucleus of the revolutionary force. The military leader of the guerrilla force will also be the political leader. The

"The Communist parties in Latin America have easily degenerated into bureaucratic machines, better organized and more disciplined than the traditional political parties of any capitalist or colonial country, but basically no different from them. It is quite clear now that if Fidel Castro could lead a few hundred guerrilla fighters to political power in Cuba, an island ninety miles from the United States, communist leaders in countries much farther from Washington—Chile, Argentina and Brazil—for example—could have seized power earlier... party leaders and their following... have been limited to pleading for reforms within the classical oligarchical systems of Latin America—with whose leaders they have always coexisted—on the pretext that... there have been no "objective conditions" for seizure of power by the communists."

(JUAN BOSCH, N.Y. Review of Books, 10/26/67).

rugged life in the countryside will "proletarianize" the city intellectuals and politicize the peasant who takes up arms. Participation in the guerrilla struggle substitutes for the work of classical political cadres of the Communist parties. Combat is seized as the means for mobilizing the people.

Both the Moscow-oriented parties and the *Peking Review* have attacked this view for its elimination of the political party and program as originator and director of the struggle. What the Cuban and guerrilla groups appear to be really rejecting is the traditional degeneracy of Latin American political bureaucracies which endlessly subordinate the armed struggle to purely political negotiation. This has not been the case in Asia where Communist parties have been effective in organizing revolutionary struggles. In Latin America, on the other hand, political and military leadership has been characteristically combined since the independence struggle from Spain.

Nonetheless, the Cuban reliance on mobile guerrilla warfare and combat to organize the people behind the insurgents leaves certain problems unsolved. There is, for example, the conflict between the need to win the support of the people on all levels and the need for constant mobility. Since the success of the Cuban revolution, as Regis Debray pointed out in *Revolution Within the Revolution?*, U.S. surveillance in the countryside of Latin America has vastly increased. Military "civic action teams," Peace Corps, missionaries, and similar groups are involved in espionage and pacification programs designed to adjust conditions enough to prevent the peoples' turning to revolution. Debray's program of armed propaganda—taking a town by killing the local military officials (who are undoubtedly hated), gathering the people to propagandize the goals of the revolution, then evacuating, which he devised as an answer to U.S. penetration in the countryside, hardly seems sufficient to identify the guerrillas with the aspirations of the people. Debray explains that leaving cadres behind in the early stages of the fight will bring certain repression. However, without participation in literacy work, campaigns to gain more for the people through land seizures, strikes, or whatever means are suitable

in a given situation, always backed up by the gun, it is difficult to see why the guerrillas' promises should be more highly regarded than those of any other politicians. Repression will come anyway.

Unless a broad base of people are organized in the struggle, and politically aware of the implications of counterinsurgency propaganda, U.S. "psywar" may turn out to be more successful than in Vietnam. Similarly, a broad-based intelligence and military structure is necessary to resist U.S. penetration and perhaps invasion. Francisco Prada of the Venezuelan National Liberation Front and Nestor Valle of the Guatemalan Revolutionary Armed Forces indicated that U.S. intervention would transform the civil war into a war of national liberation. This does not automatically follow. After intervening in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, in the first quarter of the century, the U.S. crushed the opposition and set up native military forces which have been able to control the population till the present day.

In South Vietnam, it is the highly organized political and military apparatus of the NLF that enables the people to withstand American propaganda and military bombardment. Furthermore, the land reforms, literacy campaigns and medical services maintained inside besieged NLF zones makes the Front a clear alternative to the U.S. and Saigon government. Otherwise, the people would not choose to fight to the end.

The Vietminh organized during the French and Japanese occupation when the enemy was clearly identifiable and usually more of an outsider than the Vietminh member. In Latin America, the American presence is more hidden, while the guerrillas may be the outsiders. The guerrillas may be right that in the long run provoking the Americans into a more overt position may facilitate revolutionary organization. But today in Bolivia, for example, the guerrillas may be twice removed from traditionally suspicious peasant communities which are Bolivian, but also Indian. Anthropologists I have spoken with have argued that unless the rebels recruit local villagers to organize supporting structures, the fight can not succeed.

Moreover, the city can play a more organic role than Debray suggests. Traditionally in Latin America the urban workers and unemployed have been far to the left of the peasants (leftist candidates frequently carry the cities); since urban dwellers constitute an ever increasing percentage of the population, almost 60% in Venezuela now, it would be a mistake to leave them unorganized except as a supply base. However, the potentially explosive shanty towns present a military problem; they can easily be placed under seige or bombed.

Last, wherever there is a weak revolutionary structure during the fighting, there will be difficulty after the victory. Fidel faced this problem when he had to rely on the Communist Party upon coming to power—a cause of much trouble later on. The counter-revolution in the Escambray was largely a result of the maltreatment of peasants by the revolutionary troops there who seem to have been inadequately politicized and were isolated from the revolutionary directorate's control.

The exact position of the various guerrilla groups on these problems remains unclear to me. At OLAS, it was easy to be overwhelmed by the huge amounts

of backgrounders available and people to be interviewed. The atmosphere was euphoric, and the Cuban views were dominant. However, the Guatemalans tended to talk in terms of integrating themselves into the peasant community, through literacy work as well as through combat. And the Peruvian MIR indicated that underestimating the importance of the cities had been a shortcoming leading to their defeat. Both the Venezuelans and Guatemalans told me that their movements had wide support in the government's armed forces, indicating unusual interest in this type of infiltration and broad-based support. One of the guerrilla movements, MIR of Venezuela, has support among the labor unions and other workers groups dating from the days when they broke from Acción Democrática; they seemed to be following the line of multiple combat fronts. I did not leave Cuba convinced that Debray's book represents the official line. Nor did it seem that Cuba was imposing on the guerrilla groups her formula for the conduct of revolution.

If the "new Vietnams" which Che numbered in his appeal to *Tricontinental* (see August/September *Viet-Report*) finally get off the ground—and they will take time—the United States is bound to intervene. U.S. investments are far greater than in Southeast Asia, and dependence on Latin American trade is essential to the beleaguered credibility of Washington's balance of payments. Then, too, U.S. military preparedness has long been "localized" throughout the hemisphere (unlike Southeast Asia before 1961). Military missions and counterinsurgency "advisory" teams maintain the kind of footholds which makes large-scale intervention always imminent. We had better recognize the dimensions of this economic and military "preparedness" now if we are going to act on it. And, if the revolutions do not get off the ground, Latin Americans may then look forward to the misery which breeds only more despair.



Viet-Report

FINAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE OLAS CONFERENCE

(Havana, July 31 — August 10, 1967)

WE, THE REPRESENTATIVES of the peoples of our America, conscious of the conditions which prevail on the continent, aware of the existence of a common counterrevolutionary strategy directed by U.S. imperialism,

PROCLAIM:

1. That making the Revolution constitutes a right and a duty of the peoples of Latin America.
2. That the Revolution in Latin America has its deepest historical roots in the liberation movement against European colonialism of the 19th century and against imperialism of this century. The epic of the peoples of America and the great class battles that our peoples have carried out against imperialism in earlier decades constitute the source of historical inspiration of the Latin American revolutionary movement.
3. That the essential content of the Revolution in Latin America is to be found in its confrontation with imperialism and the bourgeois and landowner oligarchies. Consequently, the character of the Revolution is the struggle for national independence, emancipation from the oligarchies, and the socialist road for its complete economic and social development.
4. That the principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement of Latin America.
5. That armed revolutionary struggle constitutes the fundamental course of the Revolution in Latin America.
6. That all other forms of struggle must serve to advance and not to retard the development of this fundamental course, which is armed struggle.
7. That, for the majority of the countries of the continent, the problems of organizing, initiating, developing and crowning the armed struggle at present constitutes the immediate and fundamental task of the revolutionary movement.
8. That those countries in which this task has not yet been undertaken nevertheless will regard it as an inevitable sequence in the development of revolutionary struggle in their countries.
9. That the historic responsibility of furthering revolution in each one of these countries belongs to the people and to their revolutionary vanguards in each country.
10. That the guerrilla is the nucleus of the liberation armies, and guerrilla warfare constitutes the most effective method of initiating and developing the revolutionary struggle in most of our countries.
11. That the leadership of the Revolution demands, as an organizational principle, the existence of a unified politico-military command, as a guarantee of success.
12. That the most effective solidarity that the revolutionary movements may practice among themselves, is the furthering and the culmination of their own struggle in their respective countries.
13. That the solidarity with Cuba and the collaboration and cooperation with the armed revolutionary movement is an undeferrable international duty

of every anti-imperialist organization of the continent.

14. The Cuban Revolution, as a symbol of triumph of the armed revolutionary movement, constitutes the vanguard of the Latin American anti-imperialist movement. The peoples that develop the armed struggle, as they advance along this road, put themselves in the vanguard.
15. That the peoples who have been directly subjected by colonialism of the European countries, in order to achieve their liberation, must have an immediate and basic objective: that of struggling for independence, and uniting with the general struggle of the continent as the only means of avoiding being absorbed into U.S. neocolonialism.
16. That the Second Declaration of Havana, that expresses the beautiful and glorious revolutionary tradition of the past 150 years of American history, constitutes a document outlining the program of the Latin American Revolution which has been confirmed, deepened, enriched and made more radical by the peoples of this continent during the last five years.
17. That the peoples of Latin America have no differences with any other peoples in the world and extend their hand of friendship also to the peoples of the United States, whom they exhort to undertake the struggle against the repressive policy carried out by imperialist monopolies.
18. That the Latin American struggle strengthens its ties of solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa and those of the socialist countries, the workers of the capitalist nations, and especially with the Negro population of the United States which suffers class exploitation, poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination and the denial of their most elementary human rights, and which constitutes an important force within the revolutionary struggle.
19. That the heroic struggle waged by the people of Vietnam gives invaluable aid to all revolutionary peoples who are fighting imperialism, and constitutes an inspiring example to the peoples of Latin America.
20. That we have approved the Statutes and created the Permanent Committee, in Havana, of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity, which constitutes the genuine representation of the Latin American peoples.

WE, THE REVOLUTIONARIES of our America, the America south of the Rio Bravo, successors of the men who gave us our first independence, armed with an undaunted will to fight, and with revolutionary and scientific guidance, and with nothing to lose but the chains which oppress us,

ASSERT:

That our struggle constitutes a decisive contribution to the historic struggle of humanity to liberate itself from slavery and exploitation.

THE DUTY OF EVERY REVOLUTIONARY IS TO MAKE THE REVOLUTION.



GUATEMALA:

Military Camp Under Liberal Command

by JON FRAPPIER

AN IMPORTANT question facing revolutionary aspirants throughout Latin America is whether it is more difficult to organize a guerrilla struggle and mass movement under a military dictatorship or under a liberal regime. And during the Kennedy administration the same question was raised in Washington. Liberal governments were favored in Latin America, for a while at least: Bosch in the Dominican Republic, Goulart in Brazil, Paz in Bolivia, Betancourt in Venezuela. Among other reasons, the Kennedy team felt that the promise of reform and facade of change would cut the sails of the revolutionaries. As it turned out, men like Bosch, Goulart and Paz ended up too close to the people, "demagogues" Washington said, stirring up trouble and passing too many "radical" bills. Furthermore, these men didn't allow the whole counterinsurgency package to function as freely as planned, and soon military coups were approved, removing them from office.

In Guatemala, the Kennedy plan had more success, and the results have endured. The current situation in Guatemala stands as an intriguing example of just how a U.S.-supported liberal regime functions.

The last two Guatemalan governments, one military and the other civilian, both faced the threat of armed insurrection by guerrillas. However, the military government headed by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia chose to ignore the threat and restrict U.S. involvement in his administration while the civilian regime of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro confronted the guerrillas militarily and allowed the United States greater leeway in all government affairs. It is important to understand the reasons for the different responses and the degree to which the United States was able to involve itself in the problem.

In July 1966 the newly elected president, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, took office following the three year military dictatorship of Colonel Peralta. Peralta had seized power in March 1963 in a palace

coup which ousted President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes. Several sources have indicated that President Kennedy and his advisors actually instigated the coup or at least gave the go-ahead to Peralta who at the time was Ydigoras' Defense Minister.[1] The sources explained that the U.S.-backed coup prevented the scheduled presidential elections which the liberal candidate Juan Jose Arevalo seemed likely to win. Arevalo had been elected president following a revolution in 1944 and served until 1951, during which time he passed a new labor code stimulating the organization of unions, legislated health and education reforms, established a social security system, restricted the penetration of foreign capital into Guatemala and initiated a series of additional reform programs.

However, Arevalo aroused Washington's suspicion with his policies striving for economic independence from the United States. For example, Empresa Electrica, the only electric utility facility in Guatemala owned by the U.S. company, American and Foreign Power, was brought before the Guatemalan Labor Court to justify its high profits and low wages. Policies such as this resulted in a reduction of American aid and an embargo on U.S. arms.

John O. Bell, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala during the Peralta coup in 1963, argued successfully with Kennedy and his advisors at this time that Arevalo was a Communist and that if he was permitted to be elected president then the United States would be faced with the same situation that threatened in 1954 when Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was in power.

In 1950, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected to the presidency, succeeding Arevalo. He wasted no time in stepping up the programs Arevalo had begun and started new ones which cut much deeper into the old system. In 1952, Arbenz and the Congress passed an Agrarian Reform Law which included the expropriation of land from the largest single landholder in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company of Boston. Although the law was mild enough to be praised by some agronomists and economists in the U.S., it was a major reason for the withdrawal of Washington's support.

JON FRAPPIER / Member of the North American Congress on Latin America, visited Guatemala in the summer of 1966 to report for the Radical Education Project of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

In June 1954, Arbenz was overthrown by a CIA-organized invasion led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who the United States installed and supported as president until his assassination in 1957. The pretext for disposing of Arbenz was that the Communists had infiltrated the Guatemalan government, thus presenting an imminent danger to American security. The fact is that the Communists were openly invited into government agencies and in some cases were elected to the Guatemalan Congress. However, the Communists did not support Arevalo as they did Arbenz and he had never granted them legal status as a party.

Knowing that approval from Washington was crucial in 1963 if elections were to be held, Arevalo appealed to the U.S. government in a message delivered through Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in which he presented his position and attempted to iron out the differences. His answer was Peralta's coup.

PERALTA: HE WAS CHOOSING BATISTA'S WAY

ALTHOUGH Peralta was on good terms with Washington and never threatened U.S. business investment, he did not want the U.S. to become too involved in his country's affairs. Tension began to develop between Peralta and Washington when it became clear that a revolutionary movement existed in Guatemala and was rapidly developing a rural and urban base.

The United States realized the seriousness of this development, particularly after their experience in Cuba, and knew that action had to be taken quickly against the guerrillas as had been done in Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. The Guatemalan military under Peralta's control did not consider the guerrillas a serious enough threat to actively and continuously pursue them. According to Peralta, the guerrillas were a small group, without popular support—nothing but a bunch of bandits. The U.S. Embassy and Military Mission knew differently. By mid-1966, the size of the larger of the two guerrilla forces, Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), had grown to between 200-500 under arms. The area they controlled and their activities were constantly expanding. FAR's strategy was not to provoke the military into battle but to build a peasant base, and this they were doing through political propaganda sessions in the villages, literacy programs and health projects.

When the Guatemalan military did attempt to confront the guerrillas, it was sporadic and usually ended without armed combat, but with the repression and killing of the peasant population.

An interview I had in the summer of 1966 with Colonel Joseph Koontz, who was head of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, revealed other tensions. (Colonel Koontz had been stationed in Vietnam and Colombia previous to his assignment in Guatemala.) Peralta restricted the number of Guatemalan officers that were to go to the U.S. or Southern Command in Panama to receive advanced training and indoctrination. An excessive number of colonels in the Guatemalan military, which is the combined result of political payoffs and no retirement plan, also impeded their efficiency.

Colonel Koontz regularly went to all the Guatemalan military installations to study intelligence re-

ports on preparedness, guerrilla activity, etc.; but Peralta issued an order to his officers to withhold this information, because "Koontz and the U.S. already know too much." Koontz admitted that he probably had more knowledge about Guatemalan military capabilities than any local person. In absolute terms, he estimated that as of the summer of 1966, the Guatemalan guerrillas were weaker than the Venezuelan or Colombian guerrillas, but in relative terms, they were stronger, since the Guatemalan government and military were too weak, disorganized, and unprepared to meet the threat. He added that Peralta's order was no longer a problem since Mendez had come to power; Mendez would be more cooperative.

Peralta apparently reasoned that the more control and influence the U.S. had, the more easily his authority could be undermined if the U.S. felt it was to their advantage to do so. For example, during his administration AID offered Guatemala about \$500,000 worth of TV equipment so that educational television could be set up. Peralta refused the grant, in part because he felt the U.S. would start censoring material and putting on commercials.

MENDEZ: AT LEAST HE COOPERATES

ACCORDING to Colonel Koontz, Mendez made a deal with the military before the 1966 presidential election, agreeing that if elected he would appoint a military man as Defense Minister. It is not clear what role the U.S. Mission played in this decision or in selecting the specific man, but according to Colonel Koontz, the appointed Defense Minister, Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque "is one of the younger and more enlightened officers."

Immediately, the two governments' different attitudes toward the guerrillas became obvious. Within a month after taking office in July 1966, Mendez offered the guerrillas an amnesty—which was rejected. By October 1966, the Guatemalan military under the direction of U.S. "advisors" launched in the eastern provinces their largest offensive to date. Large numbers of troops were transferred from Guatemala City bases to military installations in Zacapa. At the same time, military civic-action programs under the supervision of U.S. personnel went into full force. New wells were dug, roads built, and food distributed. Emphasis was given to projects with immediate results, such as mobile health units, model school construction and aid to demonstration farms.

The head of the U.S. Civic Action project in Guatemala, Major Woener, clarified the function of the program in an interview with David Tobis (*National Guardian* 1/27/68). "Civic action is a military weapon in counterinsurgency. I wish I could say our main concern is in improving nutrition or in getting a better water system to the people. These are only by-products. The security of the country is our mission. We are going to have to consolidate and improve before we can get a better return from our investment. We are not propagandizing enough."

As a result of the counterinsurgency effort, the guerrillas have had to increase their activities in the city apparently to force the military to redeploy some of its troops from the eastern region back into the urban zones, so as to ease the pressure on the battle-

weary rural guerrillas. It is possible that the U.S.-Guatemalan military offensive has even forced the rural guerrillas to abandon their peasant base in Zacapa and Izabal, and move to other areas of the country.

Related to the sustained military offensive against the guerrillas is the tremendous increase in U.S. military "advisors" in Guatemala. In the summer of 1966, the MAAG information officer admitted to having 24 military personnel in Guatemala. (This is also the figure the Guatemalan guerrillas gave out.) Lately, however, the U.S. mission is reluctant to give out information on advisor strength; but according to Father Blase Bonpane, one of the Maryknoll priests removed from Guatemala by his order, the U.S. military personnel number close to 1,000, an estimate also made by Georgie Anne Geyer in her series for the *Chicago Daily News*, December 1966.

A major question arising from the events of the last two years is why the liberal Mendez government decided to pursue the guerrillas while Peralta consistently refused to do so. Peralta was able to oppose U.S. military penetration because he had his own base of power within the armed forces. However, Mendez did not have such leeway. He came out of the bourgeoisie Partido Revolucionario (Revolutionary Party) which had no armed power of its own. Moreover, Julio Mendez' position within the party was relatively weak for he was drafted for the election after his brother Mario, who had been the leader of the Revolutionary Party, committed suicide. Caught between the two forces, the military, whose candidate he had defeated, and the guerrillas, Mendez compensated for his lack of power by turning to the United States for assistance. At the same time Washington was able to convince him that the guerrillas posed a real threat and that U.S. direction of the Guatemalan military was necessary in order to stop them.

GUERRILLAS CONTAINED: RIGHT WING FLOURISHES

NOT ONLY have the U.S. tactics considerably weakened the guerrilla threat but they have also contained the right wing political tendencies of the military. An attempt by some officers to overthrow Mendez in December 1966 was avoided when the U.S. convinced Defense Minister Arriaga to support the government. This has caused frustration among certain military officers, which resulted in their active support of and participation in the right wing terrorist groups such as the Mano Blanca.

So far the U.S. Mission and the Mendez government have not criticized or moved against the activities of the right wing terrorists because initially they were helpful in destroying the guerrilla base. But the more active and indiscriminate the terrorists become, the greater the threat to stability.

Right wing assassination targets include Revolutionary Party members in Congress, making it obvious that their purpose is not solely to destroy the guerrillas, but also to prevent the liberal reforms advocated by Mendez. By expanding the terrorism the rightists can increase the insecurity of the population, causing them to lose confidence in Mendez and thereby prepare the way for a military take-over. Even if the military can be held in check, the reforms will be slow in coming. The government land reform



program is at a standstill. The mild tax reform law that was passed in a compromise form due to strong opposition from the Guatemalan financial elites has been rescinded. Finance Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr, the brains behind the economic reforms, has been forced to resign.

After Peralta left office, the Army took over most of the weapons and therefore the power. To re-establish a balance of power through which the Americans can have more leverage, AID has since been selling weapons, vehicles and other equipment to the police; the police force has been increased by 2000 members.

Although the U.S. Embassy seems concerned about the growing power of the right wing and the obstacles it places in the way of the minor social changes necessary for a real counterinsurgency program, it seems that the right wing is not without support among Americans. When Colonel John D. Webber, Jr. was killed by guerrillas this past February, it was in retaliation for his alleged connection with the right wing assassination of the former Miss Guatemala. But as long as the United States can satisfy other aspects of its counterinsurgency plans, under Mendez, such as university reform, which it is able to do far better than under Peralta, right wing terrorism is secondary.

Matthew Smith, head of the political section of the U.S. Embassy told me, "The present government is really willing to listen to the U.S. agencies more than ever in the past." In the summer of 1966, the Human Resources Division of AID put out a confidential report critical of the lack of development of the cooperative movement in Guatemala. According to the report, much of the problem stemmed from Peralta's disinterest in the projects, but it was enthusiastic that the situation would improve under the Mendez government.

In addition to increased economic penetration and attempts at land reform in guerrilla controlled areas, an interesting area of U.S. penetration is the Guatemalan educational system. Indeed, it is surprising

that the United States has not long ago taken steps to pacify the Latin American universities, because students are one of the most vocal political forces for change. In Guatemala certain students make up part of the urban resistance movement and carry out such tasks as printing and distributing underground publications, gathering intelligence and recruiting for the guerrillas. Much of the best research and analysis of the country's problems comes from student groups. Other students, like those who worked with the Maryknoll priests who were forced to leave the country in December 1967, influence the peasantry merely by raising the basic questions of man's dignity, human rights and the need to organize for political effectiveness.

Most Latin American governments have been unable to deprive the universities of their traditional institutional autonomy, but that is certainly no reason to think that the United States cannot accomplish the task. The goal of the U.S.-initiated educational reform program in Guatemala is to depoliticize the university. A system is being established whereby prospective students can be screened and "problem" students enrolled can be expelled. Already dossiers are being kept on students in introductory programs. Not only does this allow the administration to better select the "serious" student for continuing university education, but it will ease the recruitment problems which plague the personnel directors of American overseas businesses.

Another tactic for depoliticizing students is to copy the American pattern of study, requiring the student to study longer hours, maintain grades, take exams, attend classes, complete his degree program in four years, fulfill distribution requirements, pay high tuition fees and perpetuate obedience *in loco parentis*. Science is to be emphasized over the humanities. Students will be required to attend more daytime classes which means that students who must work during the day and attend classes at night will have to quit their jobs or forget about their education. Significantly, the law school which is a center for radical student politics, has a high percentage of night-time students.

The students themselves recognize the need for more technical and thorough education. But they feel that science is secondary until the political question is solved. "We must remain social critics till change is brought about," I was told. "Then we can become technicians." Moreover, they felt Guatemala should control its own educational system. Student strikes against the reforms have closed San Carlos University several times, but the United States is persisting with the program.

AID has begun to channel funds into the Catholic University, Landivar, where the faculty is more conservative and the students more apolitical than in the National University of San Carlos. A peasant leadership program has been set up by AID at Landivar where potential peasant leaders from guerrilla areas are brought to Guatemala City, given a six-week training course and sent back to their villages to propagandize for the government.

AID's work in Guatemala today is part of a much larger assault on the "university" problem throughout Latin America. The immediate plan is to promote the integration of a Central American University sys-

tem, placing different major faculties in different countries. Thus a Guatemalan medical student might be located in Honduras, remote from the political problems of his own country. It is a remarkable attempt to denationalize Latins and create a new social and technical infrastructure for hemispheric unity under North American tutelage. U.S. government agencies are not alone in this ambitious task but have enlisted the aid of such American universities as Michigan State, Pittsburgh, Kansas, Oklahoma State and North Carolina. Private agencies with their special expertise whose help has been enlisted include the Institute for International Education, Ford Foundation and the Inter-American Institute.

LAST DITCH FOR INDEPENDENCE MENDEZ COURTS LABOR

ALTHOUGH for the most part Mendez is content to rely on the Americans for support, he has hopes of building a power base for himself independent of the United States in the trade union movement. He is thus allowing trade unions to participate more openly in the political process.

However, there is little reason to believe that Mendez can depend on this strategy. First, the labor movement can boast only 25,000 members. (Guatemala's economically active population runs close to 1.3 million of which 600,000 are wage earners or salaried.) Unions have never recovered since 1954, when Castillo Armas outlawed most of them and destroyed their leadership. Before this happened Arevalo and Arbenz had encouraged the organization of unions by legislating progressive labor laws; labor unions openly affiliated and lobbied with political parties. By the time Arbenz was overthrown, union membership had grown to 125,000 plus another 125,000 in the peasant leagues. Apparently their destruction was part of the deal the CIA and United Fruit Company made with Castillo Armas.

Second, after the 1954 coup, the unions were dissolved, then reconstituted under government control. The result was the extreme fragmentation of the labor movement evidenced today by Guatemala's two confederations, eleven federations and more than 100 unions. The inter-union rivalry is sufficient to cause great difficulties in creating political unity. Third, the corrupt union leadership is available to the highest bidder and Mendez' Revolutionary Party is not one of the wealthier.

Fourth, and most important in demonstrating Mendez' dependence on the United States, the labor unions in Guatemala, as in many third world countries, have been penetrated by U.S. labor and government agencies. In Guatemala, many of the important unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO dominated Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) which is the Western Hemisphere branch of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

In the last analysis, the U.S. still maintains the upper hand. While I was interviewing the labor observer of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, he received a telephone call from the head of the Light and Power Union of the Republic of Guatemala requesting that the U.S. Embassy mediate a dispute between the workers and Empresa Electrica, a totally-owned subsidiary of a U.S. company, American and Foreign Power.

Mendez is caught in a position where opposition from conservative interests is blocking all attempts at progressive change, even to the degree of threatening the government itself. Without U.S. backing, he would be powerless. While it is still in the U.S. interest to support liberal reforms which would undercut support for the guerrillas, it is clear that higher priorities (or habit) in American policy have thrust them to the side. Washington today appears content just to keep the "liberal" Mendez in power for the remainder of his term, thereby maintaining the semblance of constitutional government.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) Georgie Anne Geyer, *The Miami Herald*, 12/24/66; and Samuel Shapiro, *Invisible Latin America*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1963.
- (2) *A Case History of Communist Penetration: Guatemala* (Department of State Publication 6465) 1957. A white paper which attempts to justify U.S. involvement in the

overthrow of Arbenz. The document very crudely lumps Arevalo and Arbenz into the same bag.

- (3) Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (President of Guatemala 1958-63) tells in his book *My War with Communism* (Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 49-50) what happened after his initial decision to help overthrow Arbenz. "A former executive of the United Fruit Co. now retired, Mr. Walter Turnbull, came to see me with two gentlemen whom he introduced as agents of the C.I.A. They said that I was a popular figure in Guatemala and that they wanted to lend their assistance to overthrow Arbenz. When I asked their conditions for the assistance I found them unacceptable. Among other things I was to promise to favor the United Fruit Company and the International Railways of Central America; to destroy the railroad workers' labor union; to suspend claims against Great Britain for the Belize territory; to establish a strong-arm government, on the style of Ubico." Obviously Castillo Armas did not find the terms unacceptable. Ydigoras is in no way anti-American. He provided the land for the U.S. to train Cuban exiles for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. After that failed he offered the U.S. the use of Guatemalan soil for the installation of nuclear missiles.

JON FRAPPIER'S INTERVIEW WITH FATHER BLASE BONPANE, THE MARYKNOLL PRIEST ACCUSED OF COOPERATING WITH THE GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA, TOOK PLACE JANUARY 24, 1968.

A Priest Speaks Out on Guatemala "a violence ... worse than armed violence"

FRAPPIER: Could you describe living conditions in Guatemala?

BONPANE: I would say that Guatemala is close to the bottom of every list on Latin American development. The only country that would be lower is Haiti. First of all, the average man is hungry. More than 50% of the people suffer from malnutrition. The impact of this shows itself particularly in children. The infant mortality rate is forty times that of the United States. The children do fairly well while they are at the breast. As soon as they leave their mother's breast and try to live on the type of food that is given to them they die. Those who do not die are permanently damaged because as we know from many studies, a child that does not eat well during his first five years suffers mentally for the rest of his life.

We could say that of the total Guatemalan population, about 72% do not read or write. Among certain groups of people this gets much higher. 96% of the Indian women do not read or write and close to 85% of the men. Along with this ignorance, we have a horrible economic situation, a wage scale that is brutal and violent. About fifty cents a day is above average, yet nothing is cheap. Meat is forty cents a pound, eggs are fifty to sixty cents a dozen, a pound of beans is seventeen cents—almost the same as in the United States. A man cannot feed his family on fifty cents a day, especially since Latin Americans tend to have large families. And I have seen wages as low as five or twenty cents a day.

We have something that is like slave labor in Guatemala. Trucks go up into the mountains and whole families of Indians are loaded into the back and shipped down to the coast to pick cotton or coffee. They go pri-

marily because they are hungry. Frequently these trucks have accidents and the people are killed. Sometimes they are asphyxiated when the trucks are covered up with tarps and the fumes come up. They are treated worse than animals. If a horse on a ranch gets sick, a veterinarian is called immediately. If an Indian on a ranch gets sick, he receives no aid. When the Indians return to their homes in the highlands, some of them die, because they have picked up malaria while on the coast. Still, hunger drives them back again the next year. Many people are beginning to think that this is a violence that is worse than armed violence.

FRAPPIER: Why do you think conditions have remained like this? Supposedly Mendez was elected as a reform candidate.

BONPANE: The Army is the power in Guatemala, and the government is at its service. Now, unfortunately, the Army is also at the service of the oligarchy which represents the 2% of the people who own 80% of the land. The United States generally deals with Guatemala through this group. So we, the United States, are supporting the Army, the secret police, and are helping to maintain a basically feudal system with a touch of nineteenth century capitalism. This is unfortunate, but I do believe that once the American people understand this, they will ask our government, our representative government, to change its way of dealing with the Latin American nations.

FRAPPIER: Most of us have heard about the violence that has been occurring in Guatemala. Could you talk about the right wing terrorist groups, their activities and base of support.

BONPANE: The Mano Blanca is a right wing extremist Viet-Report

group. When we deal with these people directly as I have in the department of Zacapa, we find that each member of the Mano Blanca has a card from the army identifying him as commissioned by the army to work in this capacity. So the army not only tolerates, but encourages this group. Also, the Mano Blanca informs rich families that they must contribute a certain amount of tax money to help them in their great anti-Communist campaign. Even significant wealthy people who have refused to pay the Mano Blanca have had attempts on their lives.

FRAPPIER: Could you estimate the number of assassinations by the Mano Blanca and the guerrillas?

BONPANE: The *New York Times* estimated between 1,000 and 4,000 deaths in the past year. I think if we just take a sum total from the Guatemalan papers, we would get 3,000—perhaps double that if we consider all the killings not reported in the papers. If we study the sources of the deaths, we might say that 2,800 to 3,000 have been at the hands of the far right. The guerrilla forces have possibly taken 200 lives in the same year. For example, the beauty queen that was killed recently by the right wing. We knew when she was threatened. She got her letter saying she was going to be killed—on accusation as most people are killed there. No hearing, no judge, no jury. About a month afterward, she was accosted in the area of Esquintla, most probably raped, beaten and shot. It was feared that seven peasants had witnessed this atrocity, so they were shot down by the same murderous forces. This is not atypical. Students are the most vulnerable of all. Any student is a presumed guerrilla. They have been dragged from their houses at night, tortured and killed. This happened to our beloved poetess at the University, and to the finest poet at the University of Castillo whose works are read throughout Latin America.

FRAPPIER: Could you describe your work in Guatemala?

BONPANE: I was working with the Maryknoll Center for Social Training. Students from the national university would come together in groups of forty and spend eight days in sessions studying Capitalism, Socialism, and Communism, the Papal Encyclicals that were related to social justice and the sociological conditions of Guatemala. Later, they could spend weekends and vacations in various villages where they would speak to the Indians on subjects that seemed very bland: the common good, the dignity of man, community, how to organize a peasants' league. During their longer vacation, the students would engage in programs for literacy, health hygiene and what we call in Spanish *conciencia* (self awareness), helping the person to have the ability to think and act as a human being.

The students were well received by the Indians. They always went to the villages unarmed and only wanted to speak to those who were interested in hearing them. Frequently they would live in a one room Indian home with the rest of the family for the six week period.

FRAPPIER: Why did you leave Guatemala?

BONPANE: During the past six months there was a lot of tension over the work that we were doing. We had received threats from various right wing organizations and sometimes directly from wealthy families. Guatemala is a very static place and those who have the power do not welcome change. We were a threat to these people and trouble finally came.

A few weeks ago I was told that my students were about to begin an armed revolution in the department of Huehuetenango. There were ninety of them together

up there. It was simple for me to prove that they weren't going to begin an armed revolution. I just asked that military men and political leaders go up there and observe them. There was not even a slingshot in the area.

Then a small group including some other priests and sisters were accused of plotting an armed revolution. As a result of that, the priests and sisters were asked to leave the country. The students had to run for their lives. I noticed that some news reports say that the Melvilles and Sister Marion Peter were accused of aiding rebels financially and using money not for church purposes. I would have to differ with this by saying that they used money to help the students flee for their lives. Now when there is no due process of law, and an accusation has been made and the only way to avoid death is to flee the country, I think that is a very valid church purpose.

Aside from the threat from the right wing, the second in command of the Maryknoll Fathers in Guatemala informed me that my plane ticket was ready and that I should be on the plane Christmas Eve. So realizing that the superior in New York would not have the details on the immediate problem, I discussed the matter with my church, my community there, and they were of the opinion that it would be a good idea to accept this command in order to have a voice with the North American Church and people.

FRAPPIER: Could you describe the U.S. role in Guatemala in terms of your specific project. Are the AID programs really attempting to raise the standard of living in Guatemala, and if not, what are they doing?

BONPANE: Unfortunately, the largest amount of aid from the United States is in the form of military aid. This is seen in the new helicopters, in the carbines and rifles that are given to the national police, in the new police cars that are given to the secret police. Some AID projects have been quite constructive. It is nice that wells have been dug, sewers put in, in some cases. I recently asked for money to help develop a slum. After much paper work AID said that my group, which was a committee in one of the slums, could receive \$100 from AID as long as the slum produced \$50. I think that represents the type of aid that AID has given at the project level. If we could have put to work the salaries that were given to the AID employees in Guatemala or to the Embassy employees last year, we would have had a tremendous amount of capital.

FRAPPIER: Have there been any cases of the CIA becoming involved in the briefing of priests or trying to get information?

BONPANE: These government people are usually very fine people, likeable people who frequently came around asking what we were doing, whether there was any involvement with the far left. If we knew any of the guerrilla forces, what students thought of Che Guevara and so on. Yes, they were definitely looking for information and observing our activities closely for months.

FRAPPIER: Could you describe the relationship between the guerrillas and the peasants, especially before the fighting started, and some of the projects they have been working on.

BONPANE: The self definition of the guerrilla would be that he is a teacher. But he knows from long experience that it is impossible to teach what he wants to without defending himself, so he is armed. The guerrilla is not a tinpot revolutionary. We have hundreds of examples

BONPANE... (Continued on Page 36)



In the Cuban state farm dining hall. Credit: Shereff

The New Man and the New Order in Cuba

by MIKE GOLDFIELD

A VISIT to Cuba has an exhilarating, yet indescribable effect on many Americans. Upon returning, they find it difficult to communicate to their countrymen exactly what is going on there: it is not that they lack details, but that they fail to show how these details fit together. Even the *New York Times'* James Reston, normally a glib liberal apologist for the American corporate structure, grows contradictory as he tries to explain away and undercut some of his obviously positive reactions to Cuba (see Reston's series in the *Times* from his July 21–August 3, 1967, visit). Reston is impressed by everything from the new "status of the Cuban woman" to the incredible gains made in education, housing, health, and the economy. He is taken aback by the relaxed, yet politically charged atmosphere: the friendliness of the militiamen, the lack of hostility toward Americans; the sense of political purpose and the high-level political consciousness among ordinary people. New Leftists, when seeing these and other things, often wax into a dreamy inarticulateness upon returning, talking of a beautiful trip, happy peasants, delicious ice cream, and high revolutionary spirit, none of which does justice to Cuba, or to ourselves.

Perhaps the best way to begin to understand a society in its totality is to examine its ideology—the way the society comprehends itself. In its ideology one can see its view of the ideal man and the ideal society, and the projected pattern of development for reaching these goals. One must also examine the ways and the extent to which the economic structure and the socializing institutions embody this ideology.

By way of comparison, it is fruitful to look at the ideology of our own society—pluralism. The ideal

man in a pluralist society is one who has particular (selfish) material and status interests, is competitive and inventive in advancing those interests, and is tolerant of people with interests other than his own, as long as their satisfaction does not threaten the assumptions of the system. Pluralist man is forever ready to bargain and compromise his interests, since by doing so he may obtain other possibilities to advance them. Pluralist interests are peculiar in that they are quantifiable (thus making them amenable to bargaining). The pluralist society is one in which interest groups (composed of pluralist men with similar interests, e.g., doctors or businessmen or auto workers) battle in numerous arenas for secondary and lesser levels of power and influence, while the key levels of power—which determine what types of goods the society produces, what the mass media will be saying and who shall have access to it, what occupations and roles shall be available to people—are guided by the needs of American capitalism, and the institutions and men that manage it. Pluralists tend to argue that pluralist man and pluralist society are natural—pluralism is, thus, the only realistic view. Other views of man's potential and the good society, while nice in theory, create, when implemented, inhumane perversions and gross deprivations of human freedom. It is this ideology which throws light on why James Reston has troubles explaining how a non-pluralist system can be as open and as politicized as is Cuba.

Cuba makes no bones about what she is trying to do: she is trying to create a socialist economy and communist men, and ultimately, a completely communist society.

CUBAN MARXISM

CUBAN Marxism is highly pragmatic. More doctrinal independence has been asserted in Cuba than in any other communist country. Fidel Castro even

MIKE GOLDFIELD / Graduate student in history at the University of Chicago is a member of the Radical Education Project. He was in Cuba during January and February 1968.

Viet-Report

goes so far as to say that the dogmatic quality of thought in most communist countries is very un-Marxist:

Nothing could be more anti-Marxist than dogma; nothing could be more anti-Marxist than the petrification of ideas. And there are even ideas propounded in the name of Marxism which seem to be truly fossils (Speech at the Cultural Congress, 1/12/68).

Typical of his assertions that communist countries should not attempt to become dull reflections of the Soviet Union or China is the following:

Each country has specific conditions, each revolution develops within a specific country, under specific international circumstances which vary, in climates which in many cases are specifically different. And not only these objective factors, but also subjective factors are true: countries with different traditions, people with different idiosyncracies which teach the leaders of the revolution in each specific circumstance not to copy from anybody.... (Speech at the 6th Anniversary Celebration of the Cuban Revolution, 1/2/65).

The generally accepted theory of the new man and the new order in Cuba is presented in Che Guevara's essay, "El Socialismo y El Hombre en Cuba" (Man and Socialism in Cuba), a piece which seems to have walked right out of the pages of Marx's 1844 *Manuscripts* (published when Marx was barely 26). Che puts forth several propositions dealing with the new man and the new order:

1) Under capitalism men are forced to compete for jobs, advancement, status, and goods. The men who reach the highest positions, like a Rockefeller, get there at the expense of many others. The consciousness of all men (especially the way they regard their fellow men) is formed by their participation in this "race of wolves." Also, economic development under capitalism is based on profit, not on what human beings need.

2) To create a communist society, economic priorities must be reversed. Income must be redistributed, and economic development must take place according to human needs, not as a result of the interplay of the profit-maximizing forces in the market.

3) In the Soviet Union and many other communist countries, it is felt that the establishment of a planned, socialist economy and the subsequent economic development will bring into being communist men. In Cuba, it is felt that communist men are not created merely by the economic structure; they must also be created internally (by their own will), and by a long-term and difficult educational process. "To build communism, a new man must be created simultaneously with the material base." Statements such as this one, of course, drive orthodox Marxists wild.

4) The communist man is one who does not think in terms of self-interested desires, but sees his self-realization closely linked to the welfare of his fellows. In spite of his communal orientation—or rather, because of it—Che claims that a communist man will have more opportunities for self-realization, and, thus, more freedom than man could ever have in a capitalist society.

This theory does sound nice, but much of what has happened already in some socialist countries has not
April-May 1968

only made rhetoric cheap, but suspect. In examining how the Cubans carry out their theory, three considerations will be studied: the economy, socialization of the new man, and how the society deals with obsolescent groups.

CUBA'S SOCIALIST ECONOMY

THE prerequisite for socialist economic planning in Cuba was state control of the economy. State control of agricultural land was gained by the passage of two Agrarian Reform Laws, one in May, 1959, and the other in October, 1963. These laws limited the maximum size of large farms, gave ownership of some land to small farmers, and gave the state control of 70% of the land. Control of large industry was obtained in 1960: All U.S. investments were nationalized in August, in response to the refusal of U.S. oil companies to refine Russian crude oil; during October, the railroads, the department stores, and the remaining large industries were all nationalized.

Having control of the economy, the government pumped money into services, basic consumer goods, and economic development: hospitals, schools, housing, domestic food production (e.g., eggs, milk, vegetables, fruit, meat, chicken, and coffee), bus transportation, etc. Conscious decisions were made not to import cars or luxuries, and to eliminate the gambling and much of the night life around Havana. Some results are that Cuba has eliminated commercials, billboard ads, and gaudy gas station signs; Havana has little traffic (but a highly efficient bus system), the city is clean and has little smoke and smog.

From the very beginning, an attempt was made to redistribute income. One of the first things the *fidelistas* did upon their entry into Havana was to cut all rents in half and lower costs for utilities (particularly, phone calls). The basic policy now towards necessities is that they should be free or very low-priced. Among things free in Cuba are medical care (as one government official explained to me "everything from a scratch to a heart transplant"), nurseries for small children, books for students, water, funerals, beaches, local phone calls, and most sports. Good meals, eaten at one's school or work-place likewise are free. Scholarship students (of which there are now 400,000 out of a non-adult school population of 1,700,000) obtain free room, board, and clothing, in addition to their schooling. Further, there is a 10% of income ceiling on rents, and over a hundred thousand families pay no rent; in 1970, rent will be abolished for everyone. There is an elaborate social security system which provides a minimum of half one's salary at retirement or upon receiving any incapacitating injury or sickness whether or not it is related to one's work. Among the things eliminated last year in the attempt to cut down on bureaucracy were the tolls for the tunnel going under the bay in Havana and income tax.

Some necessities, of course, must still be paid for, but the way pricing works is strange to our capitalist-trained eyes. Rather than being regulated by the market, the prices for necessities are kept low; if the good is scarce, it is rationed, rather than allowed to rise in price and become a privilege for the rich (one of James Reston's complaints about Cuba was that

coffee—a necessity—runs out as easily at the best hotels as anyplace else). It is also significant that Cuba, unlike some other socialist countries, has not allowed scarce goods to become privileges of high-ranking party members or government officials. The only prices that are exorbitantly high in Cuba are those of luxury items, making it quite expensive for those who still have large amounts of money, to flaunt even a shadow of their old style. The Cubans claim that as their economy grows, more and more things will become free and eventually money will be abolished, since under communism, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

Not the least important advantage to a planned economy like Cuba's is that there is virtually full employment, and complete job security for those who work. (Before the Revolution, unemployment ranged from 16–25% depending upon whether it was the sugar harvest season or not.)

SOCIALIZATION OF THE NEW MAN VOLUNTARY WORK

ECONOMIC development for an underdeveloped country in the twentieth century is a very painful process. In both Russia and China, economic development has required the mobilization of the population for long hours of extra work. Though called voluntary, the method of mobilization was often highly coercive. The Cubans claim, however, that the development of communism and the elimination of money require more than a developed society. How the economy is developed is extremely important. The economy must be developed by—and while simultaneously developing—people who are willing to work hard for the social good, rather than for their own material gains, or because they are coerced. Voluntary work provides both the means to develop the economy and the new man:

Through work we will create human wealth; through your work we will create human awareness... we will bring up human beings devoid of selfishness, devoid of the defects of the past, human beings with a collective sense of effort, a collective sense of strength (Castro, 7/26/67).

Cuban Marxism is characterized by what would traditionally be called its idealist tendencies, since almost as much emphasis is placed upon how people are socialized as on the level of economic development.^[1]

Voluntary work is largely connected with agriculture. It consists, for many people, of leaving their normal jobs during the harvest times and working long hours in stints of anywhere from 30 days to several months. For other people, particularly those who cannot leave for such long periods (store workers, employees of periodicals, certain types of factory

workers, students during the school year, and some administrators) doing voluntary work entails spending regular several-day periods (often weekends, or Sundays) in the fields. The most intensive periods of voluntary work come during the height of the sugar *zafra* (harvest), and with somewhat less intensity when work is needed in coffee and in tobacco. Something similar to voluntary work is done by large numbers of factory and agricultural workers. Many of them throughout the country have voluntarily renounced all overtime pay, in addition to the voluntary work they may do in agriculture.

Since one of the key premises about the new man is that he must create himself (one cannot coerce someone into feeling communal), an attempt is made to persuade people (through speeches and the educational work of the party) that self-fulfillment comes by voluntarily working for the social good rather than merely for one's own material benefits. The whole structure of social recognition in the schools and the society at large emphasize these values; the close relation between the material conditions for communism and the use of voluntary work to change one's consciousness is continually stressed.

"What most characterizes the Revolution at the moment is work," said Castro at the 26th of July celebration last year, and his assessment is most likely correct. One can already see a large change in the way people look at work. Manual labor and hard work are now held in great esteem, whereas ten years ago they were not. Cutting cane, once thought to be the lowliest of jobs, seems to be done with an intense eagerness and desire for improving one's skill. Formerly, it was a mark of high status to live a comfortable life in Havana. Now young teachers, technicians, doctors, and lawyers have more desire to work in the rural areas because that is where the country needs them. The desire to do work where one is needed, to work hard, and to undertake the most difficult work is instilled in good part by example.

A similar pride attaches to election to party membership. While in Cuba, I talked to few people (not counting counter-revolutionaries) who did not think it would be a great honor to be chosen to be a member of the Communist Party, and who did not hold in high esteem those who were already in the party. Selection for the party is based upon a person's workplace (or school). He must be a hard worker, a member of the militia, and active in one or more of the mass-based civic or political organizations. One who fulfills these qualifications may then be selected by his co-workers to be a member of the party. The person must finally be approved by the sectional branch of the party. To stay in the party one must retain the enthusiastic support of his co-workers. Though being in the party was a great honor, members seemed mainly distinguished by their willingness to set an example in work, to take on the most difficult jobs, to work the longest hours, to work the hardest; members of the party were those willing to go where they were needed, and, there appear to be very few privileges, if any, associated with membership (no extra money, no car, no nicer house, etc.). In fact, the contrary is often the case; party members often voluntarily take lower salaries and live in more arduous circumstances than other people. A compelling example (one which even people neutral to the

(1) Socialization is a complex phenomenon and must minimally include the school system, the military, the family, local meetings and groups, mass organizations, and the cultural apparatus. I am examining voluntary work because it is probably most indicative of what is unique about Cuba's attempt to form communist men.



revolution seem to admire) is set by the leaders of the country: Fidel was in a lead tank and almost got killed at Playa Giron (the Bay of Pigs); he also supposedly narrowly missed being killed while manning a rescue boat during Hurricane Flora. Che was purported to have taken his Sunday rest by spending twelve hours cutting cane in a swampy place that was particularly bad for his asthma. Such examples go a long way toward making voluntary work different from self-sacrifice.

In many of the people with whom I talked, one could see the "communist mentality" developing. I asked one worker why he did voluntary work. He told me that before the Revolution profits from his work went to rich men—now they went to ordinary people like him. He asked me whether I had seen the schools to which all children could go for free, the new hospitals and housing. He told me that people are all equal, and did I not think it was better that a society should try to fulfill everyone's needs, not just some people's. He and other people emphasized that voluntary work was not for someone else because the whole society, the factories, and the profits belonged to everyone, including themselves. Though we skeptical Americans know better than to accept such rhetoric at face-value (men and society are just not like that!), when one stops to think and sees how much the lives of most ordinary people have changed, the logic of what these workers say is compelling. At the other end of the spectrum, I talked with a young economist from Juceplan (Central Planning Agency) who certainly could have been living a comfortable life in most any other country. He said, "I may be crazy for not wanting a car, a TV, and a nice house, and in fifty years I may end up changing my mind. But now we believe that a society that develops for everyone is the best way."

But, for Americans especially, the question of how *voluntary* is voluntary work, continues to linger. And not without reason. Other countries had their voluntary work, and the problems for those who did not volunteer are not particularly heart-warming. Cuba, however, seems to be different. Approximately 40% of the people are said to engage regularly in voluntary work, a figure much lower than that given in Russia. Given the high revolutionary fervor in Cuba, it would appear that coercion could raise that figure quite a lot. But the concern in Cuba *does* seem to be that

people should want to do it; there is a confidence that the percentage will rise eventually and that there is no need to resort to the type of figure falsification that the Russians always proved so good at.

I suspect that the social pressure in adolescent groups is often coercive (it is hard to imagine an adolescent group in which it would not be), particularly since many Cuban adolescents tend to be super-revolutionary. Also, in most cases where 95% of the people in a group or factory do voluntary work, it is hard to imagine things not being a little tight for the other 5%.

In one factory I visited I spoke to people who did not do voluntary work. One man who forcefully described himself to me as a non-socialist, looked perplexed when I asked him whether there were any problems for those who did not do voluntary work. "Why should there be?" he answered. When I went into great detail to explain, he interrupted me and said simply "That's silly." In effect, the heaviest social pressure appears to be felt by those people in high and intermediate-range government positions.

ARTISTIC FREEDOM

ANOTHER significant sphere where coercion is low and the ideology of voluntarism runs rampant is art and literature. Though I had heard of the intellectual openness in Cuba before I went there, one's skepticism is only finally buried by facts. Perusing through used bookstores, I found old copies of the *New Leader*, Samuelson's *Economics* in abundance, and even in one bookstore a large selection of books glorifying America, including such titles as *The Story of American Freedom*, *Building America*, and *Trading With Latin America* by the Irving National Bank. Since 1963, Cuba has published a wide range of



The booby prize, a flag with a turtle, Banao.

Credit: Shereff

literature including titles by such authors as Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Gogol, Chekov, Proust, Joyce, Hemingway, Faulkner, Scott Fitzgerald, Sinclair Lewis, John Steinbeck, Mark Twain, and a host of others, including the current Cuban best-seller *In Cold Blood* by Truman Capote. Works by Trotsky, Deutscher's *Stalin*, and Deutscher's biography of Trotsky are all about to be published. A wide range of foreign films are available in Havana (American ones are unavailable because of the U.S. embargo), and among the most popular have been Antonioni's *Red Desert*, and *Morgan* which just won a film award. By the time I saw Talcott Parsons and Amitai Etzioni in the University of Havana bookstore, I found myself arguing to Cuban intellectuals that such a large degree of bourgeois literature was not conducive to developing communist men—and, with a paper shortage in Cuba, couldn't they be more selective. In such arguments the most decadent examples of bourgeois culture that I could find were two things I had seen at Expo '67: a Cuban fashion show with the latest style mini-skirts, et al., and a grotesque Broadway-type musical to celebrate the 26th of July, the biggest national holiday, commemorating the first act of the Revolution.

Here is the argument I got in return: many of the older intellectuals in Cuba are not particularly revolutionary. A large number exiled themselves before the revolution (for reasons of cultural preference, rather than political reasons) to New York and other Western cities; some even abandoned the Spanish language. These people returned in force after the triumph of the Revolution; they not only produce bourgeois art now (like the musical), but poor imitations. Such art is not what we would like produced in Cuba. But there is another problem, potentially more dangerous, that of socialist realism. Revolutionary art cannot be mandated from above, it must be produced by revolutionaries who are free to create. Any state control would take away freedom, and stifle artistic creativity. We must encourage people to be exposed to all forms of art and culture, and hope that the young artists who are more revolutionary than the older ones will produce revolutionary art for Cuba.

OBSELETE GROUPS

THE humaneness which runs deeply through Cuba's revolution is most clearly seen in the way that they treat those classes and groups which are not seen to have a functional role in the development of the new society. The Agrarian Reform Law of May, 1959, gave over 100,000 peasants land in the form of private farms. Though small farmers are not considered irrelevant to the growth of the economy, they are seen as the most inefficient part of the agricultural plan. Besides their inability to use equipment that is suitable for large state farms, they do not utilize the soil for what it is best suited, but grow a variety of crops to suit the needs of the individual farmer. So what does the Revolution do? It clearly wants this land to eventually be part of the state farms or cooperative farms, but it is in no hurry. Farmers can keep their lands, and even hand them down to their sons. Meanwhile, they are considered allies in the task of agricultural development and given fertilizer, equipment, technical aid and credit. If a farmer wants

to sell his land to the state or receive a pension he can, but no one pesters him. Though he may make more money than a farm laborer, he still gets the free goods and services that other Cubans do. Eventually, children of farmers will want to go to school and be technicians, some farmers will not have children, and others may opt for the pension. Twenty years from now there will be less private farming, and in another 20 years still less, but no one seems particularly concerned.

The bourgeoisie who have remained in Cuba have also been treated in a benevolent fashion. They still have their houses (though they are forbidden to hire servants), their cars, and what they have not spent of their bank accounts. One can bump into former large landholders in any of the big hotels, where they can be seen living in style off of more than adequate pensions. Those who had jobs in big companies or were private doctors or lawyers often still have the same jobs and salaries they had before the Revolution. Eventually, they will disappear as a class, since there are no up-and-coming bourgeoisie to replace them. Cuba is not exactly the type of place that a wealthy, or even a moderately wealthy man would want to recommend to his friends these days, but for a country that is still in the midst of a socialist revolution, one cannot help feeling that they could not have been treated more royally.

For another example of this humaneness, one might turn to the elimination of organized prostitution. With the large number of tourists in Havana, many of them American businessmen, prostitution flourished. In 1961, a decision was made to end it. Squads of people from the Ministry of Interior (somewhat in the fashion of community organizers) went into the red light districts. They spoke to prostitutes and gave them this line: the Revolution was made to free people from oppression, and it was made for everyone. Before the Revolution it may have been economically necessary for one to be a prostitute, but now one need not be so degraded. If you want to give up being a prostitute, we will send you to school to be trained for a job; we will find you a job and a decent place to live. After a year's time many had accepted this offer; some even found husbands while retraining. The government set up day nurseries to take care of their children, while the former prostitutes were in school. Then, in 1962, the government closed all the brothels, though there is still no law against prostitution and free-lance prostitutes can occasionally be seen.

DEALING WITH PROBLEMS

EXAMINING the ideology of a society, and the way that society implements its ideology by necessity gives one a rather simplified view of how that society operates; many of its complexities, both positive and negative, are omitted. To gain a little perspective on the overview I have presented so far, it is helpful to look at some of the problems besetting Cuba and to check how she deals with them. One set of problems arose during the 1962 period and is self-described by many highly-placed Cubans as their Stalinist era; the second set of problems to be discussed must be faced in the next several years.

Viet-Report



In the fall of 1961, Cuba began to take what appeared to be an authoritarian turn. At that time open-slate elections in the unions were abolished in favor of single-slate elections; rather than being nominated from the floor, union officials were now nominated on a single-slate chosen by the party, then given rubber stamp approval by the workers. Union meetings became smaller and less important; the unions and the industries became dominated by a section of the party bureaucracy. As a result of Playa Giron and the high-level of counter-revolutionary activity, many political prisoners were taken in late 1961 and in 1962—a good number of them for seemingly minor crimes. Homosexuals were also treated harshly during this period; they were rounded up and taken to camps to be rehabilitated. Some well-placed persons were advancing the notion that homosexuality was a “bourgeois hang-up” that need only exist under capitalism. And finally, the publishing policy tightened up in 1962; most of the books published were Soviet and those that were not echoed the Soviet line.

The general causes of these policies are easy to find. This was the period when Cuba had just moved close to the Soviet Union, was dependent on her economically, and had still not developed an independent course. There were also many Stalinists of pre-revolutionary vintage left in the newly consolidated Communist Party. Finally, Playa Giron and the continued threat from the United States created a (not particularly unjustified) paranoia against counter-revolutionaries. Each of these problems was met in

different ways. The publishing policy changed the next year, largely from criticism by intellectuals and as a result of a critique of Soviet Marxism developed at the University of Havana. The policy toward homosexuals was also changed by the next year; the experiment had failed and people with better sense asserted themselves. The arrest of the large number of political prisoners has only been half-solved. Many have been released and even given education, job retraining, and aid in resettlement with their families, but many more still remain in prisons or rehabilitation camps (not too much is known about these prisoners; one of the few sources of information is Lee Lockwood's *Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel*).

The situation in the unions was finally changed in 1965. The change seems to be due to the labor unrest during 1962 and 1963, and pressures exerted by local unions; an additional factor was the removal of a number of old communists from places where they could influence the unions. Since the return of the unions to the open-slate system, a number of other changes have taken place that give people more control of local decision-making. The CDR's (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), originally set up in 1961 as local surveillance units to spot counter-revolutionary activities, have gradually changed their functions. Now they are similar to local block clubs, expressing the concerns of their members and performing neighborhood services (e.g., administering vaccination campaigns, running education and literacy classes, cleaning the neighborhood). Representatives chosen by the CDR's also make up the majority of members for the councils of the local community governments which have been set up all over the island in the last year.

Cuba seems to have developed a set of institutions on the local level (both in the workplace and in the community) which are responsive to and at least partially controlled by the persons they effect. It appears that procedures for expressing grievances are well-functioning. But, with respect to larger issues (particularly those connected with economic planning and international relations), there are no structured relations between the leaders of the people. There is a kind of Rousseauian democracy. Even as early as 1964, Che expressed concern about the need for more formal relations between the leaders and the people. Currently, the ultimate power for making broad policy decisions rests with the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a body of around 100 men and women. Possibly, as few as six or seven people hold the real power. Much of the influence that ordinary people have over the direction of the government in these areas is based on the responsiveness, the style and the openness to criticism shown by Cuba's leaders. The problems inherent in such a situation seem to be of concern to the leaders of the country. Fidel has mentioned them a number of times in his recent speeches; he even says that the problem of institutionalizing the Revolution, giving more structure to the relation between the leaders and the masses, will be partially solved at the First Party Congress coming up in the next seven or eight months. Whether this change will take the form of local workers councils, a new variety of representative democracy, or some uniquely Cuban institution which has little historical precedent remains to be seen.

Campus Counterinsurgency

Focus: Latin America

by CAROL BRIGHTMAN and MICHAEL KLARE

What happens to a one-time Banana Boat Republic when it becomes the honored guinea pig of an American university-sponsored inquiry into the "Social Factors Relevant to Military Civic Action Doctrine?"

In this case the nation is Colombia; the sponsor, the U.S. Army Research Office; the contractor, American University; the academic problem: "to determine whether military civic action is an efficient method by which favorable changes in the attitude of civilians toward their government can be produced."

Projects such as this are preoccupying a growing army of American professors who took in more than \$38 million in 1967 for foreign area social and behavioral research for the Pentagon, the State Department and the Agency for International Development. Their impact on a country like Colombia is profound. While in the old days Spanish oligarchies and their North American benefactors might rain cannon down on rebellious peasants who strayed into trouble, under the Alliance for Progress reform-minded dictators may today choose to respond from a wide spectrum of coercive techniques—ranging from rural agitprop to U.S. Special Forces. In Venezuela, for example, a commander might study the American University's Army-sponsored dissertation on the "Nonmilitary Effects of Physical Force by Counterinsurgency Military Units in Phase 1 Low Intensity Warfare." Or he may avail himself of the leadership training codes perfected by Professor Morris Janowitz for the Army at the University of Chicago.

As the scope of U.S.-guided military action has expanded in Latin America so has the participation of American social scientists. Basically, their role is to provide the military with the social intelligence it requires for population control. As a recent Pentagon-sponsored study group appointed by the National Academy of Sciences concluded: "Pacification, assistance and the battle of ideas are major segments of the DoD responsibility. The social and behavioral sciences constitute the unique resource for support of these new requirements and must be vigorously pursued if our operations are to be effective . . . [In addition to DoD-sponsored research] strenuous efforts are necessary to insure that the Department of Defense is not excluded from the innovating influence on policy planning and strategy that exist in the universities. . . ." (*Science*, 12/17/67).

The cutting-edge of the Pentagon's counterinsurgency program is Project Agile, the creation of the inter-Service Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Agile was established by the Kennedy Administration to consolidate U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, it has been extended to the remainder of the Third World and to American ghettos. Its task is to strengthen and support the military and paramilitary forces of the pro-U.S. regimes. Agile-sponsored research is of both the "hardware" and "software" varieties: the former involves the development of equipment and weapons for warfare in inaccessible or unusual terrain; the latter includes social science

research aimed at managing peasant discontent. At this stage of U.S. intervention in Latin America, most university research on Latin countries falls into the software department.

Project Agile studies are now underway in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The Honduras and Peru projects are by far the most dangerous. Officially known as COIN-HONDURAS and COIN-PERU (COIN=counterinsurgency), the projects are both being conducted by the Stanford Research Institute. Stanford's task is to determine under what circumstances U.S. military forces should intervene in Peru (or Honduras) in the event that native armed forces were inadequate to defeat an insurgency.

Similar studies on other Latin American countries are underway at the Research Corporation of Arlington, Va., and the Defense Research Corporation of Santa Barbara, Calif. These autonomous research institutions draw heavily on the university faculties for their scientific personnel.

Project Agile, which operates on an annual budget of some \$30 million, is administered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Each of the Armed Services, however, have their own counterinsurgency programs, administered by their respective research organizations: the Army Research Office (ARO), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR).

The Army's principal outlet for counterinsurgency research is the Center for Research on Social Systems (CRESS) of the American University in Washington, D.C. CRESS is comprised of two divisions: the Counterinsurgency Information Analysis Center (CINFAC), and the Social Science Research Institute (SSRI). CRESS itself is the successor to an earlier American University institute, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO). SORO was reorganized as CRESS in 1966 as a result of the scandal which followed exposure of Project Camelot, a SORO study on the "sociology of revolutions" in underdeveloped areas. CINFAC was also originally established as part of SORO and continues to function under CRESS with the same personnel. The function of CINFAC according to the Pentagon is to "provide a rapid-response capability system which can effectively store and retrieve raw data as well as completed studies in counterinsurgency."


Current CINFAC projects span the entire spectrum of counterinsurgency activity. At the lowest levels of U.S. involvement are studies of military civic action, psychological operations and social management. At the other end of the spectrum are projects intended to assist the U.S. military in actual or contemplated operations.

Although most of CRESS's work is in the form of prime military contracts for research, CRESS also monitors subcontracts at other universities. A major CRESS project, entitled "The Changing Roles of the Military in the Contemporary World," incorporates the work of so-

cial scientists at the universities of Florida and Chicago. Under the University of Florida's subcontract, Professor Lyle McAlister has prepared a series of case studies on the political, social and economic roles of military elites in Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Mexico. At the same time a group of sociologists working under Morris Janowitz at the University of Chicago are preparing a series of "Studies in Military Sociology" for the U.S. Army Research Office.

AFOSR maintains its own program of research on the role of military elites in underdeveloped areas. Most of this research, administered by the AFOSR Behavioral Sciences Division, is funnelled through the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. Several prominent sociologists, notably Seymour Martin Lipset and David E. Apter, are participating in this program. In 1966 Lipset received a \$75,000 Air Force grant for research on "Military Planning and Some Implications for National Development." Objectives of the project (which is classified "limited use only") include research on military elites, a study of student unrest in Latin America, and an evaluation of the survey techniques used in sociological projects of interest to the U.S. military. Lipset's colleague at Berkeley, David Apter, holds an AFOSR grant for research on the "Politics of Modernization in Latin America" which evaluates the role of military elites in speeding the modernization of underdeveloped countries.

Many of these projects look harmless enough. The trouble is that "national development" and "modernization" are not scientifically neutral processes. In the hands of "military elites" who more often than not represent the forces of reaction and terror throughout Latin America, these processes have become downright hostile to rural interests. Yet the Pentagon doesn't pay American professors to teach Latin peasants how to get the government to serve them. Indeed, the very idea would probably strike these scientists as "biased."



CLAUDIUS IN JORNAL DO BRASIL (RIO DE JANEIRO)

Insurgent's Guide

TO THE CARE AND FEEDING OF U.S. CAPITAL IN LATIN AMERICA

Introductory Note

WHEN Charles Englehard came to receive the 1966 Brotherhood Award of the New Jersey Chapter of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, he hardly expected Black Power and SDS demonstrators to attend the annual dinner. But a search through WHO'S WHO, STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRIAL RECORDS, and back issues of business magazines had revealed to these groups all the sordid details that the banquet program surely would not cover. So they came to protest his controlling interests in South African gold, diamonds, and uranium—and his diligent public relations work for the South African regime.

The big revelation about the CIA's funding of liberal groups through foundation fronts could have made headlines in 1964 instead of waiting till last year—had New Left researchers been more diligent. Congressman Wright Patman, while investigating foundation tax evasion activities, named some of the CIA conduit groups. A check through the public tax forms of all foundations would have shown which ones were receiving covert money and to whom the funds were going.

There is nothing mysterious about gathering information about the power structure and its activities, and there are numerous ways in which this information can be used. For example, when the Chase Manhattan's investment in South Africa became known, conscientious Church and civic groups withdrew millions of dollars from the bank. Connections of local business and banks to international corporations and their foreign intrigues can be easily in-

vestigated, their activities explained and selective boycott practiced. At the very least, the facade of respectability surrounding local magnates can be removed through a carefully planned publicity campaign.

The following guide, "Sources on the Power Structure," also can be used together with the VIET-REPORT issue THE UNIVERSITY AT WAR (January 1968) to uncover not only the secret research conducted on campus grounds, but the financial interests of the trustees and boards of directors as well, thus obtaining a complete picture of how the university fits into the governing structure of the United States. Boycotts of classes of professors involved in warfare work, picketing their homes, or protesting the visits of the trustees, again with carefully written publicity, will bring home to unaware students and professors the connection between college and state. It will also force professors who have slid into counterinsurgency work to make a moral decision. At least, it could force them to balance the advantages of increased income and participation in policymaking against implicit involvement in U.S. repression and exploitation abroad.

While preparing for the demonstration against Dean Rusk's appearance at the dinner of the Foreign Policy Association in New York last fall, SDS researchers outlined that group's profound connection with the State Department and business interests. How many people read the Association's magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS

without understanding its function as a platform for these special points of view? It pays to look up the background of authors of books and articles on public policy.

Relying on second-hand textbook sources and the type of interpretive articles found in liberal magazines is the least effective way of informing oneself on world events. It is necessary to sift through the tons of propaganda found on library shelves and taught in foreign affairs

courses till one arrives at the original sources, which are often readily available. The following guide if taken critically (see Alex Georgiadis and Karen Spalding's piece) can be used as a skeleton for research in student papers, study groups, and for working out countercurriculum in high school and college courses.

Most important, it can provide the kind of "intelligence" which transforms scholarship from spectator sport into political activism.

by LOIS REIVICH and EDIE BLACK

I. GENERAL REFERENCE SOURCES

A. INDEXES:

Funk and Scott Index: covers business publications.

Public Affairs Information Service: covers most popular magazines, trade journals and books.

New York Times Index.

B. BUSINESS LIBRARIES (in large universities) and other SPECIALIZED LIBRARIES: Specialized Libraries Association has chapters around the country which issue directories to the libraries in their area. Examples are:

Petroleum Library (New York).

World Bank/IMF Library (Washington, D.C.).

Inter-American Defense College Library (Washington, D.C.).

C. NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL MORGUES: Such morgues store files and clippings on all subjects. Access to these is generally available only to those employed there. Examples are:

Time-Life Morgue

New York Times Morgue

Local newspaper morgues

D. SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.: Issues a monthly catalogue for \$4.00 and a free biweekly leaflet called *Selected Government Publications*. The yearly catalogue is available in most libraries.

Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, Springfield, Va.: Issues a quarterly catalogue available for \$6.00 a year.

II. "KNOW YOUR ENEMY" SEARCHES

A. WHO'S WHO: Gives short biographical sketches. Examples are:

Who's Who in America

Who's Who in Commerce and Industry

State Department Biographical Register: Short sketches of persons in the State Department, AID, and related agencies (free from State Department).

Congressional Directory 90th Congress: Biographical sketches of Congress and listing of agency personnel.

Poor's Directory of Corporation Executives: Lists officers and members of boards of directors of business corporations. Cross indexed by company and individual.

B. LIBRARY CARD CATALOGUES: Look for biographies, autobiographies, books person has written.

C. BOOKS WHICH EXPOSE POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Perlo, Victor. *Empire of High Finance*. International Publishers; 1956 and 1967

Domhoff, William. *Who Rules America*. Prentice Hall, 1967 (paperback)

LOIS REIVICH / Member of the North American Congress on Latin America.

EDIE BLACK / Former editor of *Christianity and Revolution*, and a member of the North American Congress on Latin America is a graduate student at the Union Theological Seminary.

Smoot, Dan. *The Invisible Government*. Americanist Library, 1962 (paperback): A right wing study of interlocking directorates between the State Department and non-profit organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Committee for Economic Development etc.

Wise, David and Rose, Thomas B. *The Invisible Government*. Random House, 1963

Wise, David and Rose, Thomas B. *The Espionage Establishment*. Random House, 1967

Fleming, D. F. *The Origins of the Cold War*. Doubleday.

Baltzell, E. Digby, *An American Business Aristocracy*. The Free Press of Glencoe (paperback)

III. COMPANY SEARCHES

A. INVESTMENT GUIDES: Contain company histories, list subsidiaries, and partially owned companies and where they are located, boards of directors (members), officers, and financial information. They can also be used for researching local power structure.

Standard and Poor's Corporation Records

Moody's Government and Municipal Bonds (and other manuals)

B. SECURITY AND EXCHANGE LIBRARY in Washington and its local branches contain files on companies registered on the New York Stock Exchange. (N.Y., Chicago, San Francisco have complete libraries; Atlanta, Boston, Denver, Fort Worth and Seattle Regional Offices have libraries with reports only on companies in their regions.) Files include annual reports, proxy statements (which give the stock ownership of the members of the board of directors and any other individuals owning over 10% of the stock), bond prospectuses (which give information on each bond flotation including the purposes for which the bond was floated and the investment companies which underwrite it).

C. STUDIES ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES: Show that interest groups control the major corporations in America, contrary to the prevailing thesis which holds that the corporations are subject to inside "management control" (see Adolf A. Berle, Jr. *Power Without Property*, a Harvest Book, 1959).

Interlocks in Corporate Management: Staff Report to the Antitrust Subcommittee on the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, March 12, 1965, U.S. Government Printing Office.

Patman Hearings on Interlocking Directorships of Banks: Available from the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Kefauver Hearings on Economic Concentration: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary, Senate, Parts 1-5a, 1964-1966, Washington, D.C.

Monopoly Power in America, Estes Kefauver, Penguin, 1965.

IV. NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

A. FOUNDATIONS:

The Foundation Library Center, New York City, contains:

1. Internal Revenue Service 990a's, forms which foundations must file in compliance with law (lists organizations to which the foundation has contributed).
2. Annual Reports: Include securities held, reference works, biographies of philanthropists and histories of foundations. These may also be found in regular libraries.
3. Card files of foundation grants under categories such as religion, science, etc.

Foundation Directory, 1967: Cross indexed by foundation and members of boards of directors, organized state by state.

American Foundation News Service: Issued periodically by the American Foundations Information Service, 527 Madison Avenue, New York City, contains news releases on foundation grants.

Patman Hearings on Foundations: Available from the Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

B. ASSOCIATIONS: Write for catalogue, book lists, and public relations material. There are three general categories:

1. Opinion making organizations, examples are:

Council on Foreign Relations
Committee for Economic Development
National Planning Association

2. Trade Organizations, examples are:

American Manufacturers Association
Investment Bankers of America

3. Research Institutes and Think Tanks, examples are:

Brookings Institute
Rand Corporation
Hudson Institute
Battelle Memorial Institute

C. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE: 280 Park Avenue So., New York City: Publishes several directories, among them *U.S. Non-Profit Organizations in Technical Assistance Abroad*.

V. INTERVIEWS

A. INTERVIEWS are generally a very good source of information. They should be done after initial research, when you know what questions to ask and to whom you wish to talk. Organization officials are more useful than public relations men; most people are happy to talk about their work.

B. U.S. Government Organization Manual 1966-67: Describes the activities of different government agencies and lists agency personnel. Available through the Government Printing Office for \$2.00.

C. TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES of the following agencies are available through the Government Printing Office: Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Dept. of the Interior, Dept. of Agriculture, U.S. Senate, Goddard Space Flight Center.

D. Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the U.S. on the Administration of the Foreign Registration Act of 1938 as amended for the year 1966: Lists the lobbyists and public relations agencies hired by foreign governments to promote their interests in the U.S.; yearly.

SOURCES FOR LATIN AMERICA

VI. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES FOR LATIN AMERICA

Latin America in Periodical Literature: monthly annotated bibliography of articles from 240 academic journals in U.S. and abroad, business sources and popular magazines. Indexed by topic; Center of Latin American Studies, University of California (Los Angeles).

Latin American Research Review: triannual annotated bibliography of academic articles and new books; University of Texas.

Libros en Venta—An Integrated Bibliography of Books Currently in Print in Spanish America: indexed by author, title and subject; Daniel Melcher; R. R. Bowker, 1966.

Latin America: annotated bibliography of paperback books. Georgetown M. Dorn; Hispanic Foundation—bibliographical series #11; U.S. Government Printing Office, \$.35.

VII. PERIODICALS ON LATIN AMERICA

Several categories of periodicals, journals and reports have information of importance for getting a full picture of U.S. influence in Latin America.

A. GENERAL PERIODICALS

Hispanic American Report: monthly analysis of events in the different Latin American nations; economic, political and social aspects covered. Stanford University, California, Hispanic American Society. Volumes 1-7, 1948-1964/discontinued.

Times of the Americas: four page weekly survey of the news. P.O. Box 1173; Coral Gables, Florida.

The Vision Letter: a biweekly analysis of Latin American affairs comparable to Newsweek in Spanish; and

Latin America: annual review of Latin American business and development; Vision Incorporated; 635 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Latin American Report Newsletter: a monthly analysis of current events in Latin America with an emphasis on politics and business; and

Latin American Report Magazine: bimonthly with longer articles on social and economic conditions and developments. Both for \$15.00; International Trade Mart; Box 2567, New Orleans 70016.

B. BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Noticias: weekly digest of hemispheric reports; country by country rundown of investment, political, economic and social conditions; developments in commodity markets and trade. National Foreign Trade Council; 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10020.

Business Latin America: investment operations of U.S. companies in Latin America; and

Business International Publications: studies geared to use by American companies abroad; examples are:

The New Brazil: Prospect for Stability and Profits, 1965: deals with establishing operations, official controls and factors affecting production in Brazil; and

Latin America's Emerging Market—1964: provides concrete examples of how U.S. and other foreign companies have been able to use this market; Business International Corporation; 757 Third Avenue; New York, New York 10017.

Emerging Nations Business Reports: biweekly publication specializing in reporting development financing and its effect on private business. 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, \$125/year.

Quarterly Economic Reviews: 58 economic reviews by country, \$28.00 each. The Economist Intelligence Unit (The Economist Magazine), 27 St. James Place, London S.W. 1, England.

Panorama Economica Latinoamericana: weekly publication; analysis of economic and social conditions (by country), world finance, development financing, important U.S. companies from an "anti-imperialist" perspective. Also includes analysis of Cuban economic development. Prensa Latina (Cuban news service), Vedado, Havana, Cuba.

Directory of Foreign Firms Operating in Foreign Countries: world trade. Academy Press, New York, N.Y. 1960.

C. ACADEMIC JOURNALS

The Latin Americanist: Center for Latin American Studies; 450 Main Library; University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. Monthly.

Caribbean Monthly Bulletin: Institute of Caribbean Studies; University of Puerto Rico; Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.

D. THINK TANKS AND UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CENTERS

Write for book lists of groups mentioned in first section; examples are:

Stanford Research Institute, Stanford University

American University, Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office: prepares country handbooks for the Department of the Army on the underdeveloped world. These studies furnish comprehensive and concrete facts about all aspects of life in a particular country. On Latin America:

Colombia, 1961; Ecuador, 1966; Venezuela, 1964; Brazil, 1964; Dominican Republic, 1966. Available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

University of Florida, Center for Latin American Studies: produces a series of Latin American monographs on important issues.

National Planning Association: according to its purpose undertakes research to "join in programs to maintain and strengthen private initiative and enterprise." A sample publication is:

The Development of Latin American Private Enterprise. Frank Brandenburg, May 1964; includes tables which list in order of size the top 50 corporations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela.

VIII. BOOKS BY KEY PEOPLE INVOLVED IN U.S. INVESTMENT ABROAD AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

- A. WALT ROSTOW: An economist with an intelligence background; OSS during World War II, MIT Center for International Studies (CIA-supported institution) 1950-1960; special assistant for national security affairs to the last two presidents; an architect of our Vietnam policy.

The Stages of Economic Growth—a Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge University Press, 1964.

- B. ADOLF A. BERLE: Corporate lawyer, law lecturer; has held many significant government posts, relating to Latin American policy; had large interests in Cuban sugar.

Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality. Harper and Row, 1962.

- C. MAX MILLIKAN: An economist with government intelligence experience; has been director of the Center for International Studies at MIT since 1950 except for one year as assistant director of the CIA from 1951-1952.

The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and U.S. Policy. Boston, Little Brown, 1961.

IX. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- A. RESOURCE SURVEY FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: a record of U.S. public and private programs in Latin America; includes more than 1200 educational, religious, business and private organizations with descriptions of their undertakings. Published by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Dept. of State; available from Government Printing Office. 640 pp., \$3.50.

- B. SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate: puts out various publications, for example:

Survey of the Alliance for Progress, Problems of Agriculture, December 22, 1967.

- C. SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the U.S.: also puts out hearings on Latin America. Examples are:

Economic Developments in South America, 1962.

Latin American Development and Western Hemisphere Trade, 1965.

D. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORTS: example is:

Strauss Report: Expanding Private Investment for Free World Economic Growth.

- E. *Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968:* excellent source on foreign policy and defense priorities. Reads like Marat/de Sarle.

- F. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PUBLICATIONS "in business to aid business."

International Commerce: weekly magazine listing trade opportunities and economic reports by country and area.

Overseas Business Reports: approximately 100 reports published yearly. Country reports deal with general economy, investment laws and policy, foreign trade regulations, market factors and trade with the U.S.

Proposals to Improve the Flow of U.S. Private Investment to Latin America, 1963.

X. OTHER AGENCY PUBLICATIONS

- A. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: publishes information on technical cooperation projects, laws, land reform, economic surveys. Write for Bibliography of O.A.S. publications, Pan American Union, 1965. Due to the nature of the organization, its publications are slanted in favor of the existing system in Latin America, but useful information can be found.

- B. UNITED NATIONS: The Economic and Social Council uses 85% of the regular U.N. budget. Its four regional economic commissions cover the major geographical areas: Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Far East, and Africa and submit annual reports to the parent body.

1. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) reports:

Economic Survey of Latin America: yearly.

Economic Bulletin for Latin America: twice a year: contains theoretical discussions of economic planning, development problems, education, human resources, economic integration, etc.

The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period, 1964, E/CN .12/654 Rev. 1.

Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America. E/CN .12/680 Rev. 1: gives the analysis of Raul Prebisch (former head of ECLA) of structural reforms necessary for development in Latin America.

Private Foreign Investment in the Latin American Free Trade Area, 1961 E/CN .12/550.

2. U.N. Yearly Catalogue, an annotated bibliography of all studies published by the various U.N. agencies.

A Peek Under the Statistical Rug

by ALEX GEORGIADIS and KAREN SPALDING

This brief article will examine some prevailing facts, figures, and statistics about Latin America. Our purpose is twofold: to identify some of the pitfalls of statistics by analyzing commonly used statistical indices, and to present an accurate picture of economic conditions in Latin America.

KAREN SPALDING / Assistant professor of history at Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey.

ALEX GEORGIADIS / Visiting lecturer in history at Brooklyn College, on leave from the Dominican College, San Rafael, California.

Statistics represent a compact way of attempting to convey information. Each statistical item amalgamates many specific pieces of data. Many statistics also represent the distillation of information provided by still other statistics. The result is that the figures one sees are many times removed from the economic reality which gave them birth, and they present as homogeneous and monolithic something which is quite diverse and complex. In many cases they reflect a reality completely at odds with the economic conditions they subsume. In order to show this, we have chosen to dissect the highly popular GNP, or Gross National Product.

Viet-Report

WHAT IS "GNP"?

GNP, and per capita GNP, which will be defined below, are particularly important because they are generally considered as reliable guides to a region's growth and capacity for growth, as indeed they are for industrialized countries like the United States. They are not so reliable for Latin America, as we shall see. Much is made of the fact that the GNP of Latin America as a whole has been increasing at a substantially higher rate than that of the United States, ranging from about 2% during 1962/63 to over 6% during 1964/65, and averaging about 4.8% annually over the last fifteen years. Furthermore, even with the high rate of population increase in Latin America, the highest in the world, per capita GNP has continued to grow at a rate of about 1.7% a year for the last ten years. But the economic structure of the Latin American countries is vastly different from that of the United States, so that the significance of these figures is also different from what might be expected in an industrialized country.

Let us see why this is so. In simplest terms, a Gross National Product is defined as the money value of the totality of goods and services produced during the period of a year. Per capita GNP, of course, is derived by dividing GNP by the population for the period in question. Far from a simple statistic, GNP summarizes many different economic activities in three major economic sectors, among them agriculture. One of the truly remarkable things about an industrialized society like the United States is that about 4% of the population, or slightly more than 5% of the labor forces, produces the food for the remaining 96%. In Latin America, which is only slightly industrialized, and largely agricultural, the picture is quite different. Although there are considerable differences from country to country, for the region as a whole about one-half of the economically active population makes its living from agriculture.

The contribution of agriculture to the formation of GNP also varies considerably from country to country, ranging from less than 8% for Venezuela, whose GNP is based largely on the production of oil, to about 50% for Honduras. But for Latin America as a whole, it tends to be slightly above 20% of the GNP. Furthermore, agricultural production has been growing: 4.7% in 1960/61, 4.2% in 1961/62, 1.7% in 1962/63, 4.1% in 1963/64, and 9.5% in 1964/65. If one makes allowance for Brazil, whose gross agricultural product amounts to about 40% of all of Latin America, and which had an unusually bountiful coffee crop in 1964/65, the agricultural production of Latin America increased by 3.7% that year. Nevertheless, despite this picture of growth, Latin America is having trouble feeding itself. Why?

"GROWTH" AND STARVATION

The answer is simple: the principle products of the agricultural sector have been not foodstuffs, but agricultural materials for export. Latin America provides 15% of the world's cotton, 62% of its bananas, 71% of the world's coffee, 23.5% of its cocoa, 14% of its wool, 76.5% of its linseed oil, and almost exactly one-half of the world's sugar. The entire economy of many Latin American countries is based on such

products. And, as in 1964/65, production of these crops show increases larger than those registered for overall production, while production of food crops tends to fall far below the general indices. The matter can in fact be put more strongly without exaggeration. Despite the fact that Latin America's population has been increasing at a fairly steady rate of 2.9% a year, per capita food production had fallen to 7% below pre-World War II figures by 1963/64, a year which added nearly six and a half million new mouths to feed. At the same time food-producing lands were being converted to agricultural export crops. In Peru, for example, cotton cultivation is expanding at the expense of food crops—this at a time when the average food intake of Peruvians provides about 35% fewer calories than the minimal caloric intake recommended by the United Nations.

Latin America is not only one of the world's great sources of the above agricultural products, but also of petroleum and of certain minerals without which industry is impossible. One of the things which contributed to the emergence of the United States as a great industrial power was the presence of such essential raw materials in great quantities. Latin America, too, is endowed with large reserves of these minerals. But here the similarity ends. Instead of being kept in Latin America and utilized to create an industrial and diversified economy, they are exported to countries like the United States, which is beginning to exhaust its own reserves. For example, Latin America provides 34% of the world's copper, 44.5% of its lead, 14% of its tin, 40.5% of its zinc, and 16% of the world's petroleum. These exports inflate Latin America's GNP, while at the same time diminishing its potential for real growth.

At this juncture, several things should be noted. First, the economy of the Latin American countries is heavily dependent on exports. Second, only a handful of agricultural and extractive products account for the overwhelming bulk of the exports of each country. To take a few examples from 1964, meat, hides, wool, and cereals accounted for 74% of Argentina's exports that year; coffee for 53% of Brazil's exports; coffee and petroleum for 80% of those of Colombia; for Chile, copper and other minerals made up 85% of her exports; petroleum, by itself, accounted for 93% of Venezuela's exports. Third, these goods were sold to a comparatively small group of countries, of which the United States and West Germany are the most prominent. At the same time, Latin Americans purchased most of their imports from the same limited group. Also, with the exception of Paraguay, which sells 23% of its exports to Argentina and purchases 28% of its imports from the same country, intra-Latin American trade is insignificant or non-existent.

This leads one to conclude that in certain respects the Latin American economy has changed little, if at all, over the centuries. Now, as during its colonial period, it is primarily a supplier of agricultural products and raw materials and an importer of finished products and consumer goods. The specific items of trade may have changed; the general pattern has not. Furthermore, now, as during its colonial period, the intra-regional trade of Latin America is limited, while its external trade is largely confined to a few major customers and suppliers: the United

States, West Germany, and to a lesser extent, France, England, the Netherlands, Italy, and Japan.

However, the current picture is not so simple. Not only is the economy of Latin America operated in a colonial fashion, pulling out raw materials and pumping in finished products, but today a significant part of that economy is directly owned or controlled by foreign companies which operate what have been called enclave economies. These enclaves, representing in reality overseas extensions of a foreign economy, are of course primarily responsive to the corporate policies and goals of their parent companies. By the end of 1967, direct investment by United States corporations in Latin America had reached 11.7 billion dollars. One may be sure that in directing this investment, the first concern of these corporations is the interests of their stockholders at home rather than the needs of Latin Americans.

Properly speaking, these enclaves are not part of the Latin American economy, and their operations should, for the most part, be reflected in the statistics of the parent country or in the profit statements of the parent corporation. The distortion which is caused by not doing this is enormous, and Latin American growth, where it exists, is made to appear much greater than it really is. Actually, the profits of the enclave economies might be better considered as measures of Latin American *loss*, rather than gain. For example, in 1957, direct U.S. investment accounted for about eight billion dollars of gross production in Latin America. This was registered as a gain of eight billion in GNP even though the same enterprises shipped nearly three billion dollars worth of goods out of Latin America—about one-half of all the region's exports for that year, and nearly 80% of Latin America's exports to the United States.

Again in 1957, the extraction of petroleum, a sector of the economy which is almost entirely foreign owned accounted for 34% of Venezuela's GNP. And this is without attempting to calculate the proportion of the construction, transportation, and other sectors of the economy which function as part of the petroleum complex. Yet for all the wealth which they pump out of Latin America, foreign enclaves produce little in the way of jobs. In 1957, foreign companies employed less than one million persons in Latin America, or less than 2% of the economically active population. In Venezuela, the oil companies employed only about 2% of the labor force.

Since the primary responsibility of enclave economies is to boards of directors and stockholders in industrialized countries like the United States, rather than to Latin America, they frequently operate in ways which produce severe economic dislocations. For example, in pre-revolutionary Cuba, about one-half of the arable land was directly owned by sugar companies, who also rented another 7% of the crop land. Six companies alone, mostly U.S. owned, occupied 60% of the sugar lands. Prior to the twentieth century, Cuba had been self-sufficient in food. Emphasis on the production of sugar came to be so great that Cuba stopped producing its own food and had to import it—and this despite the fact that about one-half of the sugar lands were allowed to remain unproductive. Furthermore, 25% of the Cuban labor force was unemployed about eight or nine months out of every twelve. This was because the sugar

companies found it more convenient to harvest and process their sugar mainly from about mid-January to June, even though it was feasible to extend operations over a longer period. The Cuban Revolution put an end to this. Cuba has begun to be self-sufficient in foodstuffs again. But in other sugar-producing areas of Latin America, such as Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Peru, practices similar to those of pre-revolutionary Cuba continue.

Nor is it only sugar or plantation economies which produce such distortions. In Venezuela, per capita food production has decreased because of the intense concentration on oil production. Before oil it was self-sufficient in food. By 1955, it produced only one-half of the maize, one-third of the vegetables and grains, and one-half of the milk it was consuming. There were also fewer cattle than there had been at the beginning of the move for independence.

"IMPORT SUBSTITUTION": A NEW ERA?

In recent years much has been made of the growth of manufacture and industry in Latin America. The contribution of the manufacturing sector to the gross product has risen from 17% in 1945 to 22.7% in 1965. "Import substitution," the replacing of imported goods by products manufactured in Latin America, is seen as the road to economic independence, and industrialization as the way to achieve a more diverse and balanced economy. But here again enclave economies confuse the picture. Increasingly, new direct investment in Latin America by U.S. corporations is going into manufacture and industry in preference to the traditional extractive and plantation enterprises, although the latter are not being ignored. In 1929, only 6.3% of direct U.S. investment was in manufacturing. By 1962, this had grown to 60%. By 1963, 80.3% of Peruvian industry was foreign owned; this means that at least four-fifths has to be subtracted from that portion of the Peruvian GNP which was contributed by manufacturing and industry. What is happening is not a growing economic independence for Latin America, but rather a growing dependence.

Import substitution really means that foreign companies manufacture on the spot consumer goods which they formerly shipped to Latin America. In this way they eliminate shipping costs, avoid payment of import duties, and assure themselves a supply of cheap labor. Alfred P. Sloan, former President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of General Motors, pointed out that GM's overseas assembly plants in Latin America have the "advantage over exporting complete cars in that [they] resulted in lower duty payments."

Clearly, such operations should not be regarded as "import substitutions" on the part of the Latin American countries, but rather as "export substitutions" on the part of foreign corporations.

The development of Latin American "common markets"—the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM)—can also be viewed as largely a part of this pattern of disguised "export substitution," in an intensified or specialized form. The Central American Common Market, especially, has chalked up an impressive statistical picture of growth. It was established in 1960. Between then and 1966, trade among the

members increased about 350%, to 176 million dollars. Intra-regional trade of manufactured goods grew over 600% to about 125 million dollars. The share of the Central American countries' imports originating in the area rose from 6% to about 18%. By 1966, manufactured and semi-manufactured items accounted for about 75% of intra-Central American trade, as against 47% six years earlier, and chemical products made up 50% of all the "intermediate" industrial products traded internally.

But again it should be stressed that these figures represent changes mainly in the enclave economies which use Central America as a base for export substitution activities, with all the attendant advantages mentioned above, and more. Hence trade among the CACM countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) means primarily trade among the foreign-owned plants located in this area. As *World Business*, an organ of the Chase Manhattan Bank, notes: "Industrialization based on import substitution has little long range dynamism within a market area limited by small population and unequal income distribution."

Most of these disguised export operations do little more than turn out or assemble U.S.-type goods for the small Latin American upper classes. These are the same people who have monopolized through their association with foreign capital the wealth and power of Latin America since the early nineteenth century. The automobiles, refrigerators, appliances, and other consumer goods produced by these companies do little to help redress the balance between wealth and poverty in Latin America. Instead the gap between wealth and poverty in Latin America is growing.

"GNP" FOR THE FEW

At this point, the true significance of per capita GNP can be seen. A favored analytical tool for economists, it is laden with dangers. Its growth does not indicate anything about real national participation in the growing wealth. For those sectors of Latin American society which remain outside, of the market and money economy, per capita GNP and its growth mean nothing. Per capita GNP can grow and grow, but the actual income of the peasant in the backlands or urban slum dweller can remain unchanged or even diminish. Hence one must also look at how income is actually distributed to get an idea of the economic condition of a country. Just two examples will have to do. In 1961, the bulk of Peru's economically active population (nearly two-thirds) received less than one-fourth the income, while on the other hand 1.9% of the population received 41.4% of the national income. In Chile, between 1945 and 1957, the per capita consumption of food staples such as meat, potatoes, and wheat, an index which is not as distorted as one that includes automobiles, palatial homes, and other luxuries, actually declined.

One further element in GNP remains to be examined: the part regarded as "services." In the United States, an important proportion of people in this sector would be professionals: engineers, doctors, bankers, teachers, and the others who service a diversified economy. But in Latin America only a small proportion of the population is serviced by doctors, en-

gineers, and the like. In reality, this classification serves as a convenient catch-all for persons who work only occasionally and at what they can find. In Peru, for example, estimates of underemployment for 1966 found that some 21% of the people engaged in "commerce" and some 30% in services were underemployed. These are the ragged bootblacks who abound in virtually every Latin American country, the street vendors who sell ballpoint pens and cigarettes one by one, the people who work so seldom and at such a multitude of odd jobs that neither they nor the census-taker can determine the proper category in which to place them. The fact that a growing proportion of the Latin American population is being relegated to such jobs and exiled from the hope of participating in the economic benefits registered by the statistical summaries is proven by a number of indices. While the proportion of the population engaged in the service sector rose about 6% in the fifteen-year period from 1945 to 1960, the proportion of the GNP represented by the service sector declined from 42% to slightly above 39%. The growth of the urban shantytowns is a less precise, but suggestive index. By 1955, at least 200,000 people in Venezuela had fled the countryside to crowd into the slums of Caracas. In Peru, one of the *barriadas*, or shantytowns surrounding Lima, has grown until it now ranks among the five or six largest urban complexes in the country.

Our rapid summary has attempted to describe certain conditions in Latin America, but more than that, we are concerned with emphasizing that statistical information, in and of itself, must be regarded as part of an argument, reflecting the value judgements behind that argument, rather than unanswerable "hard facts" that must be accepted at face value—if, in fact, that is ever possible. A statistic is not an irreducible fact. It is, like any other generality, an approximation that subordinates certain criteria in the interests of others, in order to reduce data to a form in which they may be manipulated. Such approximations are an essential part of the analytic process, but it must be remembered that they answer only those questions that they have been set up to answer. If you have another question, you may need to choose another statistic, another approximation based upon another set of criteria, in order to obtain an answer. A growth rate of 6% a year, for example, while it may appear impressive, does not tell you how much more wealth there is to go around. The difference between one and two is 100%, the same as the difference between 1,000 and 2,000, yet obviously the increase in absolute numbers is very different. In the same fashion, GNP and its growth measures only the creation of wealth, however obtained and however distributed. GNP can be regarded as a measure of economic progress only if that is the criterion for progress. If, on the other hand, progress is considered to be the creation of the material bases for a more rational, equitable society promoting human values, the data presented by those with different standards must be weighed, broken down, and reconstructed.

For news about the People in the forefront of struggle in Latin America subscribe to the magazine of the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners. 10 issues for \$2.00. Write to USLA Reporter, P.O. Box 2303, New York, N.Y. 10001.

The New Strategy in U.S. Investments

by EDIE BLACK

TYPICALLY, radical critiques of U.S. "colonialism" south of the border focus on the failure of U.S. investment to develop internal markets. Foreign investment, it is argued, stimulates extractive production of raw materials, such as copper in Chile, tin in Bolivia, and oil in Venezuela, and foodstuffs, such as sugar in the Dominican Republic and Cuba, and bananas in Central America, for export only; moreover, this investment has not stimulated secondary production for internal consumption. The productive assets such as mines and plantations which it has created function as "foreign enclaves"—that is, as extensions of the economy of the capital-exporting nation rather than as sectors integrated with the local economy (which tends to remain on the subsistence level). U.S. investment, so the criticism goes, actually inhibits development in Latin America, because it orients production almost entirely toward the raw material needs of the U.S. industrial process, thus preventing diversified production for internal consumption. We find classic expressions of this traditional critique in parts of John Gerassi's important work, *The Great Fear in Latin America*:

... Latin America must diversify its own production. It must build up its own manufactured goods industry; it must cut down its income dependency on exports; and it must eliminate its commercial dependency on imports. However, it just so happens that some of our major industries are dependent on Latin America's raw materials for production and on its markets for selling manufactured goods. Thus, it is to our industries' advantage to keep our policy so oriented and constituted as to prohibit or stall Latin America's diversification and industrialization (pp. 30-31).

As correct as this analysis may still be for some parts of Latin America it must be modified radically for most parts. For since World War II, U.S. investment has begun to stimulate productivity, especially in four of the largest countries, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, for internal consumption as well as for export. This shift in investment patterns from extractive industries oriented toward foreign markets to manufacturing industries oriented toward local markets is illustrated in the data presented in the report of the 1964 hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, entitled "Private Investment in Latin America." In these hearings, the results of a study undertaken by the Commerce Committee for the Alliance for Progress (COMAP) are presented to show the relative and absolute rise of the manufacturing sector of new investment in relation to the relative and absolute decline of the mining, smelting and petroleum sector.

Elsewhere in the 1964 hearings, Francis E. Grimes, a Vice-President and Latin-American "Area Executive" of Chase Manhattan Bank, testifies that the share of the total book value of U.S. investments in the manufacturing sector of Latin America rose from 8% in 1940 to 22% in 1962. (In several Latin American

countries this proportion of the manufacturing sector is much larger. For instance, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 54% of U.S. capital in Brazil is in manufacturing.) [3] Further testimony by John D. J. Moore, Vice President of W. R. Grace and Co. and Chairman of the U.S. Inter-American Council, emphasizes that this shift in emphasis toward manufacturing has laid the basis in Latin America for the diversification of production and the creation of an internal market. Mr. Moore's remarks clarify a crucial motivation behind this shift in emphasis: The need of the U.S. industrial process for new absorption of its expanding output. A table showing sales figures of U.S. manufacturing affiliates is presented "which demonstrates the capacity of Latin American markets to absorb the rapidly growing output of American manufacturing plants." Significantly, Mr. Moore contrasts the rapid growth rate of the Latin American market for goods produced by U.S. affiliates with the slow growth rate of the U.S. market for goods produced domestically:

In 1962 sales of U.S. manufacturing affiliates totaled \$4.190 billion, an increase of more than 70% over the 1957 figure of \$2.435 billion which compares very favorably with the increase of 17% shown by domestic sales of manufactured goods in the same period (*Hearings*, p. 11).

Thus we see that Latin America functions in relation to the U.S. not only as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs but, increasingly, as a consumer of finished products.

REFORM IDEOLOGY:

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS RHETORIC

CORRESPONDING to this structural shift in the patterns of U.S. investment in Latin America is an ideological shift in the attitudes of the U.S. investors. The best indicator of this ideological shift is the new attitude found among many of these investors toward institutional change in Latin America as spelled out in the Alliance for Progress. Whereas the old style investor supported and re-enforced the one-crop economy, the new style investor encourages reform of the economy to enable diversification of production. We may see this new attitude operative in the writings of two key investors and policy advisors, Adolf Berle and David Rockefeller. In Berle's book, *Latin America, Diplomacy and Reality* and in Rockefeller's article, "What Private Enterprise Means to Latin America" in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1966, we find them emphasizing three internal reforms considered essential to "economic development" in Latin America: 1) diversification of production in both the agricultural and industrial fields, 2) agrarian reform, and 3) extension of the Latin American common markets, the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market. The common characteristic of all three reforms is that they are essential to internal market expansion. They are designed to overcome the major obstacles to market growth in Latin America: one-product export econo-

mies dependent on foreign markets, the latifundiast organization of production, and tariff barriers.

AGRARIAN REFORM


THE LATIFUNDIA organization of production constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to internal market expansion—just as did the Southern plantation in antebellum 19th century United States. Like the Southern plantation, the latifundia originally performed an essential function for industrial expansion in the Western nations—supplying their industrial processes with basic raw materials. But now that the industrial expansion of the Western nations is extending to the very territories on which they once depended for raw materials, the latifundia has become an outmoded institution. It inhibits the market expansion in Latin America which is necessary for the absorption of the ever-increasing output of the advanced capitalist nations.

The latifundia inhibits industrialization in two ways. First, insofar as its production is geared toward export, it does not produce the variety of foodstuffs necessary to maintain an urban population, thus necessitating the importation of food from abroad. Such importation causes a drain on foreign exchange which is badly needed to purchase machinery and raw materials for further industrialization. Secondly, the latifundia inasmuch as it fosters a subsistence economy among the masses of the agricultural population, inhibits the growth of their purchasing power.

It is this critique which has led U.S. investors to adopt the rhetoric of their traditional critics, calling for the same two institutional reforms: diversification of production and agrarian reform. Yet it is necessary to focus closely on what is meant by agrarian reform, particularly in the eyes of the new brand of U.S. investors who are advocating a "social revolution" which represents "a dramatic and far reaching restructuring of an entire society." In his article "What Private Enterprise Means to Latin America," David Rockefeller emphasizes the urgent need for the "modernization, diversification, and expansion of agriculture" as a necessary base for industrialization. Yet, as is clear from his arguments, the agrarian reform which he advocates is not the transfer of control from the owner of production, the latifundiast, to the producer by land redistribution or by cooperativization. Rather he advocates the transformation of the class of landowners into a class of entrepreneurial farmers. Such a transformation would turn the labor intensive latifundia which now produces primarily for export into a capital intensive commercial farm producing primarily for local urban markets. As an example of such diversification of agricultural production Rockefeller cites the modernization of cattle production in Panama. Through the institution of a "scientific program of seeding, feeding, and breeding" financed by the Chase Manhattan Bank, Panama began to produce enough beef to replace her beef imports. Thus we see that, for Rockefeller, "social revolution" in Latin America entails those institutional changes which will remove obstacles to market expansion and increased productivity. It does not mean a fundamental change in the social control of the means of production.

Rockefeller's concept of agrarian reform reflects a basic assumption of capitalist economies: the identi-

fication of "development" with increasing productivity (through capital investment) and rapid market expansion. For an investor, operating on such an assumption, the decisive indicator of a "developing" nation's economic health is the rate of growth of its Gross National Product. The social questions—who owns the productive assets and who controls the market, or whose needs are fulfilled by increasing productivity and rapid market expansion—are peripheral. For him, a country is developing if its GNP rises at a significant rate, even though the productivity increase and the market expansion are generated in response to the needs of foreign interests and controlled by those interests.



COMMON MARKET PROGRAM

THE APOLOGISTS for the Alliance for Progress herald the Latin American Common Market proposed at Punta del Este last April as the major instrument of "development" in Latin America (see especially Lincoln Gordon's article in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1967). For these government spokesmen and social scientists, "development" is tantamount to the establishment of a diversified industrial base and increased productivity. Again, what they do not adequately discuss is who will exercise control over the industrial base.

Yet their business counterparts candidly admit what the ideologues ignore: a common market "reform" which places no substantial barriers to the inflow of foreign capital must inevitably lead to domination by large, foreign-based global corporations rather than to the growth of indigenous Latin American companies. The superior technology, marketing facilities, and capital resources of such corporations ensures their control over any market they are allowed to penetrate. (Note, for example, how U.S. corporations captured control of European growth industries such as aerospace and electronics after the establishment of the European Common Market.) An article in the June 1967 issue of *Fortune*, entitled "A Latin American Common Market Makes Common Sense for U.S. Businessmen Too," puts the situation bluntly:

For U.S. private enterprise, the common market spells enticing new opportunity. Apart from the traditional mining (Anaconda, Creole Petroleum) and farming (United Fruit, W. R. Grace), U.S. investment until now has mostly gone into manufacturing for "import substitution"—producing for a national market under protective tariffs. But U.S.

businessmen are beginning to see in the Latin American common market the advantages that they seized upon in the European Common Market: the chance to move to the broader, more competitive, and potentially more profitable task of supplying a market big enough to be economic on its own terms....

In many a boardroom, the common market is becoming a serious element in planning for the future. Ford Motor of Brasil, which makes Galaxies, thinks it could mesh nicely with Ford of Argentina, which makes Falcons, thus deriving economies of scale by producing both cars for larger markets. Kodak, which now makes photographic paper in Brazil, would like to make exportable film in Mexico and cameras and projectors in Argentina. I.T.T., with telecommunication-equipment plants in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, wants to "rationalize production, interchange parts, and raise production high enough to export from Latin America to other parts of the world," says Vice President Gerhard Andlinger, the company's group executive for Latin America. Other corporations interested in rationalizing or expanding operations include G.E., Remington Rand, Otis Elevator, Worthington, Firestone, Deere, Westinghouse Air Brake, American Machine and Foundry.

As *Fortune* implies, the only benefit to local Latin American capitalists is the possibility of capital participation in the formation of subsidiaries of foreign controlled corporations.

This may sound like a U.S. take-over of the whole Latin American economy, and plenty of Latin American businessmen believe that's just what's afoot. But the fear is not necessarily valid. As things stand now, most foreign-owned enterprises in Latin America reinvest a lot of their profits, thus tending more and more to be part of the landscape. Yet, if they are really going to take up residence and avoid the take-over charge, U.S. subsidiaries will have to admit Latin Americans more readily to an ownership role. Telling them to buy stock in the parent company on Wall Street is so far not the answer, since getting the dollars, and getting them out, is balked by currency restrictions and tax law.

A quick sentence in the Punta del Este declaration hints at a long-range solution: a common market stock market, which would let an Argentine buy stock in a Venezuelan brewery, or a Colombian buy stock of Brazil's Willys-Overland.

Such participation by local capitalists in so-called joint ventures with foreign corporations bears only the illusion of local control. No matter how large a percentage of the stock is in the hands of local investors, the foreign interests maintain effective dominance through management contracts. A full documentation of the use of this device to maintain "day-to-day control" despite "the window dressing of a 50-50 or even minority split" may be found in a *Business International* monograph entitled "Management Contracts Abroad" (1963).

LATIN AMERICA's largely new role as a market for the output of U.S. industry has not, of course, overshadowed her traditional role as a supplier of raw materials. In fact, it is necessary to re-emphasize that traditional role in light of one crucial development

since World War II: the development of a large U.S. military establishment as an essential market for American industrial output. The growth of production for military needs has to a considerable extent coincided with a growth in dependency on foreign sources of raw materials, especially on foreign sources of metallic ores. A pamphlet published by the Defense Department in 1953, "Raw Material Imports: Area of Growing Dependency," graphically shows this interconnection. The document points out that the U.S. is the world's largest consumer of raw materials. With 7% of the world's population the U.S. consumes 2/3 of the free world's petroleum production, 60% of its rubber production, 50% of its manganese, iron ore, zinc, copper and lead production. That production for military needs accounts for a significant portion of import dependency on raw materials is stated flatly by the pamphlet (whose estimates would appear modest today):

Military production is an avaricious consumer of raw materials. About 15% of all materials consumed by American industry goes to defense industry. But this figure does not represent a 15% across the board consumption. Defense consumption of alloying metals is inordinately large—more than 90% in the case of nickel and cobalt—and it is such metals for which we are most dependent on foreign sources.

The pamphlet cites known reserves of the vital metals in the underdeveloped world, particularly in Africa and Latin America, and goes on to relate defense supply needs with foreign investment. Grave concern is expressed over the failure of U.S. private capital to flow into the underdeveloped areas of the world to develop mineral resources in quantities proportionate to the mineral requirements of U.S. industry: "If rapidly expanding mineral requirements are to be met from abroad investment well in excess of previous levels will be necessary."

THE CASE FOR DEVELOPMENT

THE diversification advocates, agricultural reformers and common market ideologues argue that the priorities of such investment can and must feed "development." However, the central distinction between an "underdeveloped" and a "developed" economy lies in the distinction between growth stimulated by external impulses and autonomous growth stimulated by internal needs. It is this distinction—not the distinction between production for export and production for internal consumption—which should form the core of a radical critique of U.S. capital in Latin America. Regardless of whether U.S. capital creates extractive or manufacturing industries, it does not contribute to Latin American development. Quite the contrary, insofar as it stimulates production primarily in accord with U.S. needs for raw materials and consumer markets, U.S. investment actually tends to "structure underdevelopment" (as Andre Gunter Frank puts it) into Latin American economies. It creates a dependency in which critical sectors are so closely integrated with the U.S. economy that they function as extensions of U.S. industries rather than as integral sectors of Latin American industry.

BOOK REVIEWS

..... INTERNAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER. Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning; Ohio State, 1966; \$6.50.

by JAMES PETRAS

PRIOR to discussing internal security and military power in Latin America, one must ask: what are the interests to be secured and to what type of social structure is military power wedded? More important when discussing U.S. military programs in Latin America, one must also investigate the historical context—the origins, development and nature of U.S. involvement. This procedure allows us to better understand the goals which U.S. policymakers are currently pursuing. (Equally it enables us to evaluate the program and goals of those forces opposing U.S. policies.) In *Internal Security and Military Power*, Barber and Ronning represent goals stated by U.S. officials: opposition to social revolution and "subversion," support for constituted authority, and promotion of economic growth and social reform. Within this framework the authors suggest that U.S. policymakers face a dilemma. In aiding the military to suppress revolution they strengthen the status quo at the expense of social reform. By accepting official policy at face value, by choosing to ignore the historical record of U.S. interests in Latin America, Barber and Ronning obscure a major thrust of U.S. policy: support of U.S. economic investments, private and public. Thus the dilemma which this book explores is a false one, or at most, a rhetorical one. Barber's and Ronning's own material testifies to that. First, however, a digression might help clarify what we mean by the "historical record."

In recent years some young scholars have pointed out a number of cases to illustrate the economic bases of the U.S. empire.[1]

JAMES PETRAS / Assistant Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, has traveled extensively in Latin America. He is the U.S. correspondent for *Marcha* (South American Journal).

more pertinent to our discussion is the large number of scholarly works which document in detail the historical roots of current U.S. policy. What is notable about these is their age. For the most part, they represent a pre-World War period. Before Cold War scholarship defined the issue as one of "hemispheric defense against the Communist Threat...economic development and social reform," many scholars seriously considered the issue to be the U.S. threat to Latin American development.[2] Their studies clearly point to the economic basis of U.S. concern for security and defense: the security of U.S. domination of the economies, finances and even internal policies of Latin America.

In this sense Barber and Ronning are typical products of Cold War scholarship. The motives behind past and present U.S. efforts to promote the military as an agency of civic action is ignored. Historically, in our own country the army has not only provided engineers to build bridges, as Barber and Ronning note, but exterminated indigenous populations to provide "living space" for expansionist-minded farmers and industrial developers. The Army not only made useful surveys, as the authors mention, but colonized and violently annexed one half of Mexico—the state of Texas. And to this very day the same Army is helping Texas ranchers keep many Mexican laborers in a position not far above that of a peon. If one considers the U.S. historical experience as a precedent for military civic action in its full dimensions, one arrives at quite a different picture of U.S. military efforts in Latin America than the picture of progress that Barber and Ronning advertise.

CHAPTERS 4 and 5 which deal first with "Administrative and Planning Agencies," and then with "Training," are useful for understanding the U.S. government's counterrevolutionary effort in Latin America. The authors provide a detailed description of administrative and planning agencies: their members, functions and scope of activity, as well as a good des-

cription of the coordination between the Pentagon and State Department, in which the latter appears to exercise foremost authority—contrary to popular liberal mythology. The authors discuss how the two institutions exchange personnel and programs—contrary to the notion that major policy differences divide them. The key unit appears to be the State Department's deputy assistant secretary of politico-military affairs, who guides, coordinates and maintains liaison with the Defense Department and the military services on politico-military problems.

Internal Security and Military Power serves to answer certain questions frequently raised by the left in Latin America and the United States. (1) Why have Latin American revolutionaries chosen the methods of armed struggle and why have they suffered serious defeats? (2) Why have U.S. and Latin American investors remained in firm control over their society despite continuing economic stagnation and mass poverty? (3) Why have elected liberal middle class governments failed to implement their reformist nationalist programs? [3]

Barber's and Ronning's description of the massive U.S. efforts to train, finance, and indoctrinate thousands of Latin American military and police officials supplies an important part of the answer. Then too, the authors show how the handouts and impact programs of military civic action have not only failed to promote economic development and social reform; in many instances they have served to preclude it. Numerous cases are cited where military officials trained in the United States have seized power, destroyed local opposition and won quick recognition from the U.S. government.

THE BOOK provides some interesting examples of U.S. influence over what is euphemistically referred to as "Latin counterparts" to U.S. military officials. There is the pamphlet on "civic action" written by Colonel Julio Sanjines Goita, Bolivian dictator Barrientos' ambassador to the U.S. Ac-

cording to Barber and Ronning, Colonel Goita "obviously absorbed some of the ideas of the U.S. civic action planning." The prologue was written by Colonel Truman Cook, then Chief of the U.S. military mission in Bolivia, and the pamphlet was published by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Then there was the Guatemalan officer who had just returned from attending the Information Training School conducted at Fort Slocum, New York. An illustration of the school's influence could be seen in each issue of the military magazine published by the Guatemalan in his country which carried extensive articles and photographs of civic action projects. Further on, the authors note: "The experienced observer of Latin America can detect in the speeches of its leaders and in the publications issued by its defense departments, the ideas and arguments advocated by U.S. spokesmen for civic action. The same ideology and the same phrases are utilized." Compared to the control that the U.S. exercises over Latin America, the Eastern European regimes begin to look like independent nations.

The authors provide us with an extensive summary of the schools and courses which indoctrinate medium and senior grade Latin officers, and they point to the increasingly sophisticated course content which the repressive authorities are receiving. American "students" now study insurgency in the political, economic and social context in which it occurs, so that their influence may be more effectively felt in all three areas in addition to the battlefield.

THE FULL credit for the development and promotion of the counterinsurgency training programs belongs to ex-President Kennedy. This study shows that in almost every policy area and agency the big push came from the Kennedy brothers. The Kennedy-sponsored Special Groups (SG) set up the Inter-American Police Academy to train police to suppress mass protest activity; SG established both the Internal Defense Plans for each country, and the Country Team collaborative process which coordinates all U.S. agencies in a foreign country around a counterrevolutionary strategy. The authors credit the

liberal wing of the Democratic Party with taking the lead in promoting and extending world-wide counterinsurgency activity around the concepts of "civic action" and a "regional police force" (Senators Fullbright, Church and Morse, page 67 *passim*). This "modernization" process further entrenched the military's power and expanded the reach of U.S. power abroad.

In June 1962, the State Department began a series of counterinsurgency courses entitled "National Interdepartmental Problems of Development and Internal Defense." The Air Force set up a Special Air Warfare Center for counterinsurgency in Florida. The Army established a Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg; the Marines developed their own training and indoctrination schools. In addition, there is the Military Assistance Institute in Virginia. Among its "training" goals is one to "further the sales of United States produced military equipment to meet valid country requirements."

The biggest training operation takes place at the U.S. Army School of the Americas from which 16,000 Latin Americans graduated by the end of 1964. For training the Latin military elite there is the Army Special Warfare Center and School and the Army Civil Affairs School (Fort Gordon, Georgia). In addition, there are specialized training units: the Inter-American Geodetic Survey, the Mobile Training Teams, Air Commando Teams and others. With the introduction of extensive and intensive organization and planning, John Kennedy laid the groundwork for U.S. military ascendancy in Latin America.

AS LIBERALS who accept the reformist rhetoric of civic action the authors, using a makeshift cost-benefit analysis, argue that: (1) it is a highly inefficient and costly means to exploit resources for development and reform—that the output is low relative to the amount of inputs—and that civilians could produce more, cheaper; (2) that politically the civic action program has strengthened authoritarian regimes in Latin America. What the authors do not consider is whether, in fact, *these are the criteria of success by which the U.S. government chooses to operate*. For example, Barber and

Ronning accept the stated objectives of U.S. military training and civic action doctrine ("economic development and responsible government") as fact rather than ideology. They then point out that the objectives were not achieved and hence the programs were not successful. What the authors fail to consider is whether from the point of view of U.S. business interests and expansion-minded policymakers, past and present experience with civic action is not quite successful.

The continuation and extension of military civic action programs today in the face of mounting hunger and economic dislocation in Latin America suggests that the United States is committed to preserving old dependencies and not to the reformist rhetoric which beguiles the authors of this book. Barber and Ronning misinterpret their evidence to fit their own preferences, rather than those of actual policymakers. By turning these countries into client states, policymakers have achieved notable "success."

Footnotes

(1) Horowitz, *Free World Colossus*; Oglesby and Shaul, *Containment and Change*; Robert Smith, *Cuba and the U.S.*; Seitlin and Scheer, *Cuba: Tragedy in our Hemisphere*.

(2) Early scholarly studies which Cold War academicians have conveniently ignored, include: Bailey Diffie, *Puerto Rico: A Broken Pledge*; Alva Curtis Wilgus, *The Caribbean and Imperialism and World Politics*; Scott Nearing and J. Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy*; J. Fred Rippy, *Capitalists in Colombia*; M. M. Knight, *Yankees in Santo Domingo*; Margaret Marsh, *Bankers in Bolivia*; Leland Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony*; Kepnes and Soothill, *Banana Empire*.

(3) None of articles purporting to explain the rise of the guerrilla movements have attempted to relate the choice of the methods of armed struggle to the political conditions which are imposed on Latin American reality by the massive training, indoctrinating and equipping of the Latin Armies by the U.S. Part of the reason why Latin leftists have to choose armed struggle is because the U.S. has chosen to push the army as its principal ally.

by **ALLEN YOUNG**

A compelling rhetoric has characterized the official United States outlook toward Latin America in recent years. Words and phrases like development, economic growth, agrarian reform, evolutionary change, civic action and progressive military sectors have become the catch words of U.S. policy. It all adds up, at least in theory, to a commitment to reform.

This rhetoric did not appear in a vacuum. It was clearly a response to the success of the Cuban guerrilla struggle and the tangible political and economic alternatives it offered to the people of Latin America. That kind of struggle threatened, and continues to threaten the existing order of very-rich and very-poor and the U.S. position supporting that order in fact if not in theory. Revolution is thereby posed as a real alternative.

Latin America: Reform or Revolution? a reader edited by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, is a collection of 23 probing essays, more than half of them written by Latin Americans. Without explicitly "taking a stand," the editors have assembled solid, well-documented arguments to show the bankruptcy and utter hypocrisy of the U.S.-backed reformist position. It is the huge gap between rhetoric and accomplishment which most of the selections attest to. The tone for the reader is set in the opening essay, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America," written by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, a Mexican social scientist who did graduate work in the United States and in France. Stavenhagen attacks several of the widely-held myths about Latin America, the most significant being that modernizing forces must first do away with "feudalism." The author explains how Latin economies are basically capitalist in structure, although social relationships in some rural areas may

resemble the paternalistic pattern of feudal society.

Doing away with the myth of feudalism is of great importance, because it helps clarify the nature of the struggle and the identity of the enemy. A strategy for change which directs itself against an imaginary feudalism, instead of the very real commercial exploitation, will not go very far toward challenging foreign capital and its local allies in the national bourgeoisie. Those who define feudalism as the enemy often laud the "progressive" role of the national bourgeoisie, while the critique implicit in Stavenhagen's essay (and other writings in the reader) point out that the national bourgeoisie itself is a tool of foreign capital, and, ultimately, of direct exploitation.

Other myths are dealt similar blows elsewhere. Reformists often cite the growth of industry, including U.S.-backed enterprises, as contributing to social harmony in Latin America. Glaucis Soares, a Brazilian sociologist, shows how twentieth century technology is not "labor intensive," so that the growth of industry is accompanied by growing unemployment. This means that the unemployed urban proletariat moves toward insurrection, while the middle class allies itself with the military in favor of repression.

Soares' reasoning is that the growing army of discontented men without jobs will see no role for itself in the society, therefore naturally easing it toward a revolutionary path. The middle class, outnumbered, profiting from the system and enjoying the fruits of the new industries (as the lower classes cannot afford to do), calls upon the military to protect it—much as middle class Americans cheer President Johnson when he promises to attack "crimes in the streets" and when he announces paramilitary plans to put down ghetto disturbances.

Teotonio dos Santos, another Brazilian, shows how the nature of U.S. investments does not always coincide with the needs of the Latin American country. The Alliance for Progress, he argues, is designed to "make just such reforms as are necessary to perpetuate the reign of capitalism." He shows how intensive exploitation of existing markets rather than the creation of new ones is encouraged by

monopoly capital controlled in the United States. A perfect example of this is the Brazilian Ford affiliate's recent decision to set up an automobile assembly plant to manufacture the Galaxie line. The needs of Brazil are obviously elsewhere; the profit possibilities, however, lie in the small, but prosperous market of the upper middle class consumer.

Evidence is also presented to show how statistics on "economic growth" hide the political and economic realities. Anibal Quijano Obregón, a Peruvian economist and sociologist, writes that Peru's "economic growth has served only to accentuate our dependence on foreign investment, our internal colonialism and metropolitan domination, and the increased tendency toward the pauperization of the largest part of the population."

The essays' emphasis on class conflict, the role of foreign investments, and the gap between rhetoric and accomplishment of such reformist regimes as that of the Acción Democrática in Venezuela make this volume a welcome antidote to the traditional writings on Latin America. Readers of such periodicals as *Foreign Affairs* and the *New Leader*, who rely on Latins such as Alberto Lleras Camargo (of Colombia) and North Americans such as Robert Alexander (of Rutgers University), will find this book a fresh, lively alternative. This is not a zippy survey, however, such as John Gerassi's *The Great Fear in Latin America*, which remains the best work on the area for beginners. Some of the material in this reader is quite heavy and the approach is scholarly. The book will be most meaningful to the reader who already has some knowledge of Latin America's history and its contemporary society. Almost all of the authors are trained social scientists, and many of the Latins represented in the book have done graduate work in an academic discipline in a U.S. university. Occasionally, this leads to massive and irrelevant references and a typically boring academic reliance on tables, as in José Nun's essay on the military coup. Nun's important argument—that the military is used by the middle classes to protect them from popular revolutionary movements—fortunately surfaces despite the pedantry.

The editors of the reader, both

ALLEN YOUNG / Staff reporter, Liberation News Service, recently returned from three years in Latin America; his reports have appeared in the *N. Y. Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *New Left Review*, and *International Socialist Journal* (Rome).

veterans of the incipient student movement at the University of California in Berkeley in the 1950's, are experienced observers of Latin America whose political insights transcend their regional specialty. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin were both in Chile in 1965 and 1966, and their work there is reflected in this book by two of the selections. Petras, currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, is a frequent contributor to socialist publications, including *New Left Review*, *International Socialist Journal* and *Science and Society*, and he is the U.S. correspondent for *Marcha*, South America's leading leftist journal, published in Uruguay. Zeitlin, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, is the author (with Robert Scheer) of *Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere* and of *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class*.

While the reader is solid and convincing on the failure and unfeasibility of reformist approaches in Latin America, its discussion of revolutionary roads is less complete. The central essay on revolution, written by James Petras, is a realistic, yet basically optimistic appraisal. At the very start of the essay, Petras does make an important statement which correctly undercuts the romanticism that too often marks the *norteamericano's* view of *la revolución*: "Despite the voluminous writings—Left, Right and Center—about the 'coming Revolution,' nowhere in Latin America does it appear that the Revolution is about to happen."

Petras comments on the different strategies being adopted and rejected, though the essay was obviously prepared prior to the publication of Régis Debray's controversial work *Revolution in the Revolution?* and prior to the report of Che Guevara's death. Petras discusses the prevalence in the guerrilla movements of "defectors" from traditional classes, such as Guatemala's Yon Sosa, a U.S.-trained military officer, and Colombia's Camilo Torres, a Roman Catholic priest. In connection with this, he documents and explains the essentially reformist nature of the Communist Parties and their rejection of guerrilla struggle under most circumstances. Much space is also given to a delineation of the U.S. sup-

port for counterinsurgency and its inroads into guerrilla struggles. Petras argues that the failure of the guerrillas lies not in the fact that their struggle is premature, but in "their lack of a mass peasant political organization and an urban working-class-based political apparatus that could serve as both a means of materially and politically supporting the guerrillas and a means of countering the repression of the state." Petras' optimism comes in his statement that the fallen guerrillas provide moral encouragement for future struggles, and that already guerrilla forces in some countries, such as Peru, are learning from the errors of their predecessors.

BONPANE... (Continued from Page 15)

in Latin America of palace revolutions where a small group moves in, takes over the country, and continues the same corruption as before only under different management.

The guerrilla, however, is working for a development of the thinking of the people, or popular development. The guerrilla in the small village will teach literacy, reading and writing. There will be a submachine gun nearby. The people certainly are afraid of him at first because they know he's armed and they have only seen arms in the hands of the military. It sometimes takes a long time to get across the idea that the guerrilla is actually there in the name of the peasant.

Now the guerrilla has not always been successful in this; there have been errors. I don't think we should glorify the movement as something absolutely faultless or perfect. In a certain village a guerrilla asked for something to eat and the peasant refused, so the guerrilla shot him. But I would simply say that such cases are examples of things that the leadership would be opposed to. They want the peasant to be in their favor and they want to develop a popular spirit of community.

FRAPPIER: Could you describe some of the activity that started in October of 1966 when the Guatemalan military supported by and supplied by the U.S. military began seeking out the guerrillas in Zacapa and Izabal? Could you estimate the involvement of U.S. advisors, troops and equipment?

BONPANE: Naturally, it is very hard

Except for Petras' essay, however, the current crisis of the Latin American revolutionaries is not adequately reflected in the book. The "reform or revolution" quandary is closely related to the issue of whether a revolutionary movement can progress better in a liberal, reformist regime or under a repressive dictatorship, but this question is not adequately dealt with. Another question meriting discussion is how a nation can finance development, once a radical revolution has occurred. There is need to study and analyze Cuba's development, comparing its dependence on Soviet capital with the traditional Latin dependence on U.S. involvement.

to get facts or an actual count. But it was obvious to anyone in Guatemala that there was a force of about 1,000 U.S. military personnel. There are probably still that number or more today. They were not directly involved in the fighting, but they were involved in everything else. Reports are that napalm was used, that it was brought up from the U.S. supply depot in the Panama Canal Zone. This had a very negative impact on the Guatemalan people. They know where the napalm comes from in spite of the fact that it's dropped by Guatemalan pilots.

The repressive measures against the guerrillas were very detrimental to the revolutionary movement. For example, the guerrillas had occupied the towns of Rio Hondo and Jones. Well, they were pushed out of those areas and also out of Sierra de la Minas where they were also strong. But ideologically, the movement is doing nothing but growing. As far as I can see, the United States will have to direct the killing of all of the people of Guatemala before this type of activity is stopped. Maybe the killing goes on in small numbers at any one time, no more than three to four hundred, but the group does not die, it keeps coming back.

FRAPPIER: Do you think that non-violence is still a possibility given the present situation?

BONPANE: Given the present situation, I don't see the success of non-violent efforts to change the structures of the country. One man in one small area starts a co-op; fine, there will be a co-op there. But if he multiplies his effort into ten, twenty, fifty, he gets in

the area where he is touching on the economics of the oligarchy. He's going to get a death letter, as did one of the priests who was most successful in a cooperative movement. Things of impact, of real power, things that imply a structural change imply violence.

FRAPPIER: Do you view the situation in Latin America and in Guatemala in particular as analogous to the situation in Vietnam?

BONPANE: I would say frightfully so. I see a pre-Vietnam in Guatemala right now. The same military advisors, the same green berets, the same gifts of helicopters, the same napalm, the same ugly spirit of kill, kill, kill. Even the reporters in Guatemala have been disgusted by comments made by certain military attaches. One reporter, after visiting a military attache, said, "Frankly, I'm nauseated by my visit. The attache told me, 'You have to realize that

making war and fighting is simply a very refined type of hunting and there is really quite a thrill in being involved in it.' "

FRAPPIER: You said that you had made the decision to return to the United States. What direction do you think the peace movement should take in the light of your experience?

BONPANE: I would like to see the resistance movement to Vietnam expand its interests to Latin America and say that just as we don't care to become involved militarily in Vietnam, neither do we care to attack and kill our neighbors to the South, our poverty-stricken neighbors who are desperately trying to be something, not only to have something. And they have the right to be something. In Cuba today you find a spirit of self-respect. Why? Because Cubans stand for something and they are proud of it.

tionary economic organization. His main argument is that directly or indirectly, the United States dominated and controlled the Cuban economy, and that half-hearted reforms were incapable of dealing with Cuba's problems. "It was the monopolies that geared the Cuban economy to sugar, dominated its resources, suffocated its industry with the goods they pumped in, and drained out its foreign exchange for luxuries" (p. 7). An open confrontation with American interests had to lead to an irreconcilable conflict.

Cuba's dependence on the United States, and the consequences of this relationship for the organization of her economy, can stand as a paradigm for the rest of Latin America. The nature of this relationship is revealed in the following quotation from a U.S. Department of State handbook published in 1956 (*Investment in Cuba: basic information for United States businessmen*):

The only foreign investments of importance are those of the United States. American participation exceeds 90% in the telephone and electric services, about 50% in public service railways, and roughly 40% in raw sugar production. The Cuban branches of United States banks are entrusted with almost one-fourth of all bank deposits. This intimate economic relationship is so much the outgrowth of mutually helpful associations that many of the problems that have plagued less close relationships in other areas have largely been avoided in Cuba. Cuba ranked third in Latin America in the value of

●●●**THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CUBA.** By Edward Boorstein. Monthly Review Press. New York and London: 1968. 303 pp. \$7.95.

by JULIE NICHAMIN

Boorstein's book on the Cuban revolution stands in a class by itself. This is not only because it was written by an "insider" (he worked from 1960-63 as an economist in the Cuban National Bank and the Ministry of Foreign Commerce), or because it contains the first account of the real problems which the Cubans face in running a socialist economy. Rather, this book is important because in telling the story of Cuba it reconstructs the conditions of economic imperialism in all its concrete detail: it serves as a case history which documents the legacy of U.S. imperialism and describes the contemporary struggle to overcome it.

The implications for Latin America are made clear. Many people accept the idea that the "underdevelopment" of Latin American countries is a product of the "de-

velopment" of other countries, especially the United States.[1] But the logic of this position is frequently left incomplete. As Boorstein puts it: "Imperialism is not a policy: it is a system." His book argues that the only way Latin American economic problems can be solved is by destroying the imperialist system and building a socialist one. And he sees the Cuban revolution in the same way that its leaders do: as an example for the rest of Latin America to follow.

Pre-Revolutionary Economy

The first part of Boorstein's book describes Cuba's pre-revolu-



SINE

JULIE NICHAMIN / Graduate student in anthropology at the University of Michigan; helped organize the New University Conference, which was officially launched in Chicago, March 22-24, 1968.

United States direct investments in 1953, outranked only by Venezuela and Brazil.

Sugar was the king-pin of the Cuban economy: 80% of Cuba's exports were made up of sugar and its by-products; [2] 70-75% of her arable land was owned by sugar companies; the sugar industry employed 25% of her labor force (about 500,000, although only 25,000 of these people were employed year-round); and 20-30% of Cuba's gross domestic product was made up of income derived from sugar (pp. 2, 5). American interests controlled much of this industry. According to *Investment in Cuba*, out of a total of 161 sugar mills in Cuba, 118 were Cuban-owned and produced 59% of the total sugar output, whereas 39 American-owned sugar mills accounted for 40% of the total sugar output.[3]

As Boorstein points out, diversification and growth of agricultural production was thwarted by the existing system of land-holding and land-utilization, a system which wasted land through over-extensive agricultural practices, and wasted labor because the structure of employment was determined by a seasonal sugar industry. The cattle industry similarly used few laborers and a great deal of land. National manufacturing industries were underdeveloped and kept output down by basing production goals on the stability of profit returns (pp. 3-5). The national industry which did exist was "stunted, squeezed in a restricted national market by deadly foreign competition" (p. 3).

Cuba's domestic market was dominated by imports. The competition of large American companies was too much for most Cuban businesses to meet successfully, and the poverty in the countryside held down effective demand. What enterprises did exist were "foreign enclaves," whether owned by Cubans or Americans, "they were meshed with the American or some other foreign economy: they were dependent on foreign equipment, materials, or markets, and most of their profits were transferred abroad" (p. 5). Boorstein outlines the consequences of this very clearly: simply by dominating the internal market, American companies were effectively blocking the growth of Cu-

ban-owned and Cuban-controlled industry. U.S. corporations were interested in making profits, not developing the Cuban economy (except insofar as this contributed to their ability to make profits, e.g., the building of railways or ports), and this loss of economic independence meant a loss of political independence as well.

Boorstein's re-assessment of pre-revolutionary economic conditions underscores the fact that the very structure of imperialism dictated the socialist path of economic development for Cuba, if she wished to remain independent of the United States. For example, Boorstein argues that "it would have been almost impossible to operate the Cuban economy as half public, half private" because the large Cuban-owned enterprises were totally dependent on the United States for their markets, their sources of raw material, equipment and financing operations (p. 34).

Similarly, in order to begin a re-distribution of income and a re-definition of the use of resources for the benefit of the whole population, Cuba had to carry out a thorough land reform, reorient and nationalize foreign trade, and set new priorities for economic growth. All of these things required the nationalization of American and Cuban enterprises, railways and ports.

In sum, as Boorstein indicates, it is a mistake to talk of "gross national product" for Latin American countries; "the gross products are not *national* because the economies are not *national*" (p. 244). For Cuba, this meant that the domination of her economy by the United States precluded any kind of nationally directed, sustained economic development. This was true for the following reasons:

- 1) The draining of profits to foreign investors automatically lowered the possible re-investment rate.
- 2) Within the country, the draining of foreign exchange for luxury imports (by the wealthy upper class) drastically reduced the amount of capital available for economic development.
- 3) The tourist orientation of the economy and the stress on a "favorable investment climate" (as defined by such tracts as *Investment in Cuba*) effective-

ly prohibited any serious reform.

- 4) The privately-controlled sugar industry which dominated Cuba's domestic economy led to structural unemployment and idle land. As I will make clear below, these need not be the results of a "one-crop economy."
- 5) The dependence of Cuban industry on U.S. machinery, importation of raw materials, and a U.S.-oriented transportation and distribution system (lack of bulk storage facilities, short-run shipping operations) made it necessary to "develop" with U.S. capital (or at least encouraged it), which effectively ruled out any possibility for independent economic growth.

The lesson which this account of Cuba's *present* economic policies offers to other Latin American countries is that only through a socialist revolution can economic and political independence be achieved and successfully maintained.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★	
Name	★
Address	★
City	★
State	★ Zip
★	
★ BOOKS FROM HANOI ★	
★ in English ★	
★ HO-CHI-MINH'S PRISON	★
★ DIARY	★ .75
★ BIOGRAPHY OF HO-CHI-MINH	★ .50
★ HO-CHI-MINH: AGAINST U.S.	★
★ AGGRESSION	★ .50
★ GEN. VO NGUYEN GIAP: ONCE	★
★ AGAIN WE WILL WIN	★ .50
★ INITIAL FAILURE OF U.S.	★
★ "LIMITED WAR"	★ .50
★ U.S. BIGGEST OPERATION	★
★ FOILED	★ .25
★ ON SOCIALIST REVOLUTION	★
★ IN VIET NAM, 2 vols.	★ 1.50
★ VIETNAMESE STUDIES:	★
★ SOUTH VIETNAM	★ 1.00
★ VIETNAMESE WOMEN	★ 1.00
★ FAILURE OF "SPECIAL	★
★ WAR"	★ 1.00
★ FUNDAMENTAL	★
★ PROBLEMS	★ 1.00
★	
★ SUBSCRIPTIONS ★	
★ VIETNAM COURIER,	★
★ 26 weeks	★ 5.00
★ VIETNAM (Illustr.),	★
★ 12 months	★ 5.00
★	
★ Indicate quantity desired at left of	
★ title & send payment with order to	
★ CHINA BOOKS & PERIODICALS ★	
★ U.S. Gov't. Licensed Importer	
★ & Distributor	
★ 2929-24th St. San Francisco 94110	
★ (In California,	
★ add 5% sales tax on books)	
★ FREE CATALOGUE ON REQUEST ★	
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★	

Socialism and "One-Crop" Economies

In the earliest phase of the revolution, Boorstein reports, "the logic of most of the policies was natural and simple—to reverse what imperialism had been doing" (p. 182): put idle labor and land to work, diversify agriculture, industrialize rapidly. This reasoning was based on other available 'models' for socialist economic development—Russia, China, the eastern European countries—and on the conviction which was widespread during the first two years of the revolution, that simply readjusting former economic priorities and releasing idle labor and resources gave unlimited opportunities for economic growth. But Boorstein's account shows how the Cubans miscalculated the limits of available "reserves" (resources, labor, industrial capacities, etc.), and saw the need for more thorough centralized planning. For example, in describing a National Production Conference held in the summer of 1961, Boorstein writes:

The interrelations between different sectors of the economy would become clearer; it would be seen, for example, that limits on manpower can affect the sugar crop, foreign exchange earnings, and the balance of payments; and that limits on foreign exchange can affect the standard of living and agricultural and industrial growth... [one of the] main themes of the conference ... [was]: resources have their limits, priorities must be fixed; the economy must be organized by an over-all economic plan. Realism and calculation were beginning to merge with revolutionary enthusiasm and impetus (pp. 127, 122).

More important, Boorstein shows how the Cubans came to discard the "standard" industrializing models of socialist economic growth in favor of one more suited to Cuba's needs and resources. He demonstrates that it was not a "one-crop economy" which was the root of all Cuba's evils, but a one-crop economy embedded in an imperialist system. Structural unemployment and idle land were concomitants of a privately owned, capitalist sugar industry, which favored a shorter harvest season, and would rather leave land idle in reserve to

handle sudden rises in the price of sugar on the world market, than work for broader social benefits by producing to capacity and lengthening the harvest season. Furthermore, this industry saw no reason to experiment with irrigation techniques and fertilization techniques (which has recently increased the productivity of some of Cuba's sugar land two to three times), since they made enough of a profit without having to invest in such methods. Today in Cuba there is a labor shortage and mechanization of sugar harvesting is a top priority.

The labor shortage is a result of a growing demand for labor from growing light industries, diversified agriculture and stock-raising. According to Major Alberto Mora (Minister of Foreign Commerce), Cuba has at present turned to exporting over developing heavy industry, knowing that the foreign exchange brought in by sugar and cattle exports can purchase machinery needed for other industries. Once growth is sustained, there may not be as much need to rely

on a few exports to supply capital for development, and many more internal demands will be met from domestic agriculture and industry. But the Cuban case demonstrates that, having become politically independent, and having made the choice of an egalitarian distribution of income rather than an "efficient economy," a country does not have to be handicapped by its reliance on a few key exports.

Notes

1. See A. Gundar Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. (New York and London: 1967), and James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?*
2. With tobacco, minerals and coffee added to sugar, close to 98% of Cuba's total exports were accounted for.
3. Page 37. Even these figures are questionable; they are probably underestimates. The "Sources" for this data states: "The table is based on apparent nationality of the reputed ownership of stock organization owning or leasing sugar mill." Furthermore, these figures do not take into account interlocking ownership and control between American and Cuban companies.



BRECHT on the record

Each of the six albums is listed at \$5.95; less at discount houses. Postage-free at list price from Folkways, 701 7th Avenue, New York City (or, in the case of *A Man's A Man*, from Spoken Arts, 95 Valley Road, New Rochelle, New York).

You will also want BENTLEY ON BIERMANN: songs of the East German Yev-tushenko. Another Folkways release — April 1968.

- THE ELEPHANT CALF / cast album of the Brecht extravaganza, plus Eric Bentley's suite DEAR OLD DEMOCRACY. *Ash-Folkways* 9831
- You • BENTLEY ON BRECHT / music by Weill, Eisler, Wolpe, Dessau. *Folkways* (FH-5434)
- will • BRECHT BEFORE THE UNAMERICAN COMMITTEE / a recording of the actual encounter of Brecht with the notorious Parnell Thomas. *Folkways* (FD-5531)
- want • SONGS OF HANNS EISLER / 28 songs, mostly by Brecht, sung by Eric Bentley. *Folkways* (FH5433)
- to • THE EXCEPTION AND THE RULE / the original Off-Broadway cast album of the whole play, music by Wolpe. *Folkways* (FL 9849)
- own • A MAN'S A MAN / the original Off-Broadway cast album with John Heffernan as Galy Gay. *Spoken Arts* (SA 870)
- these •
- six •
- record •
- albums:

VIET - REPORT
133 West 72nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10023

BULK RATE
U. S. POSTAGE PAID Permit No. 5730 New York, N. Y.

Special to readers of VIET REPORT: Mention this ad in your order and get a 20% discount on

MR Books on Latin America
PRESS

THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CUBA by Edward Boorstein. "Stands in a class by itself ... not only because it was written by an 'insider' (Boorstein worked from 1960-63 as an economist in the Cuban National Bank and the Ministry of Foreign Commerce), or because it contains the first account of the real problems which the Cubans face in running a socialist economy but because ... it lays bare the nature of imperialism in all its concrete detail." — *Viet Report*. \$7.95

REMINISCENCES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR by Che Guevara. Most complete text in English—with picture and letter sections. "Testament, textbook, the absolute truth, putting to shame the pretenders and privileged of the contemporary world.... Bound to have powerful meaning to the youth of America." — *Collegiate Press Service*. \$6.95

CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA by Andre Gunder Frank. "Contains not only two excellent case studies of Chile and Brazil, but a sweeping reinterpretation of Latin American and world capitalist economic history.... Highly recommended." — *Choice* (publication of the Association of College and Research Libraries). \$7.50

PUERTO RICO: FREEDOM AND POWER IN THE CARIBBEAN by Gordon K. Lewis. "By far the best general survey of Puerto Rico ever written." — *American Historical Review*. \$12.50

CUBA: ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy. "Essential reading for all Americans who want to understand what is happening in Cuba." — *I. F. Stone's Weekly*. paper \$2.95

DOLLAR DIPLOMACY by Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman. "Written more than forty years ago, the book continues to be valuable for the light it throws on the early origins of an American policy which has been greatly accelerated and vastly widened in recent years." — *The Book Exchange* (London). \$6.50

Also from our List on Latin America:

Whither Latin America? by Carlos Fuentes and others. cloth \$3.25; paper \$1.75

The Ordeal of British Guiana by Philip Reno. cloth \$3.25; paper \$1.00

The Second Revolution in Cuba by J. P. Morray. cloth \$3.25

The United States, Cuba, and Castro by W. A. Williams. cloth \$5.00

Revolution in the Revolution? by Regis Debray. cloth \$4.00

Guerrilla Warfare by Che Guevara. cloth \$3.50

The Man at the Door with the Gun: Explosion over Latin America by Cedric Belfrage. cloth \$4.50
paper \$2.75

Be sure to enclose sales tax, where applicable, and 20 cents for postage and handling when you order. Order directly from: **MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS**

116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011

VIET-REPORT
133 West 72nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10023

- ☐ Please enter my one-year subscription to VIET-REPORT at \$4. Out of US add \$1.
- ☐ I want to save \$1. Please enter my two-year subscription to VIET-REPORT at \$7.
- ☐ Please renew my sub for (one year/two years).

Please send my subscription to:

Name _____
Street _____
City/State/Zip _____

Please send a gift subscription to:

Name _____
Street _____
City/State/Zip _____

- ☐ Payment Enclosed (VIET-REPORT will send extra bonus issue).
- ☐ Bill Me. I will send payment on receipt of first issue.