

81-7.175



AIR WAR

THE THIRD INDOCHINA WAR

LAO REFUGEE DRAWING



A Handbook Prepared by
PROJECT AIR WAR AND THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

Project Air War and the Indochina Resource Center are projects of the Indochina Education Council which was established by agencies of the United Church of Christ, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and the United Methodist Church to help meet the crucial need for informing the American people about the ongoing war in Indochina.

PROJECT AIR WAR

PROJECT AIR WAR is one of the major information centers in the country studying and analyzing the ongoing war, a conflict which has escalated in the air even as U.S. foot-soldiers have been withdrawn. The Project provides both authoritative statistical data about today's automated war and a tragic picture of what life is like for hundreds of thousands of Indochinese peasants living under constant bombing.

Project material has already appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Time, Boston Globe, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, Congressional Record, CBS and NBC national news, the Mutual Radio network, transcripts of Congressional hearings, and a wide variety of other publications.

Project staff members speak at community meetings, college campuses, and academic gatherings; are called upon frequently by congressional offices and media representatives for background information; and work closely with several national peace groups.

INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

The INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER serves as an independent clearinghouse for information on contemporary Indochina. The Center incorporates nine general sponsors from the academic community and sixteen academic associates who provide a wide range of inputs.

The Center provides reliable, up-to-date information from specialists on the social, economic, cultural, political, and historical realities of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. This information, which is often otherwise unavailable, is made accessible to Congress, journalists, peace groups, and others concerned with Indochina through the twice-monthly newsletter, Indochina Chronicle, in books and articles, as well as by direct contact. The Center also provides direct answers to specific requests, sets up briefings and seminars, and is currently developing a series of audio-visual exhibits on Indochina for loan.

Cover and following essay by a 29 year old Lao refugee.

"There was a pagoda on the hill right next to my village. The airplanes shot it and started a fire. Two monks were killed there together. On account of the war. The planes thought that there were soldiers in the pagoda so they shot it. But there weren't any. Only the monks died.

--from Voices from the Plain of Jars, ed. by F. Branfman, Harper and Row, 1972. Original collection of essays and drawings by Laotian peasants.

AIR WAR

THE THIRD INDOCHINA WAR

A HANDBOOK PREPARED BY

PROJECT AIR WAR AND THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

MARCH 1972

COPYRIGHT 1972 BY THE
INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER
1322 18TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IS GRANTED
TO NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS. PLEASE CREDIT AND
FORWARD TWO COPIES FOR OUR FILES.

PRICE: \$1.50; 10 or more, \$1.00; Add 20% for shipping.

"In the defense report which I made to Congress this year, I tried to point out that we would be continuing air and sea power and the presence of air and sea power in Asia for a good time... This idea that somehow or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia is a great mistake..."

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on NBC's "Meet the Press," November 14, 1971.

Introduction

This handbook has been prepared by PROJECT AIR WAR and the INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER, two Washington-based research projects concerned with the air war. The material presented in this handbook is but a fraction of the information on file in our offices, and we welcome requests for further help.

This manual was conceived in the belief that this election year 1972 may well be the most crucial period in the Indochina War. The war is not ending. It is not even "winding down." The Nixon Administration is waging a massive and highly sophisticated air war which is even more destructive than the ground war of preceding years.

Ironically, domestic opposition to the war has been diminishing. Domestic dissent in the past has been largely due to high draft calls, numerous American casualties, and extensive press coverage. In today's air war, however, conscription and American deaths are down, and news is carefully managed. The air war has been removed from the front pages and TV screens. As a result, many Americans have been convinced that the war is ending.

This handbook has been designed to help U.S. newsmen, political figures and peace groups do what correspondents in Indochina can no longer do: reveal the facts about today's air war to the American people. The graphics and source material are intended especially for use in leaflets, speeches, articles, posters and brochures.

The manual is divided into three sections:

1. Documented source material on the air war -- Material is broken down into 17 topics. A fact sheet has been prepared on each topic, consisting primarily of statistics and quotes from the Department of Defense, Congressional hearings, books, and newspaper and magazine articles.
2. Graphics -- The middle section of the handbook contains camera-ready photographs, drawings by bombing victims, and charts, diagrams and cartoons on the air war.
3. Resource Bibliography -- A list of readily available groups, articles, pamphlets, audio-visual and other materials for further action-oriented research on the air war is appended.

It is our belief that the use which is made of this handbook and similar information will play a crucial role in ending the Indochina War. Public pressure to end the war in this election year will depend to a large extent on public awareness of the full extent of today's air war.

The effects of the Third Indochina War will be felt far beyond Indochina. It is clear that the air war represents a new age in the history of military conflict, an era of automated war. One of the few limitations on our leaders to wage such war now and in the future is informed public opinion here at home.

Public awareness of the air war in this key election year may well affect the fate of millions throughout the Third World in the years to come.

Abbreviations

Publications and Wire Services:

<u>AmRep</u>	<u>American Report</u>
<u>AP</u>	<u>Associated Press</u>
<u>Chronicle</u>	<u>Indochina Chronicle</u>
<u>Cornell study</u>	<u>The Air War in Indochina</u> , Center for International Studies, Cornell University
<u>CR</u>	<u>Congressional Record</u>
<u>DNSI</u>	<u>Dispatch News Service International</u>
<u>Harvey</u>	<u>Air War: Vietnam</u> , by Frank Harvey
<u>Monitor</u>	<u>Christian Science Monitor</u>
<u>NewRep</u>	<u>The New Republic</u>
<u>NYP</u>	<u>New York Post</u>
<u>NYT</u>	<u>New York Times</u>
<u>PNS</u>	<u>Pacific News Service</u>
<u>Post</u>	<u>Washington Post</u>
<u>Star</u>	<u>Washington Star</u>
<u>UPI</u>	<u>United Press International</u>

Organizations and other:

<u>AFSC</u>	<u>American Friends Service Committee</u>
<u>ARVN</u>	<u>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</u>
<u>CCAS</u>	<u>Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars</u>
<u>CamAF</u>	<u>Cambodian Air Force</u>
<u>DoD</u>	<u>Department of Defense</u>
<u>DRV</u>	<u>Democratic Republic of Vietnam</u>
<u>FY</u>	<u>Fiscal Year (begins July 1, ends June 30)</u>
<u>GAO</u>	<u>General Accounting Office</u>
<u>GPO</u>	<u>Government Printing Office</u>
<u>Ibid.</u>	<u>Same source as quoted above</u>
<u>IVS</u>	<u>International Voluntary Service</u>
<u>NARMIC</u>	<u>National Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex</u>
<u>NEARMIC</u>	<u>New England Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex</u>
<u>NLF</u>	<u>National Liberation Front of South Vietnam</u>
<u>PAW</u>	<u>Project Air War</u>
<u>PRG</u>	<u>Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam</u>
<u>RLAF</u>	<u>Royal Laotian Air Force</u>
<u>SSAC</u>	<u>Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate</u>
<u>SRS</u>	<u>Senate Subcommittee on Refugees</u>
<u>USAF</u>	<u>United States Air Force</u>
<u>VNAF</u>	<u>Vietnamese (South) Air Force</u>

Table of Contents

PAGE

1	OVERVIEW: Automated, Total and Secret War
5	Dimensions
7	Aircraft
9	Aircraft Carriers
11	CIA and Mercenary Air Forces
13	Automated Warfare: Mechanized War and the Electronic Battlefield
16	Ordnance
18	Costs
20	Corporate Involvement
22	POWs - Pawns of War
24	Secrecy - Executive Dictatorship
26	Ineffectiveness
29	Impersonality - Warfare from a Distance
31	Life under the Bombs
34	Civilian Casualties
37	Environmental Destruction
39	War Crimes
42	Spirit of Resistance
45	RESOURCES
45	Groups
46	Articles and Reprints
48	Subcommittee Reports
48	Congressional Record
49	Books
50	Other

GRAPHICS

22 pages of camera-ready photographs, drawings, charts, diagrams, and cartoons are located in the center section between pages 22 and 23 of the text.

Overview

A giant apparatus of destruction is today firmly installed in and around Indochina. Fifty thousand American airmen and 500 strike aircraft ranging from the huge B-52 to the killer gunship, located at a dozen mammoth airbases and aircraft carriers, are waging full-scale aerial warfare.

The Nixon Administration, while removing U.S. foot soldiers, remains fully committed to a 20-year-old goal of American leaders: keeping U.S.-supported regimes in power in Indochina.

For this reason the Administration has invaded Cambodia and southern Laos, doubled the bombing of Laos and introduced 10,000 new Thai soldiers there, renewed the bombing of North Vietnam, dropped over 3 million tons of bombs on Indochina and killed, wounded or made homeless over 3 million civilians (source: SRS). For the same reason the Administration's newest negotiating stance still insists that the U.S. government have a say in determining who will rule in Indochina, the very reason the war has been fought for over two decades.

Tactics have changed, but the goals have not. The Nixon Administration took office committed both to maintain pro-American Indochinese governments and to withdraw American ground troops from Vietnam. Under the Nixon Doctrine the Third Indochina War (1969-?) began, substituting American air power for American ground troops. The First Indochina War (1946-54) was primarily a French colonial war; the Second Indochina War (1961-68) was the Kennedy-Johnson commitment of American ground troops. The Second Indochina War proved too costly to maintain.

The Nixon Administration has thus turned to a new form of war, one in which machines do most of the killing and destruction, unknown to the American people; a war in which an American President can claim to be bringing peace even as he continues to wage a full-scale and bloody war from the air.

Militarily, this new war is a variation of former Gen. James Gavin's "enclave" strategy. A majority of the people of Indochina has been concentrated in and around the major towns and bases. Within these American-controlled zones, a wide variety of political, economic and cultural measures are undertaken to break the spirit and culture of resistance which has thus far proved the main obstacle to U.S. military success. The vast regions outside the American-controlled zones--including two-thirds of Laos, three-quarters of Cambodia, all of North Vietnam, and much of South Vietnam--are basically free-fire zones, subject to American bombing any time of the day or night. Well over two-thirds of Indochina has thus been turned into a virtual free-fire zone where the new warfare is being tested.

This new war is automated war, waged by machine with ground troops playing a secondary role; it is total war, making no distinction between military and civilian targets, destroying everything below; and it is secret war, carried out without the knowledge of the American people.

This new war is the air war, the Third Indochina War.

AUTOMATED WAR

Always in the past air power has been used to supplement a large expeditionary ground force sent abroad. Substantial bombing has, of course, been carried out before: during World War II, the Korean War, the Second Indochina War. But in the past such bombing has always been meant to support an expeditionary ground army which did the bulk of the fighting and dying. Between 1965 and 1968, for example, most American bombing was employed to aid the half million strong American ground force in South Vietnam by weakening NLF rear bases, supply lines, and strike teams.

What is new today is that bombing is the heart of American military policy; ground forces play a secondary, though still important, role. American air power today does more fighting, costs more, and involves more men than the dwindling force of U.S. foot soldiers still engaged in combat. Asian foot soldiers are used to support American bombers by: (1) "showing the flag" when going in after bombing has caused guerrilla retreat and taking out supplies and refugees; (2) providing static defense for the major towns and bases; and (3) serving as "live bait" to draw guerrilla fire so American pilots will have some idea where to bomb.

TOTAL WAR

The air war, by its very nature, is destroying everything below: homes, schools, gardens, pagodas, rice fields, forests, animal life and, of course, any people caught in the open.

When American leaders chose to massively bomb the poor, rural lands of Indochina, they inevitably undertook war against the society as a whole. The only strictly "military" targets regularly locatable from the air were roads and bridges, with the exception of a few North Vietnamese factories destroyed early in 1965. Other "military" targets, such as soldiers, trucks, arms depots, or anti-aircraft batteries, are but sporadically found and are assumed to be intermixed with the civilian population. The Air Force and Navy have introduced hundreds of aircraft into the skies of Indochina, ordering that aircraft must be used as often as possible and cannot return to base without dropping their bombs. As a result, pilots inevitably wind up systematically destroying the civilian and social infrastructure.

One of the most striking examples of this total war from the air is the Plain of Jars in northeastern Laos. The Plain of Jars was a thriving, vibrant community of 50,000 when the Pathet Lao guerrilla movement occupied it in May, 1964. The United States then began bombing it, striking in ever-increasing intensity until September, 1969, when U.S.-supported Meo guerrillas took the survivors off the Plain. During these years, everything on the Plain was leveled. Today it is a deserted wasteland. There was almost no ground fighting on the Plain during these 5-1/2 years. It is the first society in history to be erased from the map by total, automated war.

SECRET WAR

Through blatant news management, the Nixon Administration has been able to wage a full-scale war while convincing most Americans that it is attempting to end the war. Secrecy is the means of keeping the war politically "acceptable."

The public was first informed of the Laos air strikes in March, 1970, six years and 350,000 sorties after they began. Sen. William Fulbright complained at that time that, "The President does not have the authority, nor has the Congress given authority to engage in combat operations in Laos, whether on the land or in the air." The Nixon Administration has unilaterally expanded the air war into Cambodia and recently reinitiated massive bombing of North Vietnam. With the air war's funding scattered in the general budgets of the services and the CIA, it eludes effective control by Congress.

The Nixon Administration has prohibited the press from observing most of the air war first-hand, by refusing to allow newsmen to go on bombing raids outside South Vietnam, keeping unsympathetic journalists off Thai airbases, and not allowing free access to American pilots in Udorn, Thailand. Since such censorship was not practiced in Vietnam (newsmen were always permitted to go out on bombing raids, and have free access to bases and pilots there), it is clearly not due to any need for military security. Rather, the goal seems to be to keep the truth from the American people.

Before 1969, 70 percent of the tonnage fell within South Vietnam (source: Cornell study) and most of the bombing was carried out from South Vietnamese airbases. Since 1969, two-thirds of the tonnage has fallen outside South Vietnam (*Ibid.*), mostly from Thai airbases. The Administration has refused to fly newsmen to scenes of battle in Laos and Cambodia, where most of the fighting has taken place. Newsmen are only infrequently taken in on short, packaged tours, and are invariably kept away from freshly bombed areas. Thus newsmen usually have been unable to observe newly bombed regions taken by American-supported troops. Once again, this was not the policy in South Vietnam, where first-hand reports of aerial devastation did much to create sentiment against the war in this country.

Administration officials have successfully created the illusion of a sterile, antiseptic air war waged only against "military" targets. They have done this by: (1) classifying all information about the air war besides overall tonnage and numbers of airmen out of public and congressional reach; (2) coining such euphemisms as "protective reaction" and "limited duration protective reaction" strikes to mask massive and sustained bombing raids; and (3) maintaining time and time again, in press conferences, speeches, and congressional hearings, that civilian targets are never bombed.

Reports are filtering back to the states that the U.S. has begun clandestine bombing in

northern Thailand. The reports may or may not be true, but the point is that unless Congress and the press are permitted to investigate such claims, there can be no effective check on the President's power to bomb anywhere, at any time.

THE FUTURE

The Nixon Administration has made it clear on numerous occasions that it has no intention of ending this automated, total, and secret war.

Indeed, all prospects are for further intensification and escalation of the Third Indochina War. In February, 1972, for example, it was revealed that the number of B-52s and aircraft carriers in the Indochinese theater would be doubled.

By November, 1972, the Third Indochina War will be the second longest in American history (surpassed only by Johnson's ground war). Unless Americans elect a President committed to total withdrawal, there is no end in sight.

The agony of Indochina may have only begun.

Dimensions

The air war continues at a high level. During 1971, 763,000 tons--the equivalent of 35% of all American air ordnance expended during World War II--were dropped on Indochina (DoD). The potential for sudden escalation remains great, as exemplified by the 5-day Christmas raids against North Vietnam and the more than ten-fold increase in strikes within South Vietnam during February.

The Cornell study cites Pentagon plans to continue the air war at the current level. B-52 sorties, for example, down from a peak of 1,600 a month to 1,000 a month, are programmed to continue indefinitely at the current rate. In defending the bombing, Administration spokesmen invariably point to reductions from 1969 levels, thus laying the groundwork for permanent prosecution of an air war at "acceptable levels."

The operational heart of the bombing has shifted from South Vietnam to land bases in Thailand and aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. Already 45,000 of the 73,000 U.S. air personnel directly involved with the bombing are located outside of Indochina proper. May 1, 1972 will mark the first time that the number of American airmen and American ground troops in Indochina will be equal in the history of this war or perhaps any war.

Geographically, the brunt of the bombing has shifted from inside North and South Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia. Under Nixon the bombing of Laos has doubled, and all of the 150,000 tons over Cambodia have fallen since May 1970. Recently, for all practical purposes, the Johnson bombing halt over North Vietnam has ended.

During the last three years the technology of the automated battlefield has escalated and the size of the South Vietnamese Air Force has been increased until it now stands as the sixth largest air force in the world.

SORTIES AND TONNAGES

Sorties 1971

USAF.....160,000
VNAF..... 36,000
(DoD)

Tonnages 1971

"Allied".....763,000 tons (DoD)
South Vietnam...270,000 tons*
Laos.....445,000 tons*
Cambodia..... 90,000 tons*

*Cornell study

Note: Totals for the breakdown tally slightly higher than the DoD figures for total "Allied." Tonnage and sortie figures for "protective reaction" strikes are not included.

Protective Reaction Strikes

1970.....21 (DoD)
1971.....108 (DoD)
1972 (first 35 days)..35 (DoD)

c) 5 times the tonnage dropped on Japan during World War II (154,000 tons);
d) 23 times the total tonnage dropped by the British during their successful ten year counter-insurgency in Malaya (33,000 tons).
(Library of Congress Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Impact of the Vietnam War, 6/71, and the Cornell study)

The total of 6.3 million tons of bombs (DoD) dropped on Indochina from 1965-1971 represents:
a) 250 pounds for every man, woman, and child in Indochina (population 49 million);
b) 22 tons for every square mile of territory in Indochina (area 284,000 square miles or about the size of Texas);
c) More than twice the 3.1 million tons of bombs dropped during World War II and the Korean War combined.
(Impact of the Vietnam War)

The majority of the bombs dropped on Indochina have been dropped since President Nixon took office (3.2 million tons since 1969--DoD). The current bombing rate, 50,000 tons during November and 61,000 tons during December, represents:
a) More than 2 1/2 Hiroshimas a month;
b) More than 3 million pounds a day;
c) More than 2,000 pounds or a ton a minute.

The 3/4 million tons of bombs dropped on Indochina in 1971 represent:

- The explosive equivalent of 38 Hiroshimas (one Hiroshima = 20,000 tons);
- 80% of the air ordnance expended during the 3 year Korean War (966,000 tons);

The Executive branch has made it clear on many occasions that it intends to wage a prolonged air war:

"I am not going to place any limitations upon the use of air power."

(Pres. Nixon, 2/17/71)

"Under the [Nixon] Doctrine," Laird said, "the United States is prepared to provide material assistance and air and sea assistance to our allies and friends in Asia."

(Post, 1/21/71)

"U.S. ships and warplanes will remain on duty in Southeast Asia after the last American soldier leaves Vietnam," Defense Secretary Laird indicated yesterday."

(Post, 4/4/71)

If necessary, we will "not only continue our air strikes, we will have to step them up."

(Pres. Nixon, 11/12/71)

"In the defense report which I made to Congress this year, I tried to point out that we would be continuing air and sea power and the presence of air and sea power in Asia...This idea that somehow or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia is a great mistake."

(Sec. Laird, "Meet the Press," 11/14/71)

"High level DoD officials say there are no current plans to cut any of these forces [400+ attack bombers in Southeast Asia]...The Administration now appears to be approaching the level [of airpower] which will be maintained indefinitely."

(Michael Getler, Post, 1/14/72)

"Air sorties in southeast Asia will also be stepped up by 50%."

(From a privileged account of a National Security Council meeting; reported by Jack Anderson, Post, 1/20/72)

"The buildup reflects what informed officials say is a U.S. intention to use all air assets available."

(Post, 2/10/72 on the dispatch of an extra carrier to the Gulf of Tonkin and the readying of additional attack aircraft)

MEN, BASES, AND AIRCRAFT

Until mid-February, two aircraft carriers were regularly on station in the South China Sea with 13,000 men and approximately 120-150 attack aircraft. The recent addition of the Kitty Hawk and Constellation has doubled the force, raising it to the peak levels realized in 1968.

(CBS News, 2/9/72)

With the addition of the third and fourth carrier to the South China Sea and the activation of 40 additional B-52s, there are now nearly

600 attack aircraft in Southeast Asia. These additions have increased the American bombing force in Indochina by more than 40%.

South Vietnam

As of January 6, 1972 there were 28,000 U.S. airmen stationed within South Vietnam (DoD). Their numbers are scheduled to decline to 16,000 by May 1.

Danang remains a major strike base. Cam Ranh Bay, a major support base, is where the 7-1/2 ton "Commando Vault" bombs are flown from. Several other bases, including Tan Son Nhut, are used regularly by U.S. aircraft.

Thailand

This is the heart of the air war. There are currently (1/72) 32,000 U.S. military personnel in Thailand (DoD), and 215 attack bombers (Michael Getler, Post, 1/14/72) stationed at the following five bases:

- 1) Udorn, control center for the air war;
- 2) Utopao, home for approx. 45 B-52s;
- 3) Ubon, source of most F-4 activity over Cambodia;
- 4) Korat, base for the radar planes of the electronic war;
- 5) Nakhon Phanom (NKP), location of the automated war's computers.

(CBS News, 12/71)

Bomb Tonnage by Theater
(Thousands of tons)

	SVN	NVN	No. Laos	Trail (Laos)	Cam-bodia	Total
1965	218	63	10	23		314
1966	302	136	11	63		512
1967	598	226	19	91		934
1968	1,059	180	22	171		1,432
1969	957	--	189	240		1,386
1970	511	3	128	266	67	975
1971	<u>238</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>296</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>764</u>
	3,883	614	494	1,150	176	6,317

Source: Cornell study

Note the yearly totals may differ by as much as .3% from DoD figures due to rounding.

Aircraft

The aircraft used in the Third Indochina War are organized in the following manner: aircraft in South Vietnam are under the command and logistical support of the 7th Air Force, headquartered at Tan Son Nhut Air Base; aircraft stationed in Thailand (with the exception of B-52s) are under the command and logistical support of the joint 7th/13th Air Force, headquartered at Udorn Air Force Base; B-52s, stationed at Utapao Air Force Base, Thailand, are under the command of the 8th Air Force (Strategic Air Command); the aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin (Yankee Station) are under the control of the 7th Fleet representative in Saigon.

Bases that are under U.S. control, and conduct attack missions are: TAN SON NHUT, CAM RAHN BAY, and DANANG in SOUTH VIETNAM (only Danang flies missions outside of South Vietnam); UDORN, UBON, KHORAT, NAKHON PHANOM, and UTAPAO in THAILAND are engaged in the bombing of locations outside of South Vietnam (North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). There are usually two aircraft carriers on Yankee Station at all times. In principle, each base or carrier has a tenant WING, with 75-100 aircraft. The wings are divided into SQUADRONS, with approximately 20-25 aircraft assigned to each squadron. When necessary, squadrons may be further broken down into DETACHMENTS of 5-10 aircraft. In addition to its tenant wing, each base or carrier may have a number of detachments from other wings to carry out specific mission assignments (crash rescue, reconnaissance, base defense, etc.)

A mission (or strike) is a flight by one or more aircraft. A sortie is a single flight by an aircraft.

There are over 300 land based combat aircraft (excluding B-52s) involved in the air war. The number of carrier based combat aircraft fluctuates with the number of ships on Yankee Station at any time.

The aircraft in use in Indochina can be divided into 8 categories:

FIGHTER-BOMBERS (F-4, F-100, F-105, F-5, F-8), designed for world wide mobility with supersonic speeds. These aircraft are designed for either air-to-air combat or air-to-ground combat roles. These aircraft often fly "cover" for unarmed reconnaissance and cargo flights and B-52s.

ATTACK AIRCRAFT (A-1, A-4, A-6, A-7, A-37, A-3, T-28, and A-26) are generally subsonic aircraft designed specifically for air-to-ground combat. Attack aircraft have the ability to stay over their targets longer, carry more ordnance, and deliver their ordnance with more accuracy than fighter-bombers.

OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT (O-1, O-2, OV-10) are used primarily by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) for spotting targets from the air and directing attacks on them. These aircraft carry white phosphorus rockets for marking targets, and may carry a 7.62 mm mini-gun for strafing.

GUNSHIPS (AC-47, AC-54, AC-119, AC-130, UH-1 Huey helicopter, AH-1G "Cobra" helicopter) are flying gun platforms. The primary weapons are the 7.62 mm "Gatling" gun and the 20 mm "Vulcan" cannon. Both types of weapons are capable of firing 6,000 rounds of ammunition per minute, from a single gun. These weapons are designed primarily for close air support or to stalk mobile targets.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AIRCRAFT (EC-47, EC-119, EC-121, EB-57, EC-130, EB-66) act as airborne command centers and relay stations for ground sensors. They can also function as electronic counter-measures aircraft, jamming radar and producing signals that will mislead detection and gunnery systems on the ground.

RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (RF-4C, RA-5, EC-47, SR-71) utilize camera and radar systems to make photo images and electronic signals for both pre and post bombing analysis. Systems used on these aircraft include: infra-red cameras and radar capable of picking out life by the difference between body heat and jungle heat, side-looking radar capable of transmitting reports to a ground station and making a permanent photo-image simultaneously.

BOMBERS (B-52 and B-57) are used for both strategic and tactical bombing missions. The B-57 operates at low levels, at the same altitude as a regular fighter-bomber. The B-52 operates at altitudes of 30,000 feet, isolating the aircrew from any chance of seeing their targets or victims.

SUPPORT AIRCRAFT (C-47, C-54, C-7, C-130, U-3, T-39, etc.) comprise the rest of the almost 1,000 aircraft in the 7th Air Force. These aircraft are used for medical evacuation, cargo and troop transportation, and any other miscellaneous activities that do not require a combat aircraft.

The skies of Indochina are covered with an umbrella of aircraft at any time of the day or night; FACs and observation aircraft at 2,000 feet; attack and gunships at 5,000 feet; fighter-bombers at 7,000 feet; reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft at 10,000 feet; KC-135 tankers at 20,000 feet, B-52 bombers at 30,000 feet, and the SR-71 at 70,000 feet.

The brunt of the air war today is being carried out by F-4s, B-52s, and gunships.

"The 7th Air Force has 33,000 military personnel and nearly 1,000 aircraft."
(Air Force Magazine, 5/71)

"The B-52s bomb these [Ho Chi Minh] trail entrances daily, each dropping as many as 150 bombs of 500 pounds."
(Craig Whitney, NYT, 12/3/71)

"[AC-47s] can start their deadly circle quickly, and in three seconds cover the area of an entire football field with one bullet in every square foot."
(Lt. Col. Thomas Rickelsmen, USAF, St. Louis Post Dispatch, 11/24/65)

"When they [gunships] fire their guns, it looks as if a stream of brilliant candy apples is streaking from the aircraft to the ground."
(Sgt. Robert Lessels, USAF, Air Force Magazine, 11/71)

"The Americans unleashed the terrifying 'Puff the Magic Dragon' [AC-47] and I could visualize the scene below. Men, women, children, caught like rats in a flood...No place to hide, no way to plead their case of innocence to the machine in the sky, no time to prepare for death."
(Quaker worker, Quang Nai hospital, South Vietnam, Vietnam, 1969)

"The Douglas AC-47 'Spooky', the Fairchild-Hiller AC-119 'Shadow' and the Lockheed AC-130 'Stinger'...are all fitted with side firing weapons--three 7.62mm Miniguns in the AC-47, four in the AC-119, and four 7.62[mm] guns and four 20mm cannons in the AC-130."
(Air Force Magazine, 5/71)

"The A-7 makes ground movement after dark a nightmare...the devastating accuracy of this aircraft is being applied to an increasing number of night missions."
(Vought Aeronautics advertisement, Air Force Magazine, 1/72)

"A fighter-pilot who was based at Danang told me, 'We are going four or five hundred knots, and we can't see much ourselves. I've never seen a body or a person yet, and I've been on over a hundred missions. It's virtually im-

possible to see any movement on the ground. The FAC is the expert. We're only experts in delivery."

(Jonathan Schell, The Military Half)

"...I flew with a FAC pilot from Texas...The standard FAC plane was a Cessna-1 Bird Dog. It seated two, one in front and one in back; had a single propeller; and was armed with four tubes containing phosphorus rockets, two tubes being mounted under each wing. It could fly as slowly as forty miles an hour, and could hold an extremely tight corkscrew turn when the pilot wanted to look at one small area of ground for a sustained period..."
(Ibid.)

"The converted D models of the B-52 can carry a total of 108 500-lb. bombs...This compares with the 51 capacity for either the 500 or 750-lb. bomb of the F versions available here when the aircraft first began operations in the summer of 1965. Total capacity of the D with 750-lb. bombs on board is 66..."

"The 750 and 500-lb. bombs continue to be the primary ordnance loads for the B-52's, although a variety of other ordnance currently is being employed."
(In the Name of America, 1968)

"...A military spokesman said today that the paratroopers had swept through part of the area of two B52 raids in the Iron Triangle last Friday. He said that 750-pound bombs with instantaneous fuses made craters only about four feet deep but blew down the jungle 300 feet around the crater.

"Delayed-fuse bombs, which go off after penetrating into the ground, left craters fifty feet wide, blew down trees to a distance of 75 feet from the crater rim and collapsed some tunnels 100 yards away.

"One 'complex' of about 25 farm huts was reported '75 per cent' destroyed by the B52s."
(Ibid.)

"Gen. TALBOTT: The backbone of our interdiction force has been tactical fighters--primarily F-4s. The F-4s are being used more at night...F-4 squadrons have been equipped with a very accurate (deleted) navigation system... These sensors are integrated through computers to deliver several types of weapons including laser guided bombs."

(Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)

Aircraft Carriers

More than any other weapon system, the attack carrier has been adapted to the kind of conflict with the Third World that has characterized U.S. military intervention since World War II. Once an arm of the fleet, designed to protect naval ships from air attack and to provide a long-range strike force against opposing naval forces, the attack carrier has become a mobile platform from which to launch air attack against ground targets.

The attack aircraft carrier is today playing a major role in the air war and is likely to play an even more important one in the future as U.S. ground troops and land-based air power is gradually withdrawn from South Vietnam. In February, 1972, three attack carriers were put on station in the Gulf of Tonkin, the largest number since the height of the bombing in 1968, and a fourth was on its way to join them. Though the actual number of combat sorties flown from carrier decks is kept secret, it is known that carriers launched almost half of the combat sorties against North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 at the rate of more than 4,500 sorties a month. The sortie rate for fiscal 1972 was reportedly budgeted at 3,000 sorties a month.

The role of the attack carrier in Indochina is not surprising. With more than 75 combat planes, a crew of 5,000, and a fully integrated operations system, each attack carrier can maintain full-scale combat operations off the coast of Vietnam for months at a time, free of reprisal from enemy forces and without fear of changes in the political situation in Indochina that might force the withdrawal of U.S. land-based forces. Over the last decade or so the weapons system of the attack carrier has been completely redesigned to fight conventional land wars. Its aircraft, which in World War II could carry at most several hundred pounds of bombs, are now capable of carrying 12-18,000 pounds of bombs, more than the heaviest bombers of World War II. Its radar systems were once designed for operation over water; they have now been redesigned for land operations, including navigation systems that automatically fly planes at ground level over mountainous terrain. Over the last decade the Navy has designed and employed over a dozen types of anti-personnel weapons, useless against ships but very effective for killing and maiming guerrilla forces and the peasant populations that support them.

As a result of these and other changes, the attack carrier has become a major weapon of counter-revolution. Its main role in the future will be much like its role in the past 25 years. Whether it will be Korea, China, Lebanon, Cuba, Thailand, Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Cambodia or Laos again, or whether it will be some other country of the Third World in which an American government wishes to intervene, the attack carrier is likely to be the first U.S. force engaged and the last one withdrawn.

Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, chief of the U.S. Navy, said, "American naval operations would continue in the Gulf of Tonkin as long as necessary to protect U.S. troops in Vietnam and that there were no plans to withdraw U.S. aircraft carriers from the waters around Vietnam." (Post, 2/27/72)

"Aboard the USS Enterprise - Navy Pilots, flying off this huge floating airfield and other carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, are playing a bigger role than ever in the continuing American air war.... Virtually all the thousands of strikes (1,700 from the Enterprise alone in the last month) flown at the infiltration routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in southern Laos are now launched either from the carriers or from air force bases in Thailand." (Post, 1/1/72)

"Officers aboard 7th Fleet ships off the coast of Vietnam disclosed that Navy strength has been reinforced from an average of 10 ships to 16, including the aircraft carrier Constellation and support ships. The US Command

made no mention of this or of the report that the manpower of the fleet was now 18,000 to 20,000 men instead of the 13,000 the Command had said.

(Boston Globe, 2/15/72)

"...the availability of a fourth carrier in the area will make it possible for the U.S. military command to keep at least three of the big ships on station at all times and available for strikes in the South, against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, or possibly in new reprisals against North Vietnam.

"Should things be going badly for the South Vietnamese, the United States could also forego rotating one of the carriers into port for a rest and keep all four on the line." (Post, 2/10/72)

"Since we do not have a fortress America strategic concept, the position that our country takes with respect to the rest of the world definitely determines the number of carriers and, for that matter, the entire structure of the Armed Forces..."

'This new carrier is not associated with particular force levels. It is needed to handle our modern aircraft, and it is needed to give the so-called long legs and mobility that is needed in this modern era. (Testimony before Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on the CVAN-70 Attack Carrier)

"The United States, of course, has a forward strategy. We are a maritime nation. We have operated our forces overseas because we prefer not to have to fight our wars within the United States. Therefore, we have designed our forces-- Air, Army and Navy--in such a way that they permit us to project power overseas...." (Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Former Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April, 1970)

What are the most probable warfare situations for carrier involvement in the future?...

"In the next 30 years, which is the lifespan of a carrier, most conflicts in which the United States will become involved will be below the threshold of general nuclear war.... Projecting the history of the past 20 years, if we become involved in a conflict it will most probably be a limited war similar to Korea or Vietnam...."

(Rear Adm. James L. Holloway, III, Former Chief of Strike Warfare Division, US Navy, April, 1970, CVAN-70 Attack Carrier Hearings)

"Yankee Station has had little or no publicity. Few people in the United States would know what you were talking about if you mentioned it. Yankee Station is not a siding in Back Bay, nor a rock 'n' roll radio station playing Colonial music. It's a position in the South China Sea about 100 miles northeast of Danang where American aircraft carriers cruise around in a methodical pattern and launch and recover fighter and bomber airplanes that are hitting North Vietnam...." (Harvey)

"The carrier on Yankee Station is a mobile, privileged sanctuary. It can be replenished from home with whatever it needs to fight. It can go anywhere in the world on short notice. It is immune from sneak missile attacks, since it is always moving. No capricious foreign government can order it closed (as can happen to a land base). The carrier can control its food, water, health and recreation very tightly. There are no mosquitoes to give you malaria...." (Ibid.)

"Navy aircraft carriers have now proven their worth in this Vietnam war--and their potential for any wars of similar type that might erupt sometime in the foreseeable future.... The Connie (note: Constellation) is a sea-going airfield that can move around at 35 knots; houses more than 5,000 officers, men and tech reps; can hurl jets off her four steam cats

like shooting beans; carries enough power to flatten targets just as flat as the Strategic Air Command's massive intercontinental bombers and missiles; can launch and recover day or night in very lousy weather; has a flight deck of 4 1/2 acres; carries dozens of planes-- fighters, bombers, photo-recon, radar picket, onboard delivery and planeguard helicopters." (Ibid.)

"Now, for a moment, let's look at the big picture of operations on Yankee Station. The three big attack carriers often work as a team, and the planes from all three ships - more than 200 of them - go off in coordinated waves in strikes against a single target, sometimes going back time after time for days, until that particular target is simply battered to a pile of dust and rubble...Raids like this are undertaken, from time to time, when it is decided to eliminate a target for good and all. They are devastating. Their destruction would have to be seen to be believed. Dry-bones communiqués detailing numbers of items hit and numbers of sorties flown simply do not tell the story at all." (Ibid.)

"Yankee Station happens to be one of the most important offensive bases of operations in this whole war, and nobody even knows the place exists, except for a few experts who follow these matters closely." (Ibid.)

"Aboard the 63,000 carrier Coral Sea...28 fliers in the Sundowners Squadron heard the news that two more of their comrades faced indefinite imprisonment in North Vietnam...The records say that Bob Pearl is 38 years old and that he has had four tours and 400 missions over Indochina since 1965...Were the raids on the North worthwhile? 'All we can see are our losses and no fruits for our efforts...I think people find it hard to agree with the party line about covering withdrawal...'So, it seems that the attack carriers of the Seventh Fleet, doomed to act as floating mail-order houses for high explosives, will sail on and on, Flying-Dutchman-fashion, until--as the joke has it--they run aground on their own accumulated garbage." (John Saar, Life Magazine, 2/4/72)

"Before long, the pilots and the planes will be the last warriors and weapons the United States has left in Indochina.

"And barring a breakthrough in efforts to reach a settlement of the war or a reversal of American policy, the U.S. air armada flying from bases in Thailand and as many as three carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, will remain indefinitely." (Post 3/2/72)

CIA and Mercenary Air Forces

CIA and local Asian air forces are playing a growing role in the air war as the Administration seeks to minimize overt American involvement. There is abundant documentation pointing to the participation of these air forces in opium smuggling as well as in combat. (See Ramparts, 4/71 for a fuller account.)

Local Asian air forces--supplied, maintained and directed by American "advisors"--are doing an increasing amount of the bombing. The size of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) has increased dramatically, and the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), and the Cambodian Air Force at slower rates. Although all the aircraft are piloted by Asians, Americans do everything else, from directing bomb loading to spotting for strikes.

Air America and Continental Airlines, privately owned, profit-making companies, operate under CIA direction and wage much of the supportive air war in Laos and Cambodia. The "charter" companies' planes perform troop transport and supply functions, spot for bombers, and engage in rescue operations for downed pilots. Air Force helicopters, helicopter gunships and giant C-130 cargo planes are "rented" to Air America for \$1 a year in Laos.

ASIAN AIR FORCES

American aid to VNAF, FY 1970-72: \$922 million
 American aid to RLAF, FY 1970-72: \$128 million
 (DoD, CR, 8/3/71)

"The Nixon Doctrine . . . was premised on the assumption . . . of increased U.S. military assistance."
 (Undersecy. of State U. Alexis Johnson, FY 1972 DoD Authorization Hearings)

"An important factor in carrying out the Nixon Doctrine will be our military assistance program. We are requesting 48 million for development and 70.4 million for procurement of the International Fighter. In addition, we are requesting 10 million for initial spares. This aircraft is needed to provide an air defense capability for [our] Asian allies."
 (Secy. of Air Force Robert C. Seamans, FY 1972 Senate DoD Appropriations Hearings)

Sen. Symington: "Are we going to continue to put these billions into Southeast Asia? Is that the overall plan in the U.S. today?"

Secy. Seamans: "For the foreseeable future we are going to continue to spend sizeable dollars in Southeast Asia."
 (Ibid.)

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

"South Vietnamese military officers continue to deal in large quantities of heroin and to transport it around South Vietnam in military aircraft."
 (Rep. Robert H. Steele, House Subcommittee on Europe, 7/7/71)

"The South Vietnamese Air Force is the sixth largest air force in the world."
 (Michael Getler, Post, 1/14/72)

VNAF INVENTORY

Year	Fixed Wing Attack Aircr.	Heli- copters	Total, inc. Cargo, recon.
1/69	approx. 100	approx. 125	approx. 575
1/72	(total FW & heli. 750+)		1,000+
1/73*	300-400	500-600	1,200

*projected
 (1969 and 1973 figures, Cornell study.
 1972 figures, DoD)

VNAF PERSONNEL

1968:	20,000	(slightly under)
1972 (Jan.):	45,000	
1973*:	50,000	

*projected
 (Ibid.)

VNAF ATTACK SORTIES

Year	Indochina	Laos	Cambodia
1968	2,250/mo.	none	none
1970	3,150/mo.	none	820
1971*	3,490/mo.	40	1,100

*as of July, 1971
 (Cornell study)

"Mr. Seamans acknowledged that the Vietnamese 'will never be able to build the capability to do all that the United States Air Force has been doing in Laos. The Vietnamese Air Force . . . does not possess either B-52s or F-4s, the jet planes that do most of the trail bombing, and there are no plans,' Mr. Seamans said, 'to give it any.'"
 (Craig Whitney, NYT, 12/6/71)

"VNAF is being geared to fight a war where it will continue to have complete air superiority." [This superiority will apparently be provided by U.S. aircraft operating from Thailand and carriers in the South China Sea.]
(Brig. Gen. Kendall S. Young, chief Air Force officer for Vietnamization)

Gen. Ryan: "They will not be able to supplant the complete U.S. Air Force in South Vietnam."
Sen. Case: "At any time?"
Gen. Ryan: "That is correct."
(Gen. John D. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, Senate FY 1972 DoD Appropriations Hearings)

ASIAN BLOOD, AMERICAN MONEY

"Lao T-28 bombers have attacked towns, Saravane being a well-known case in point. . . Laos Air Force pilots are . . . paid a bonus for each sortie so that there is an incentive not to adhere strictly to the rules of engagement [forbidding random bombing]."
(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on Laos, 4/71)

"There is a growing concern of the tendency of Laotian air force pilots from Luang Prabang and Long Cheng to dump their bomb loads on unauthorized targets, which is confirmed by U.S. military personnel. Only minutes after taking off the pilots reportedly hurry home to reload--and collect a dollar bonus for every sortie they fly. The indiscriminate bombing is causing loss of life on the ground and forcing villagers to flee their homes."
(D.E. Ronk, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/4/71)

"The VNAF bomb villages indiscriminately. They don't care where they bomb. A lot of times they'll wipe out a village because they or their commander has a grudge against it, maybe it wouldn't make the proper payoffs."
(Ronald Ridenhour, former G.I. whose insistent prodding broke the My Lai story, in a PAW interview)

CIA AIR FORCES

"There is a large U.S. civilian (paramilitary) fleet operating in Laos run by Air America, Continental Air and Lao Air Transport . . . under contract with AID, although funds are provided by AID, the DoD, CIA, and the State Department. The funding arrangements are worked out in Washington."
(Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on Laos, 4/71)

"Air America is under the management of George Dole, a CIA employee. . . . He is looking to the future, carefully developing the airlift capabilities of other companies he runs for the CIA, such as Southern Air

Transport. . . . The sole purpose for the existence of SAT is that the agency be ready for the contingency that some day it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country . . . without of course having to contend with the Congress or anybody else."

(Victor Marchetti, highest ranking CIA official to "go public," a former participant in CIA daily staff meetings chaired by director Richard Helms.)

CIA-DIRECTED AIR FORCES IN LAOS

Inventory
20 helicopters
12 C-123s*
7 C-7As*
10 Porters
7 C-46s
1 Volpar

Estimated Cost
FY 1970: \$23 million
FY 1971: \$26.2 million

Personnel
Air America: 276-415

(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on Laos, 4/71)

"The CIA has changed its rules in an attempt to stop the use of its private airline, Air America, for transport of drugs [opium and heroin] in Laos. Although only two months ago CIA director Richard Helms adamantly denied there had been any agency involvement in this traffic, he is now said to have told a secret Congressional hearing that there was involvement but it has stopped."
(Flora Lewis, Post, 7/23/71)

"The CIA has involved us in this covert operation, an opium war. The clandestine yet official operations of the U.S. government could be aiding and abetting heroin traffic here at home."
(Sen. John Tunney in a campaign speech before the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce)

"John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in testimony before the House Select Committee on Crime, said that middle-level government officials and military men throughout Southeast Asia were deeply involved in the traffic in opium, the product from which morphine and heroin is refined."
(Felix Belair, NYT, 6/6/71)

Automated Warfare

MECHANIZED WAR

A giant apparatus of mechanized war--consisting of aircraft, huge airbases and aircraft carriers--has become the centerpiece of American intervention in Indochina. When John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson chose to escalate, they increased U.S. ground troops; when Richard Nixon escalates, as on the 11th of February 1972, he dispatches more B52s and aircraft carriers.

The goal of this mechanized war is to replace U.S. personnel with machines, so as to reduce dollar costs; reduce domestic dissent occasioned by American deaths; increase combat efficiency by removing American foot-soldiers who will not fight; and remove the war from the political arena by making it secret and unsusceptible to congressional or public pressures.

.....

"In Vietnam where artillery and tactical air forces inflict over two thirds of the enemy casualties, firepower is responsive as never before. It can rain destruction anywhere on the battlefield within minutes...whether friendly troops are present or not...On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located, tracked, and targeted almost instantaneously through the use of data links, computer assisted intelligence evaluation, and automated fire control. With first round kill probabilities approaching certainty, and with surveillance devices that can continually track the enemy, the need for large forces to fix the opposition physically will be less important...Today, machines and technology are permitting economy of manpower on the battlefield, as indeed they are in the factory. But the future offers even more possibilities for economy. I am confident the American people expect this country to take full advantage of its technology--to welcome and applaud the developments that will replace wherever possible the man with the machine...

"I see battlefields or combat areas that are under 24 hour...surveillance of all types. I see battlefields on which we can destroy anything we locate, through instant communications and the almost instantaneous application of highly lethal firepower."
(Gen. William Westmoreland, CR, 10/16/69)

"For America in the '70s to follow this tactic--to fight a war with this technology and with mercenaries...so that we don't see the person we kill--is reprehensible. We kill people with technology because we don't have the will to fight ourselves."
(Rep. Paul McCloskey, National Observer, 1/8/72)

Although bombers now wage most of the war, Asian ground soldiers still play an important, if secondary, role. Bombers can kill and destroy, but they cannot hold territory; they cannot take refugees or search out enemy supplies; they often cannot locate their targets. These essential tasks are left to U.S.--supported Asian troops.

"Vang Pao (CIA-supported Meo leader in northern Laos) would move out, identify the enemy, pull back, and the air power would come in."
(Gen. Petit, SSAC, 12/15/71, p. 784)

"They're just using those kids as cannon fodder. The Americans send them out a few clicks so they can find out where the communists are. Then they call the bombers in. The Cambodians don't do anything and they're dying like flies. Sometimes they're even caught in the bombing raids themselves."
(Richard Boyle quoted in "Cambodia: Nixon Doctrine Incarnate," AmRep, 12/24/71)

"As the operation evolved...new tactics appeared, calling for the ARVN units to stay mobile...They reduced the heavily outnumbered ARVN battalions to the role of live bait. The troops spent their days and nights running and hiding while U.S. airpower struck at the pursuing North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Saigon spokesmen claimed the tactics were very successful, but some Vietnamese called them 'inhuman.'"
(John Saar, Life, 4/2/71)

General Williamson: "We are making unusual efforts to avoid having the American young man stand toe-to-toe, eyeball-to-eyeball, or even rifle-to-rifle against an enemy that may outnumber him on the battlefield. We are trying to fight the enemy with our bullets instead of the bodies of our young men--'firepower not manpower.'"

Senator Cannon: "In your judgment, will this type of equipment be effective in protecting our logistic and supply installations that will remain after we have substantially completed our Vietnamization program?"

General Williamson: "I am confident it will."
(Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)

General Evans: "Besides supporting real-time employment of Commando Bolt F-4s and gunships, sensor intelligence is an input for establishing most of the targets in Laos...What is most important, gentlemen, is that we can gather this type of intelligence without exposing one American soldier to enemy action."
(Ibid.)

THE ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD

The air war in Indochina has served as a laboratory for the development of elaborate and expensive electronic devices as instrumentation for an "electronic battlefield." The goal is automated and computerized warfare, providing an all-weather, day-night capability.

Areas have been seeded with air-dropped devices that can detect vibrations or people; they can listen to sounds; they may be sensitive to metallic objects, to heat radiation, or to chemical emanations from human beings. The information is transmitted by radio to receivers on mountain tops or in continuously airborne manned and unmanned communications aircraft. The signals are then relayed to a central computer in Thailand where the responses of the various sensors are correlated and the decision to strike a certain region is finalized.

A new system recently introduced in Indochina called PAVE PHANTOM is automated to the extent that the pilot need merely punch data on the desired target position in his computer's keyboard, together with information about his chosen weapon, and the computer will steer the aircraft over the target and release the weapon.

The chosen weapon is often another electronic wonder, a "smart bomb." One smart bomb is guided to its target by radar. Another, a laser bomb, homes in on a spot of light beamed from another plane flying at a safer level. The T.V. bomb has a television camera in its nose; "shown" a picture of the target, it homes in on the identical image on the ground.

Technology had made some conventional weapons, such as gunships, even more devastating. The new four-engined AC130E gunship, armed with rapid-firing 40 mm cannon, seeks its prey with infra-red vision devices, see-in-the-dark TV, and sensors that detect electrical noises of trucks' ignition systems. After being directed to the target area by ground computers, the aircraft is placed on the automatic system and the on-board computer takes over, flying the aircraft and aiming and shooting the cannon.

"The code name for the electronic operation is IGLOO WHITE. It was designated for fighting a war in hostile territory, offering the enemy absolute control of the surface territory while maintaining air superiority above. The system does not require U.S. ground troops to assure success. It meets restrictions placed on ground operations in Laos."

(George Weiss, Armed Forces Journal, 2/15/71)

"I personally think it [electronic battlefield] has the possibility of being one of the greatest steps forward in warfare since gunpowder."
(Sen. Barry Goldwater, Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/18/70)

"We got the Ho Chi Minh trail wired like a pin ball machine. Before, the enemy had two things going for him. The sun went down every night and he had trees to hide under. Now he has nothing."

(Air Force officer quoted by George Weiss in "The Air Force's Secret Electronic War," Military Aircraft, 1971)

"An Orwellian transformation is taking place in our military policy in Indochina. Due to public pressure American boys are slowly coming home, but they are leaving an automated war behind... We intend to turn the land of Vietnam into an automated murder machine. Computer technology and a small number of troops manning aircraft and artillery are creating a U.S. destructive military presence that may literally hover over Southeast Asia for years to come."

(Sen. Mike Gravel, CR, 10/5/71)

"All these devices and weapons share the same fault. They are indiscriminate. Like the people sniffer they draw no distinction between friend or foe, civilian or soldier, adult or child, and will impartially call down an automated death on all who cross their path."
(CCAS, The Indochina Story, p. 96)

"Automated warfare has certain 'advantages.' Instruments do not defect. They are not known to take consciousness-expanding drugs. They have no ethical qualms about killing civilians. They do, more or less, what they are told. They represent a cheap mercenary army. In the end we will have the machines fighting the "gooks" with no human beings involved on either side! We are manufacturing a slave army of mindless machines to police the world; the very existence of such advanced technology will bring strong pressures for its use to counter "insurgency" all over the world. If unchecked, such a sequence of developments may prove to be the most ominous consequence of American military involvement in Southeast Asia."
(Cornell study)

"If ground troops sometimes will not, and usually cannot, distinguish between enemy and innocent in a guerrilla war, we know that aerial bombardment never can. The sensor which detects body heat, the aircraft thousands of feet in the air, the computer complex many miles distant, are completely neutral and indiscriminate. Even the so-called "smart bombs" cannot tell the differences; they destroy everything in their target area."

(Sen. George McGovern in a speech, 12/14/71)

Senator CANNON: What happens when you get into the more densely populated areas? General DEANE: If you get into more densely populated areas you are not going to be able to tell friend from foe so these devices in themselves would not be particularly helpful to you. Now, you could tell that tanks as opposed to passenger cars were passing through the town, but in terms of people you would not know whether they were friendly people, merchants, or soldiers.

(Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)

DEANE: A sensor-aided combat surveillance system consists basically of the following common components: detection devices, called sensors, which pick up the movement of vehicles or troops; a communications link (usual radio) from the sensor to a 'readout' device; the 'readout' device, which receives sensor transmissions and shows when each sensor is picking up a target; and display and processing equipment to assist in counting the targets and in determining their direction and rate of movement. Individual systems may also include special munitions, aircraft, etc., which I shall mention later...MAJOR ANDERSON: First, the road is cut at a point difficult to bypass, using highly accurate guided weapons. Laser-guided bombs have been performing most of this function. Next, antimateriel landmines are emplaced....Third, antipersonnel landmines are emplaced over the antimateriel mines....Fourth, sensors on both sides of the munitions package determine if truck traffic is getting through the package. Sensors in other locations are used to determine other routes taken by enemy..

(Ibid.)

Mr. GILLEAS: How do we prevent sensors from killing innocent people versus enemy troops?

General DEANE: You say the sensors won't tell you. And the sensors might give you an indication if over an acoustic sensor you heard voices and determined from the conversation that they were enemy, that is the only way I would know you would be able to tell...You could have in Vietnam, for example, a group of woodcutters coming back down the trail that might look like a squad to them; you could make a mistake, I think."

(Ibid.)

General EVANS:...our current family of sensors...was designed specifically for use in Southeast Asia. We believe the system has demonstrated significant potential for enhancing future tactical operations worldwide, and Tactical Air Command has in fact stated a requirement for integration of IGLOO WHITE technology into TACs' worldwide operational capacity. To provide this capability, improvements must be made to accommodate present sensor design to the much more severe environmental conditions to be found in many other areas of the world which are of military interest."

(Ibid.)

COSTS OF THE ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD

\$3.25 billion through FY 1971 exclusive of munitions...

(Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 3/23/71, pg. S3618)

Future costs could reach \$20 billion in the next decade.

(Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 7/13/70, pg. S11115)

The sensor program in Indochina with its air and ground weapons and munitions cost \$1,680,600,000 through fiscal year 1971.

(Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)

"The Pentagon is concealing essential facts regarding its expenditure of more than \$3 billion on the electronic battlefield."

(Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 3/23/71, pg. S3618)

INEFFECTIVENESS

The employment of massive technology by the U.S. has led to the deaths of many innocent civilians and animals, while its military value is subject to question. The sensors cannot distinguish between friend and foe, animal and human, and the decision to call in warplanes is made without this knowledge. The guerrillas have ingeniously confused the "people sniffers" by hanging pails of urine in the trees. The heat sensors are deceived by small fires and guerrilla signs that warn, "Avoid this area. There are devices that are listening for you." dot the landscape. Every advance in American technology brings new countermoves by the "backward" guerrillas. The organized and determined guerrillas can withstand, and thus defeat, the new technology, but many innocent peasants are caught by American firepower.

"On several occasions after heavy sensor activation the night before, morning patrols sent out in search of enemy bodies found dead water buffalo instead."

(A former Army lieutenant, as reported by Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 3/23/71, pg. S3621)

"We must guard against mindless applications of new technologies just because it exists, applications which have little or no chance of success."

(Ibid.)

Ordnance

The 2,000 tons of bombs dropped daily on Indochina constitute an unparalleled and sophisticated variety of weapons designed to maim and kill those below. These bombs can be divided into five distinct categories:

1. HIGH EXPLOSIVES, ranging in weight from 250 pounds to the massive "Commando Vault" 15,000 pound bomb. (See also "Environmental Destruction")

2. ANTI-PERSONNEL bombs are designed for use against unprotected human flesh. According to a paper delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science by Prof. E.W. Pfeiffer and Prof. Arthur Westing, at least 50 percent of all bombs dropped on Indochina are anti-personnel bombs:

A. 1,000 PINEAPPLE BOMBLETS can be dropped by one aircraft in a single flight. When dropped, the pineapples send 250,000 steel pellets spewing in a horizontal pattern across the land.

B. The GUAVA can explode on impact, in the air, or with a time delay fuse, with each aircraft throwing 400-500,000 ball bearing pellets in a 360 degree pattern. The guava can inflict casualties on those who are hiding in holes, or in bunker or cave entrances because of this spraying pattern. The equivalent fire power in terms of conventional land war would make the 1,000 pineapples equal to 13,160 infantrymen each firing one clip from an M-16 rifle; the guavas are equivalent to twice that, or 26,320 infantrymen firing a standard clip from an M-16.

C. The FLECHETTE, or "nail" bombs, contain several hundred 1 inch barbed nails in each 3 inch bomblet. The flechette is designed to enter the body, shredding muscles and body organs as it passes through the body, by the path of least resistance, i.e. the ricochet effect. Both pellets and flechettes are difficult to remove, sometimes necessitating exploratory surgery in order to insure removal.

"Often the nails [flechettes] will knife right through the target, although at certain angles they do have a tendency to tumble immediately on impact, and after piercing the skin a tumbling nail can cause a gaping wound."

(Dean Morton, CBS News, 3/29/71)

3. INCENDIARY bombs, designed to burn their victims, vary as to temperature, adhesiveness, and effective range. These include napalm, super napalm, napalm B, napalm parage1, thermite, magnesium, white phosphorus, and NPT.

A. NAPALM variants are characterized by their large range of effectiveness--sheets of

flame envelop everything for hundreds of yards.

B. WHITE PHOSPHORUS is characterized by the fact that it burns on contact with oxygen. "Willie Peter," as pilots refer to it, cannot be extinguished, which means that it usually has to burn its way to the bone before it goes out, and has a more localized dispersal pattern than napalm.

C. NPT, napalm-phosphorus-thermite, dispersed over a wide area, burns at a high temperature, and is difficult to extinguish. It is a combination of the deadliest characteristics of the other incendiary agents.

"In the civilian hospital at Can Tho, I saw a man who had a piece of white phosphorus in his flesh. It was still burning." (Harvey)

4. AIR TO GROUND MISSILES have come into greater use in recent years. The most common are either laser guided or teleguided missiles, called "smart bombs." Conventional bombs with laser guidance systems are dropped from an aircraft, and then home in on a beam that guides the bomb to its target. Teleguided missiles include the "Walleye" and "Bullpup," which fall on the image projected on the pilot's screen. The latter are used particularly against caves or suspected underground complexes, and are accurate within 6 feet when dropped from 4 miles away.

5. AREA DENIAL MINES are designed to make large areas of land uninhabitable for human life. These weapons include:

A. The DRAGONTOOTH and GRAVEL mines, which are camouflaged to blend in with the land, and are dropped by the thousands every month. The gravel and dragontooth are designed to blow the foot off the person who steps on it, or the hand off anyone who picks it up, but neither one will destroy a truck tire if rolled over.

B. The SPIDER MINE or the WAAPM (Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine) has eight fine wires that extend from it. When a wire is tripped, ball bearing-like pellets are thrown for a distance of 60 meters. Unlike other weapons, area denial weapons are not dropped on a specific target, but rather entire areas are flooded with them.

"It [the gravel mine] is purely anti-personnel. If a person steps on it, it will blow his foot off. If a truck rolls over it, it won't blow the tire."

(Maj. R.D. Anderson, USAF, Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)

EXAMPLES OF ORDNANCE USED IN INDOCHINA

BLU 24/26	Guava bomblets, each holding 260-300 pellets, and 50 grams of explosive. Different fuses determine if the bomblet will detonate on impact, in the air, or with time delay. 360 degree spray pattern when detonated.
BLU 31	750 pound mine dropped from a plane, armed with a seismic sensitive fuse. The mine buries itself on impact, and can be detonated by the vibrations from a single truck.
BLU 52	270 pounds of CS II riot control agent. The chemical CS causes vomiting, nausea, tears, and muscle spasms. It can cause death to the elderly, infants, and the sick.
M-36	800 pound casing containing 182 incendiary bomblets.
PAVE PAT II	2,500 pound propane gas bomb, used as an incendiary device.
CBU 28	Dragontooth mine. Anti-personnel, area denial mine.
CBU 34/42	WAAPM, Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine. WAAPM is an area denial weapon with a spraying pattern of 60 meters.
CBU 46	Fragmentation bombs that are dispersed in the same manner as the BLU 24/26 guavas, but using the actual fragmentation of the bomblet rather than pellets as the kill mechanism.
XM-41E	Gravel mine. 3 inch cloth bag containing explosive powder and two plastic pellets. Operation is similar to the dragontooth. An added feature is the use of plastic, which necessitates exploratory surgery.

(The above data was gathered from the hearings of the Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee of the Preparedness Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, Nov., 1970.)

"Phosphorus has the particularity that inside the wound or burn, it burns slowly. On occasion this slow combustion lasts up to 15 days. At night can be seen the greenish light produced by the material that continues burning the flesh and bones. Besides this, accompanied by the wounds and the profound burns, the victims suffer a severe intoxication produced by the augmentation by three or more times the quantity of inorganic phosphorus in the body."
(Dr. Abraham Behar, [French physician visiting North Vietnam in 1967], quoted by J.B. Neilands, Asian Survey, 1970)

"That white phosphorus is used as an anti-personnel weapon was confirmed in a press report in 1969: 'We killed them one by one with grenades, direct hits with Willie Peter--white phosphorus artillery shells--or with napalm.' This is a statement attributed to a major serving as a commander in the Special Forces' Fifth Mobile Strike Force."
(J.B. Neilands et al., Harvest of Death, 1972)

"This is the BLU-52 chemical bomb. It is a standard firebomb case. It becomes a BLU-52 when filled with 270 pounds of CS-1 or CS-2 riot control agent. Its operation is quite simple. After the bomb is released, the thinskinned bomb case breaks open on impact with the ground, spreading its contents over a wide area...CS-1 will last for 3 to 5 days and CS-2 will last for 30-45 days...Their effects are nausea, choking, and copious weeping. They have been employed to a very limited degree in South Vietnam on carefully selected targets. [Deleted]."
(Major Anderson, Senate Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)

Costs

Conservative estimates place the annual costs of the air war at some \$3 billion. Actual costs probably run much higher.

However, in terms of the cost of the air war to the Indochinese people and compared to pre-1970 war costs for the U.S., this is a relatively inexpensive war, intended to be a protracted and perhaps a "permanent" war.

Costs have shifted from maintenance of a ground army to military aid and development of electronic counterinsurgency weaponry. "Smart bombs cost...\$12,500 for the T.V. bomb kit. Conventional bombs cost anywhere from \$224 for a 500 pounder to \$1,864 for a 3,000 pounder" (AP dispatch in the Philadelphia Bulletin, 1/14/72). One Walleye missile costs \$25,000. The Pentagon acknowledged that the cost of the sensor detection system alone had reached \$1.6 billion by November 1970.

SOME FIGURES

	Total Air War Costs
1966-71	\$27.5 billion, or approximately 1/4 of the war's overall costs. (Cornell study)
1971	\$2.79 billion, or approximately \$60 per family of four. Operating costs: \$2.2 billion Aircraft attrition: \$.6 billion (Ibid.)
Cost per day, 1971	\$7.64 million
Projected costs	\$2 to 4 billion annually (Cornell study)

PRODUCTION COSTS

1 B-52	\$8 million (AP dispatch, 1/9/72)
1 F-4	\$4 million (Sec. Seamans, 1972 Air Force Appropriations Hearings)
1 Huey Helicopter	\$250,000 (Ibid.)
1 Shrike air-delivered missile	\$35,000 (CBS News, 1/19/72)
1 aircraft carrier	\$960 million (Sen. Allen Ellender, CR, 1/25/72)

OPERATIONAL COSTS (average costs)

1 B-52 sortie	\$41,000 (Cornell study)
1 fighter-bomber sortie	\$8,500 (Ibid.)
1 truck destroyed on Ho Chi Minh Trail	over \$100,000 (Sen. Mike Gravel, CR, 10/5/71)

CHRISTMAS RAIDS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Estimated cost of plane losses Dec. 17-Jan. 1:	\$24 million (conservatively tallied @ \$2 million/plane, 12 planes lost, DoD)
Sortie costs:	\$8.5 million (based on DoD figure of 1,000 sorties)

ELECTRONIC BATTLEFIELD

Total costs	\$3.25 billion (Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 3/23/71, based on Senate Electronic Battlefield Hearings)
Future costs	As high as \$20 billion (Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 7/13/70)
DoD acknowledged cost of sensor program, FY 1967-71	\$1.68 billion (Senate Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/70)
Operating cost of Thai based computers	\$625 million (Orville Schell, AmRep, 9/24/71)
Developmental cost of Wide Area Anti-personnel Cluster Bomb (WAAPM)	\$86.3 million (Ibid.)

COST OF AMERICAN AID TO INDOCHINESE AIR FORCES

	VNAF	RLAF
FY 1970	\$245 million	\$46 million
FY 1971	340 million	79 million
FY 1972	337 million	83 million

(DoD, CR, 8/3/71, p. 12938)

SOME TRADE-OFFS

The cost of one month's 1,000 B-52 sorties would approximate the Administration's 1971 attempted \$47 million cutback in the school lunch program, reducing the number of students assisted by nearly 600,000.
(PAW)

The cost of one fighter bomber sortie equals the annual salary of one teacher. One week of no fighter bombing would reserve enough funds (approx. \$24 million) to reopen the Dayton public schools, and finance for one year the Independence, Missouri public schools, both closed last November for lack of money.
(SANE)

The \$52.5 million cost of the helicopters lost in the Laos invasion in 1971 equals the cost of 17 local health centers, each treating 40,000 patients annually.
(Ibid.)

The air war's \$350 million helicopter operating costs for 1971 (Cornell study) represent twice the estimated federal outlays in 1971 for the operation and support of the Federal Court System, assistance to state and local courts, and legal aid to low income citizens.
(The Urban Coalition)

The fuel for one jet for one hour equals 2-1/2 months of food for a family of four.
(Science for the People, 11/71)

One aircraft carrier costs the same amount as public housing for 270,000 people.
(Sen. George McGovern, NYT, (12/6/71))

ON THE OTHER HAND

While the Administration spent nearly \$3 billion on the air war in 1971, the President:

- 1) Vetoed the \$2.1 billion daycare-childcare bill;
- 2) Vetoed the Public Works Bill due to its allocation of \$2 billion for federally financed jobs in areas of high unemployment;
- 3) Called for an OEO cutback of \$545 million in its FY 1972 budget;
- 4) Called for a cutback of \$50 million in aid to elementary and secondary schools in its FY 1972 budget;
- 5) Called for a cutback of \$88 million for the school milk program in its FY 1972 budget;
- 6) Called for a cutback of \$28 million in aid to public health centers and clinics in its FY 1972 budget;
- 7) Called for \$132 million less than Congress had previously authorized for solid waste disposal programs in its FY 1972 budget;
- 8) Called for \$129 million less than Congress previously authorized for the fight against air pollution in its FY 1972 budget;
- 9) Called for \$92 million less than Congress previously authorized to combat alcoholism in its FY 1972 budget;

- 10) Announced that it had spent only \$422 million of the \$1.25 billion allocated by Congress in FY 1971 for the construction of solid waste treatment facilities;
- 11) Called for expenditures of \$900 million less than recommended by the Urban Coalition for federal assistance to urban areas in its FY 1972 budget.

The above figures are less timely now due to the Administration's recent release of its proposed FY 1973 budget. While this budget contains generally moderate increases for domestic programs, it still allocated only \$430 million for the war on cancer. "[The] National Cancer Institute got far less than it felt it needed."
(Post, 1/25/72)

HUD's budget for 1973 was below its 1972 level, containing a \$50 million cut in federal subsidies for private apartment rentals.

The FY 1973 budget contained no new money requests for water and sewer grants. Congress has appropriated \$850 million since mid-1970, of which only \$550 million has been spent by the Executive branch.

IMPLICATIONS--WAR ON THE CHEAP

"A continuing air war, largely conducted and entirely supported by the U.S., will inflict ever-widening costs on the peoples of Indochina while reducing U.S. costs to little more than a normal peacetime readiness level for 'permanent war.' When one takes into account the future technological possibilities for warfare-from-a-distance and when one considers the relative cheapness of this kind of mechanized war for the U.S., there emerge far-reaching implications for the possible future conduct of American foreign policy."
(Cornell study)

Corporate Involvement

The air war is dependent on the readiness of manufacturing and research companies to seek contracts for the development and production of weapons systems. The war industry is a lucrative one; profits from weapons manufacture are substantially higher than profits from similar size non-military manufacture. The continuing substitution of electronic weapons systems for manpower means, of course, that a higher percentage of war costs go directly to corporations rather than to soldiers, and that the future has become brighter for arms makers.

"The Vietnam build-up virtually assured American businessmen that no economic reverse would occur in the near future."
(Pres. Johnson, "Economic Report of President Transmitted to Congress," GPO, 1/70)

"Electronic warfare is our business."
(Headline from full-page ad by GTE Sylvania in Electronic Warfare, Convention Issue, 1971)

"Systems Specialist Electronic Warfare--A substantial increase in business activities requires experienced systems professionals to join our Applied Research Staff...Areas of responsibility will include: Receivers, Transmitters, Computer Interface, Electro-Optical Devices, Lasers....The Hallicrafters Company, A subsidiary of Northrop Corp.... An Equal Opportunity Employer"
(Ad from the Post, 1/16/71)

"A General Accounting Office survey of 146 military contracts showed a 28.3 percent average profit on total capital investment and 56.1 percent on equity (capital supplied by stockholders). A private study showed defense contractors earning 17.5 percent profits on total investment, compared with 10.6 percent profit for civilian contractors of comparable size, between 1962 and 1965."
(A Rich Man's War and a Poor Man's Fight: A Handbook for Trade Unionists on the Vietnam War, Washington Labor for Peace, 1971)

"Congress was first informed in November, 1970 of military expenditures for an automated battlefield--expenses that began with the creation of the Defense Communications Planning Group in 1966, and totalled at least \$3.25 billion before Congress was informed."
(Report of Senate Armed Services Committee on its Electronic Battlefield Hearings, 11/24/70)

"Honeywell's production of fragmentation weapons has greatly increased since Nixon took office and began 'winding down' the war. In 1968, the Army bought 41,987,278 fragmentation weapons. In 1970, it bought 101,001,700--more than twice as many. As measured by corporate production of killing machinery, the war is winding up, not down."
(Honeywell Project, "Honeywell: Controllers of Power, Masters of War," 1971)

Contracts of Honeywell, Inc. to produce anti-personnel weapons for use in Indochina:
--\$50 million for Submarine Tactical Missile, to fire cluster bomb unit-laden missiles from offshore;
--\$55,000 for research and development on the Dart Bomb whose spinning darts "grind up human flesh;"
--\$6 million for a Fuel Air Explosive Munition, designed to cause a vast incendiary explosion of vaporized fuel;
--over \$100 million for the Wide Area Anti-Personnel Mine.
(Ibid.)

"Raytheon Co., largest war manufacturer in Massachusetts, makes 80 percent of all U.S. aircraft borne missiles. Its contracts for the Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, both used in Indochina, have totalled \$735 million between 1966 and 1972. The surface-to-air Hawk missile, produced for use in Indochina as well as for sale to Israel and Jordan, has accounted for \$730 million in Raytheon contracts in the same period. A GAO study found a 30 per cent inefficiency rate in Hawk production."
(Richard Krushnic, "Raytheon Company: Heart of the Massachusetts Military Industrial Complex," 1971. Contract values are quoted by Krushnic from W.E. Hutton & Co., "Field Report on Raytheon Company," 2/71, p. 16)

These were the leading military contractors for the Indochina War from 1965 to 1970, with total contract values in millions:

McDonnell-Douglas	\$3,388.5
Lockheed	1,455.7
Textron	1,210.5
Olin	1,141.4
Ling-Temco-Vought	974.5
Grumman	950.2
General Motors	780.4
DuPont	681.3
Boeing	646.2
Honeywell	642.4

(Washington Labor for Peace, A Rich Man's War and a Poor Man's Fight)

"General Electric supplies the rapid firing 20 mm Vulcan cannon and 7.62 mm mini-guns which together can fire over 48,000 rounds of ammunition a minute (from a single AC-130E 'Surprise Package' gunship). Such fire power capability in the air represents the military's answer to an 'enemy' who cannot be seen, and whose presumed territory of activity must be overwhelmed with gun fire.

[GE's other contracts to supply the Indochina War include manufacturing engines for F-4 Phantom jets, Igloo White computer equipment, television guidance systems for the Walleye "smart" bomb, radar jamming systems, the "laser target designator" for laser-guided bombs, and special television equipment designed for night-time bombing. The company's annual military contracts totalled over \$1 billion in both 1970 and 1971. 1971 military sales are estimated to have earned \$2.60 per share.]

(NEARMIC, "General Electric Company," 2/72)

Some of United Aircraft's contracts for Indochina weapons manufacture:

- Pratt and Whitney subsidiary: \$100 million a year for Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 jet engines; F-111 engines; \$35 million a year for Navy A-4 and A-6 engines;
- Hamilton Standard subsidiary: wing-sweep actuators for the F-14;
- radar and cockpit display systems, and weapons delivery systems;
- Sikorsky subsidiary: CH-53A/D helicopters, \$50 million a year.

(Richard Krushnic and Susan Wolf, "More than any other State in the U.S., Conn. is the Warfare State," pamphlet, NEARMIC, 2/72)

"AIR FORCE - We were pleased to announce, in the May Scope, the winning of the 20 mm SAPHE projectile development project from Eglin. . . This is one of a family of ammunition programs that we are trying to get under our belt. On the Air Force production side, the big item - the WAAPM air delivered mine - is enjoying a fine reputation in actual use; its performance is very good."

(SCOPE, a Honeywell in-house publication, 6/69)

"Our Air Force business continues to grow, and this pattern will continue into 1970. The procurement 'mix,' however, is having some large excursions, creating serious impacts on our factory. In general, FY70 quantities appear to be emphasizing cluster bombs and minimizing unitary warhead bombs and fuzes. This is good for our CBU production at St. Louis Park, but it hurts our bomb fuze production at Hopkins."

(Ibid.)

"Air Force F-15. Sperry's There! For this nation's newest air superiority fighter--being built by McDonnell-Douglas- Sperry is developing the attitude and heading reference system, the digital air data computer, the multi-function display, and the flux valve."

(Sperry Rand Flight Systems ad, Air Force Magazine, 7/71)

"Safe. New Proximity Fuze can only be armed after leaving the plane. . . The new SAFE fuze is based on Motorola's experience in advanced and current GP bomb fuzing, dispenser fuzing, missile and rocket fuzing, guided ordnance fuzing, artillery and mortar fuzing, and small caliber projectile fuzing. For more information, write Motorola Government Electronics Division, 8210 E. McDowell Rd., Scottsdale, Arizona 85252."

(Motorola ad, Air Force Magazine, 1/72)

"Electronics is big business, and getting bigger, both here and abroad. . . The big question is the defense market, now leveling off with the winddown of the war in Southeast Asia. There are indications, however, that new and complex weapon systems, based on advances in technology, will be needed to replace present systems. Such trends could increase defense purchases of electronic equipments and components and halt further decline in defense procurements. Smoothing the industry-government interface in this critical area is one of our main jobs at Electronic Industries Association (EIA)."

(V.J. Adduci, EIA president, Air Force Magazine, 7/71)

"One thing is clear. . . The military services, and notably the Air Force, are going to depend more and more on electronics for both management and operational requirements. I know I speak for the electronics industry of the United States when I say we stand ready to do our part in satisfying the needs of national defense."

(Ibid.)

"Goodyear Aerospace Associative Processors can provide significant benefits in other radar, electronic warfare, communications and data base management systems. . . Airborne and ground based electronic warfare and radar signal processing tasks are already under way. You can put this technology to work for you. Save money and improve your system performance. When we say it, we mean it. For further information call Wayne (Brubaker, our Digital Systems Marketing Manager) (216) 749-3631 or write Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, Department 911 VG, Akron, Ohio, 44315."

(Goodyear ad, Air Force Magazine, 7/71)

POWs -- Pawns of War

An American has been shot out of the sky and captured or listed as missing in action once every three days since President Nixon took office. Hundreds more were prisoners when he began his administration. None will be freed as long as the air war continues.

There are those in this country who argue that the POWs must remain in prison, rather than be released through some "unglorious" total withdrawal, so that others will not have fought in vain. But this argument assumes that we can "win" some sort of victory that will make our sacrifices in Indochina justifiable.

What if we must at some time withdraw anyway? We will at such a point have subjected these men and others yet uncaptured to more unnecessary years of imprisonment.

It is clear that further air raids will only increase the numbers and prolong the imprisonment of American POWs. One thing is certain: As long as the air war continues, more men now free will be shot out of the sky, killed, wounded, or captured until the bombing ends.

NUMBER OF AMERICAN POWS (1/20/72)	
<u>IN NORTH VIETNAM</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
North Vietnamese.....	346
DoD.....	385*
<u>IN SOUTH VIETNAM</u>	
NLF.....	18
DoD.....	90
<u>IN LAOS</u>	
DoD.....	5

* including 20 listed as dead by the North Vietnamese.

"Some wives and parents...believe that top-level U.S. policy makers are being deliberately misleading when they denounce the North Vietnamese as liars because the Hanoi officials say they can't produce an accounting of anything like 1,600 men [the total number of prisoners and missing claimed by DoD]. (North Vietnam has produced a list of 339 men [as of 9/30/71] it says have been captured.) These wives and parents suspect that Washington's demand for the accounting is just a throwaway bargaining ploy for the Vietnam negotiations in Paris...

"I think they're misleading us for their own purposes," one Missing in Action mother claims. (Wall Street Journal, 9/30/71)

PARTISAN NATURE OF POW FAMILIES SITUATION

Congressman Les Aspin, on January 22, 1972, "released documents that showed that the Re-

publican National Committee has become a dominating influence in the affairs of the avowed nonpartisan National League of American Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (the major organized group of relatives of detained and missing U.S. servicemen)... The documents disclosed that by April, 1971 the GOP National Committee was giving financial advice and political support to the organization." (AmRep, 2/18/72)

"POW/MIA Families for Immediate Release is angry at having to swallow the same story about the President's plan to help American POWs when every time a bill is offered and a door is opened to help us end this war and get out POWs, the administration maneuvers and pressures with scare tactics to their key supporters in the House to slam it.

"President Nixon has blatantly abandoned the prisoners and is creating two residual forces-- one in Southeast Asia to continue the war, and one in this country consisting of POW/MIA families who are not going to remain quiet about these defenseless pawns." (Shirley Culbertson, POW sister, Post, 11/27/71)

"He talks about a bloodbath," said one ladylike wife, "but he's not kidding us. He's got to choose between President Thieu and my husband, and if he doesn't choose my husband, you can bet he's going to hear from me. We've been polite long enough, and we know we've been had." (Star, 7/13/71)



NORTH VIETNAM'S POSITION ON RELEASE OF POWS

"The more Nixon wants to force his terms on the North Vietnamese people by increasing his air attacks, the longer will be the list of U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam." (North Vietnamese Army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan quoted in NYT, 12/29/71)




Some of the more than 20 million bomb craters in Indochina.

U.S. B-52 Stratofortress.




20 mm. Vulcan cannon shells
for U.S. gunship.




Thousands of sensors, such as those in this photograph, are planted throughout all of Indochina. The vibrations transmitted by the walking of a man or an animal are enough to cause the sensor to send a signal to an airborne relay station.

EC-121 are used throughout Indochina to relay the signals sent by the ground sensors. Other aircraft are used in this phase of the air war, including "drone" aircraft which require no pilot or air crew. These aircraft relay the signals to giant computer systems on the ground.



The IBM 360 computer system takes the information from the relay aircraft and the ground sensor, and integrates it with information stored in the memory bank. An image of the sensor net is displayed on a cathode tube [similar to television], and an Air Force officer monitors the sensor net. The computer prints a read out that is sent immediately to the command center.








Shell of an anti-tank weapon, usually fired out of a rocket at underground shelters, since it is able to penetrate armor.



The flechette, or 'nail bomb', contains several hundred 1-inch barbed nails in each 3-inch bomblet. It is designed to enter the body, shredding muscles and body organs as it passes through the body.



Among the bombs used in Indochina are Cluster Bomb Units, large "mother bombs" loaded with hundreds of smaller bomblets. As the "mother bomb" casing breaks, the smaller bomblets tumble to the earth. Each of the "mother bombs" can carry as many as 500 smaller bomblets. Each of the smaller bomblets is loaded with hundreds of ball bearing shaped pellets.



As the bomblets fall through the air, the rotation causes the fuse inside the bomblet to arm. The guava bomblets [left] use three different types of fuses. One fuse will cause the bomblet to explode on contact with the ground. The second fuse has a time delay device in the fuse, allowing it to rest on the ground undetonated. The third fuse will explode the bomblet in the air, throwing ball bearing pellets in a 360° pattern for 60 meters. The 360° pattern makes anything above ground, or in holes and caves, a target.



The U.S. Air Force has defoliated an area of South Vietnam equal to the size of Massachusetts. The first re-growth is usually bamboo, which provides excellent cover for guerrilla actions; the program was recently terminated.




This pineapple bomb contains steel ball bearing pellets that are useless against structures but can kill or wound a human being.



'Huey' and 'Cobra' helicopters are used as flying gun platforms, and are designed primarily for close air support or to stalk mobile targets.




Other types of ordnance dropped on Indochina include incendiary bombs (napalm, thermite, white phosphorus and a combination of all three, NPT) and high explosive bombs (ranging in size from 250 pounds to the giant 15,000 pound "Commando Vault" or "Cheeseburger" bomb).



An A1-E attack aircraft drops a white phosphorus ("Willie Peter") bomb on a night mission. The pilot releases the bomb while traveling at a speed of several hundred miles per hour.




High explosive 750 pound bombs are dropped at altitudes of up to 35,000 feet [by B-52s] or as low as 3,000 feet [fighter-bombers].



This BLU 66 uses fragmentation rather than ball bearing pellets for the kill mechanism. Each of these bomb-lets is broken into small pieces of shrapnel by the force of the explosion, throwing the metal in a 360° pattern.

The XM-41E "gravel mine" is used as an area denial weapon. The mine is dropped in the same fashion as other CBU bomb-lets, but it has no specific target. The mine rests on the ground until a person or animal steps on it or attempts to pick it up.




DRAGONTOOTH




The "dragontooth" (MK-36 system) is similar to the gravel mine in purpose and operation. It is dropped by the thousands over a target area and remains inactive until disturbed. Neither it nor the gravel mine has the power to destroy a truck tire, but will blow off a human foot if stepped on.


THE MAJOR U.S. AIRBASES IN INDOCHINA
 (There are also two to four aircraft carriers, each with 70 to 75 warplanes, stationed in the South China Sea.)




ANNUAL TONNAGE OF AIR-DELIVERED MUNITIONS (ESTIMATES)




BOMBING TONNAGE



SOUTHEAST ASIA: U.S. AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT



VNAF AIRCRAFT INVENTORY



Charts from The Air War in Indochina, Center for International Studies, Cornell University (lower left chart drawn from data in the study).

The Ongoing Civilian Toll (as of August, 1971)

	South Vietnam*	Laos**	Cambodia	Total
KILLED	335,000	100,000	tens of thousands	450,000+
WOUNDED	740,000	250,000	tens of thousands	1,000,000+
REFUGEES	5,695,300	1,000,000	1,600,000	8,295,300
TOTALS	6,770,300	1,350,000	1,600,000+	9,755,300+

KILLED, WOUNDED, AND REFUGEEED
UNDER JOHNSON (1964-1968)
5,655,300

MONTHLY CIVILIAN TOLL
UNDER JOHNSON (1964-1968)
95,000

KILLED, WOUNDED, AND REFUGEEED
UNDER NIXON (1969-Aug., 1971)
4,100,000+

MONTHLY CIVILIAN TOLL
UNDER NIXON (1969-Aug., 1971)
130,000

*Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees

**Project Air War

SENSOR PROGRAM


16 November 1970

BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY SYSTEMS

(Dollars in Millions)


	FY67	FY68	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	5 YEAR TOTAL
CONVENTIONAL BARRIER SYSTEM	15.6	16.9	2.3	.3	4.3	39.4
AIR SUPPORTED SYSTEM	137.4	182.4	175.6	92.4	118.8	706.6
GROUND TACT- ICAL SYSTEM	-	12.1	174.2	81.1	128.8	396.2
MUNITIONS*	177.0	212.6	59.6	39.2	50.0	538.4
TOTAL	330.0	424.0	411.7	213.0	301.9	1680.6

*associated with air-supported system



Cost of sensor program from Hearings before the Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee, U.S. Senate, 11/70.

Indochina: Monthly Tonnage of Aerial Munitions from Cornell study.



The area covered by a single mission of six B-52 bombers, about one-half mile wide and three miles long, is shown superimposed on a section of a street map of Washington, D.C. About 150 tons of bombs are dropped onto this area within a fraction of a minute. (Cornell study)

Supplement

May 19, 1972

"Perhaps we should have known all along that the President's underlying objectives in Vietnam were identical to those of his predecessors and that it was only his tactics that would be different."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, April 18, 1972

Air War: The Third Indochina War was prepared in mid-February. Since then, there has been a dramatic escalation in the air war which has led to the preparation of this supplement. Additional supplements will be prepared in coming months and may be obtained by writing to Project Air War or the Indochina Resource Center at 1322 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

This supplement is divided into two sections: "The Expanding Air War," a summary and analysis of the events surrounding escalations of the air war from February through May; and "Fact Sheet Additions," of recently received source material.

I. The Expanding Air War

In the short run, the President's decision to mine many of North Vietnam's harbors makes clear there is no limit to the actions he will take in order to achieve a favorable military balance in Indochina. It is improbable that this latest escalation will prove decisive, and, unchecked by public pressure, more dangerous and destructive gambits are likely to follow.

In the long run, if the Administration manages somehow to contain the offensive, the country stands on the brink of public acceptance of a policy of endless bombing. The air war, a hidden war until recently, can now be seen as a public and political reality open to scrutiny, despite the administration's imposition of additional restraints on press coverage. If the bombing goes unchallenged at this time, it may gain a permanent license.

February and March

Even before the sharp increase in the bombing in April, the administration made clear its continuing commitment to a permanent war in Indochina.

A) In January 56,000 tons of bombs exploded over Indochina; in February a near 20 percent increase brought the tonnage to 67,000. March figures totalled 70,694. (DoD)

B) February saw the stationing of a new squadron of F-4s and the doubling of the number of B-52s in the war zone, along with the dispatch of two additional carriers bearing 150 attack aircraft. These actions increased the number of attack planes in the war zone by nearly 40 percent.

C) February also saw the release of a General Accounting Office study of the refugee crisis in Cambodia. Besides recording the creation of more than 2 million new refugees in that country, the report revealed that "saturation bombing missions are carried out...[over] about 26% of Cambodia's territory." The study also noted "that the more affluent persons flee their homes when [the] Communists take over...[but] the less affluent persons tend to remain...and flee only if actual fighting breaks out...It appears that refugees are currently being generated as a direct result of combat activity involving Cambodian and/or South Vietnamese forces and of Allied air strikes." (GAO report, "Problems in the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) Concerning War Victims, Civilian Health, and War Related Casualties," 2/72)

D) Protective reaction strikes against North Vietnam which numbered 21 during 1970, 121 (recently revised upward from 108 by the DoD) during 1971, reached a 1972 total of 100 on March 20 of this year.

E) Also in March, Secretary of the Air Force Seamans, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Appropriations Subcommittee, requested funds for a FY 73 increase of 20 percent in the size of the South Vietnamese Air Force, already the 6th largest in the world. 117 million dollars were earmarked for the F-5E "International Fighter" alone, a plane designed solely for the use of 3rd world pilots and specifically for use in Indochina. (Statement issued by Sec. Seamans)

F) As the air war expanded, secrecy surrounding the bombing increased. On March 17 the U.S. command for the first time classified information concerning the number of planes participating in raids over North Vietnam. (NY Times, 3/18/72)

G) A recently released summary of a still classified Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee staff report entitled "Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, January 1972" indicated, "There would also seem to be a progressive cutting off of Congressional access to Executive branch documentation related to the programs which the Congress funds. Without adequate access to such documentation, however, the legislative branch cannot effectively examine programs."

H) On March 10 the Association of Foreign Correspondents in Vietnam protested, in the words of the Associated Press, "what it called 'a U.S. command policy of a steady and purposeful reduction in the flow of news' about the war."

April and May

In April and May the most dramatic escalations occurred. The combined American air and naval bombardment of Indochina continued to grow, approaching record levels. The bombing of North Vietnam was resumed on a regular basis with targets previously off limits systematically struck. The mining of many North Vietnamese harbors, rivers and canals created the possibility of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or China. Secretary Laird pointedly declined to say whether ships attempting to enter North Vietnamese ports would be stopped.

Though the Pentagon has not yet released exact statistics, it is estimated that more than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped in April, approximating the highest levels of the war. Since January the number of B-52s in the war zone has more than tripled, the number of fighter-bombers more than doubled, and the Navy's off-shore fleet trebled. There are currently five aircraft carriers on station in the South China Sea--the largest number in the war's history--with a sixth carrier, the Ticonderoga, en route with its sophisticated anti-submarine capability. The Navy is considering taking the 58,000 ton battleship New Jersey out of mothballs for bombardment of Vietnam (Post, 5/18/72). A sixth airbase in Thailand, Takhli, has been opened to house four new squadrons of F-4s, and four squadrons of Marine bombers have been transferred from Japan to Da Nang and Bien Hoa. In Washington it has been revealed that the administration will ask for supplemental war appropriations, probably in excess of one billion dollars.

The two most serious escalations involve the loosening of target restrictions over North Vietnam and the mining of its harbors. Both demonstrate the administration's willingness to inflict massive civilian casualties on the North Vietnamese in an effort to reverse the continuing deterioration of the military situation in the south. The indiscriminate bombing of heavily populated parts of Haiphong by B-52s on April 16 is a particularly graphic illustration of this policy.

On May 10 Admiral Zumwalt revealed that the denial of food imports to North Vietnam was one of the goals of the mining operation. In recent years North Vietnam has had to import from 15 to 25% of its food supply, characterized by Zumwalt as a material "which helps fight the war."

Reports from Hanoi indicated that part of the dike system which prevents massive flooding of North Vietnam's rice growing regions was struck by U.S. aircraft on May 9 (Post, 5/9/72). President Nixon labeled the dikes "strategic targets" on May 1, but at that time indicated that their destruction would cause "an enormous number of civilian casualties," and was "not needed." (Star, 5/1/72) The new air strikes have decimated many square miles of populated areas. French and American observers in North Vietnam report widespread use of anti-personnel weapons, including the first recorded use of a new plastic anti-personnel bomb. The new strikes went as far north as 60 miles from the Chinese border.

Saturation bombing is also being applied throughout South Vietnam, as it was during the 1968 Tet offensive. It was at that time, commenting on the battle for Bentre, that an American major declared, "It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it." On April 21 UPI reported "David Kennerly who flew over An Loc in an air observation plane, said the northern section of the city has been leveled by 500 pound bombs dropped by allied planes." Earlier (4/9) George Wilson had noted in the Washington Post, "Scores of refugees interviewed in Quang Tri City, Hue, and Da Nang said they fled the countryside for fear of getting hit by bombs..." On May 11 Lee Lescaze wrote in the Post, "What the group of people in the market fear most they said is that [the] North Vietnamese will capture Kontum and then American planes will bomb the city killing communists and civilians together, destroying the city."

Ironically enough, in the face of the administration's actions, all available evidence indicates that no amount of bombing will significantly affect the final outcome of the fighting on the ground. Especially illusory are the possible achievements of aerial interdiction efforts. On May 9 Senator Mike Gravel released portions of the National Security Study prepared for President Nixon in 1969 evaluating the likely success of many of the actions taken by the administration in recent weeks, including the mining of the harbors. The CIA indicated, "all the war's essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event imports by sea were successfully denied...even with an unlimited bombing campaign." The Department of Defense concluded that a minimum of 6,000 sorties a month were necessary to limit rail traffic and many multiples of that total required to cut the 7-10 roads connecting North Vietnam and China. Even with such an effort (costing \$500,000 a month, based on Pentagon Papers Document No. 118), the chances of success were said to be indeterminate.

That the President chose to accept the political risks inherent in mining the harbors anyway is not surprising, when it is recalled that millions of tons of bombs have been dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail after the Pentagon Papers and other studies revealed such strikes to be nearly worthless. Driven by his own bellicose rhetoric into a corner, the President has seized upon one of the few cards left to him in Indochina--airpower. Regardless of its accompanying civilian casualties, cost ineffectiveness, and simple military ineffectiveness, he is likely to employ it freely in the months to come. Only a total South Vietnamese collapse or forceful public outcry at home seems likely to ground the planes.

1972 Bombing Tonnages

January	56,780
February	67,536
March	70,694
April	120,000*
May	150,000*

Source: DoD
*estimated

The highest previous monthly bombing figure of the war was in March, 1969 when 130,141 tons were dropped.

THE BUILDUP OF AIR AND NAVAL POWER

Air Power

	<u>January</u>
B-52s	45
Land-based fighter-bombers	250
Carrier-based fighter-bombers	150
Total fixed-wing aircraft	445

May

139 (Air Force Times, 5/17/72)
500+ (may include B-52s--AP, 5/9/72)
425-475 (AP, 5/9/72); an additional 36-40 added
May 17 (Post, 5/18/72)
1,100-1,154

Sea Power

Aircraft carriers	2
Total fleet	15-20
Naval personnel	13,000

5 (another reportedly on the way--AP, 5/18/72)
60+ (AP, 5/18/72)
46,000 (AP, 5/18/72)

1972 Sorties Per Day

	<u>Fighter-bombers</u>	<u>B-52s</u>
January	350	33
May	825	75

Based on DoD figures

Yearly Sortie Figures

	<u>North Vietnam</u>		<u>Cambodia</u>	
	1970	1971	1970	1971
	2,000	4,500	9,000	16,500

Staff report of SRC, released 5/7/72

Casualties

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Captured</u>
U.S. casualties from air losses, 3/31-5/16 (AP, 5/17/72)	72	79	23	1

Vietnamese military casualties, 3/30-5/17 (Star, 5/18/72)

NVA & NLF	29,000		
SVN	4,922	2,432	15,339

Current Costs Per Day

Daily Operating Costs

Fighter-bombers	\$10.2 million
B-52s	3.4 million
Helicopters	1.6 million
Aid to VNAF & RLAFF	1.2 million
TOTAL	\$16.6 million
Daily aircraft losses	3.5 million
TOTAL	\$20.1 million

Based on the revised Cornell cost estimates of \$12,300 per FB sortie and \$45,200 per B-52 sortie.

These costs as itemized above do not include costs of damage to aircraft. News reports list more than 4 fixed-wing and 18 helicopters damaged during the first 18 days of April. This is an additional cost of up to \$500,000 per day. Other costs include transportation of more aircraft to the theater, higher costs per sortie for carrier-based aircraft, increased use of helicopters and VNAF aircraft, etc. The actual cost of the air war may well approach \$25 million per day, or two and a half times the 1971 rate.

Vietnamese civilian casualties, 3/31-5/8

Refugees

700,000 (Warren Nutter, Asst. Secy. of Defense to SRC, 5/8/72)
200,000 in Da Nang alone (Post, 5/18/72)

Killed and wounded

20,000 (President Nixon, 5/8/72)

NOTES ON THE BLOCKADE

Code-named "Operation Linebacker," the mining of North Vietnam's ports and inland waterways is using devices described as "among the most technically advanced and dangerous marine weapons available today" (Time, 5/22/72). There are two types of mines, "buried" and "moored." Both types are dropped by Navy jets from an altitude of 10,000 feet, slowed by "rotocutes," helicopter-like blades which reduce the mine's impact. Buried mines rest in the silt; moored mines, used in deeper waters, are suspended by cable. Each mine costs more than \$20,000.

Only two of the Navy's six varieties of mines have been used in Operation Linebacker. "These were the Mark-53, a snub-nosed cylinder about 5 feet long, 1 foot in diameter and about a half-ton in weight, and the Mark 55, resembling an overgrown milk can at 9 feet in length, 1 1/2 feet in diameter and 1 ton in weight. Both are powerful enough to disembowel a cargo ship...Perhaps the most sophisticated aspect of the U.S. mines...was their potential to instill psychological terror." (Time, 5/22/72)

There is some debate over the effectiveness of the mines. U.S. mine specialists contend that "it is virtually impossible to sweep modern minefields." (Michael Getler, Post, 5/15/72) However, a North Vietnamese spokesman in Haiphong contends that the mines which are sown daily, are being de-activated just as fast. "'They've been removed,' Mr. Thuy said. 'Whatever kinds of mines they lay, we have ways of defusing them. Nixon's mining cannot stop foreign ships coming in.'" (Anthony Lewis, NYT, 5/18/72) Lewis also quoted "independent sources" saying that an East German freighter had entered Haiphong harbor a week after Operation Linebacker was begun.

Secretary Laird, when asked if Soviet ships "might" be stopped, replied, "That is the impression I want to leave...We will take actions necessary to prevent delivery of supplies to North Vietnam." (Star, 5/10/72)

Administration Goal Permanent War?

"Do I think a war that has gone on for 30 years is going to end? The answer is no...our policy is to get U.S. troops out of the war." (Melvin Laird, Star, 4/16/72) "I don't say it will end the war but it will terminate the American (ground) presence in Vietnam." (Laird, Post, 4/19/72)

Secretary of State Rogers, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reported that the U.S. will take "whatever military actions necessary" to achieve its objectives in Indochina. "Now we said from the beginning, every time I've testified,...we are going to continue to use the air power necessary to prevent a takeover by the Communists of South Vietnam." (4/17/72)

President Nixon stated on April 26, "We will not be defeated; and we shall never surrender our friends to communist aggression...It would amount to a renunciation of our morality, an abdication of our leadership...This we shall never do." (Post, 4/27/72) On May 8 he stated, "We shall do whatever is required to safeguard American lives and American honor." (Post, 5/9/72)

POWs Plea for Peace

"To the people of the United States and the Congress of the United States from American pilots captured in North Vietnam. Despite the bombing halt announced in 1968, the President ordered the resumption and authorized the continuation of the bombing of North Vietnam and a variety of excuses to justify the raids. On Sunday morning, April 16, 1972 the peace of Hanoi and Haiphong were shattered by American bombs. Many innocent people died a totally needless and senseless death. We, the detained Americans in Hanoi, could not help but be struck by the futility of such actions. We have come to know the Vietnamese people, and we know that no bombing, or no threat of death, is going to still the spirit that lives in them. We believe that widespread bombing of North Vietnam serves only to turn world opinion more strongly against the United States, and risks the death and capture of many more Americans, as well as endangering the lives of those already held captive. No bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong will cause the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, or the Government of North Vietnam, to come begging for peace, for while they truly desire peace, it will not be a peace short of freedom and independence. No bombing of North Vietnam serves to make the withdrawal of American forces any safer, and only makes it more likely that they cannot be withdrawn at all, and serves only as an admission of the failure of the Vietnamization policy.

"We appeal to the American people to exercise your rights and responsibilities, and demand an end to the war now! We appeal to the Congress to take firm, positive action to go with the words already spoken against the war. The resumption of the Paris peace conference, and serious negotiations based on the 7 Point Proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government are obvious first steps. We require these steps and much more, Americans! The hope of the world is in your hands. Bring us home now!

"Very respectfully,

Walter E. Wilber, Cdr., USN, Troy, Pa. (captured June, 1968)
David Hoffman, Lt. Cdr., USN, San Diego, Ca. (captured December, 1971)
Kenneth J. Fraser, Capt., USN, Brooklyn, N.Y. (captured February, 1972)
Lynn E. Gunther, Capt., USAF, Dalles, Oregon (captured December, 1971)
Edison W. Miller, Lt. Col., USMC, Quinton, Iowa (captured October, 1967)

James D. Cutter, Capt., USAF, Stillwater, Fla.
(captured February, 1972)
Edward A. Hawley, Jr., USAF, Birmingham, Ala.
(captured February, 1972)
Norris A. Charles, Jr., Lt. J. G., USN, Tampa,
Fla. (captured December, 1971)

Pacific News Service, Paris, May, 1972

The Air War Goes North

"The biggest U.S. air and naval task force ever assembled in Vietnam mined the entrances to Hai-phong and other North Vietnamese ports today and heavily bombarded railroads and highways in North Vietnam." (George Esper, AP, 5/9/72)

"Hanoi Radio reported that U.S. planes bombed populated areas of Quangbinh and Ninbinh provinces south of Hanoi. The North Vietnamese radio claimed three U.S. planes were shot down, bringing their claimed total to 124 since the bombing of North Vietnam was greatly increased." (Post, 5/18/72)

Dr. Philip Harvey of St. Stephen's Hospital in London reported on the bombing raids less than a mile from the Hotel where he was staying in Hanoi April 16:

"I saw photos of the body of one woman--she was pregnant--and she had been riddled with plastic pellets from an antipersonnel bomb. This is a new development. The pellets used to be metal, but now that they are using plastic it is impossible to locate the pellets by normal X-rays. They can be found with the use of ultra-sonic vibrations, but the North Vietnamese do not have such equipment.' A full ultrasonic vibration unit costs about \$50,000...

"Dr. Harvey said that the plastic pellets penetrate the victims' bodies at 1,300 feet a second, creating such intense heat that they vaporize the flesh.

"'They can fracture a bone without even making contact with it,' he said. The wounded people Dr. Harvey saw all had multiple penetrating wounds caused by cubical pellets, he said." (Harold Jackson, Manchester Guardian, in Post, 5/1/71)

"There are no weapons in the U.S. inventory which employ plastic fragments or pellets or which depend upon plastic or any other nonmetallic projectile for fragmentation effects. No U.S. weapons are designed with the intent of making X-ray detection of fragments difficult or impossible, nor are weapons designed with the intent of making any medical treatment difficult or impossible."
(DoD response to Dr. Harvey's charges, Post, 5/1/72)

Paul Zuchowski of Standard Machine and Mold Corp. in Alexandria, Virginia has told Project Air War that his company makes plastic bomb casings designed to splinter into fragments approximately 1/16" x 1/8" x 3/8" under a contract with the U.S. Navy.

II. Fact Sheet Additions

COSTS

One naval mine	\$20,000+ (Time, 5/22/72)
AC-130 gunship	\$7,000,000 (Craig Whitney, NYT, 4/1/72)
C-130 aircraft	\$3,400,000 (1972 Senate DoD Apprps Hearings)
AH-1G Cobra helicopter	\$400,000 (Ibid.)
Air war munitions per day	\$7,000,000 (Newsweek, 4/24/72)
BLU anti-personnel bomblet (with 300 steel pellets)	35¢ (Business Week, 4/15/72)
Training one pilot	\$500,000 (How Much Is Enough? Enthoven and Smith, Harper & Row)

Total Russian and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam in 1971: \$175,000,000.

(U.S. intelligence estimate, Scripps-Howard in Washington Daily News, 4/21/72)

Direct U.S. war costs, 1971: \$15.3 billion. (Cornell study)

"Russian and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam during the last seven years is so small it would hardly pay one year of interest on the more than \$100 billion the U.S. has spent on the war in Southeast Asia."

(R.H. Shackford, Scripps-Howard writer, in Washington Daily News, 4/21/72)

INEFFECTIVENESS

"The air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

(CIA, in National Security Study Memorandum No. 1 [NSSM 1], 1969)

The enemy's supply needs are "so small and his supply of war materials so large that the enemy can replace his losses easily." Daily need for externally-acquired supplies put at 80 tons or 20 truck loads.

(CIA and DoD, NSSM 1)

"There is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombing failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism or risk escalation."

(State Department, NSSM 1)

"The bombing did not significantly raise the cost of the war to North Vietnam. . . It may have hardened the attitude of the people" to

resist. Each B-52 strike was estimated to kill .43 enemy--a cost of \$100,000 per enemy killed. (DoD, NSSM 1)

"The millions of pounds of bombs we continue to drop over North Vietnam and much of South Vietnam appear to be about as related to stopping the North Vietnamese offensive as underground atomic explosions in Amchitka."

(William F. Buckley, 5/8/72)

"In any case the bulk of North Vietnam's supplies enter not from the sea but from China via road and rail. The entire history of deep interdiction of supply routes from World War II to the present demonstrates its ineffectuality. At the most, therefore, Mr. Nixon's orders would simply tend to move Soviet supplies back to the trans-China route and shift the balance of influence in Hanoi a little more towards Peking."

(Editorial, NYT, 5/10/72)

"After some adjustments the Soviet Union and China could get enough war materials and food into North Vietnam by rail to make up for sea-borne supplies cut off by the mining of North Vietnamese ports, U.S. military and civilian specialists believe." It is estimated that only 1-2 percent of China's rail tank cars could carry the 50,000 tons of fuel per month necessary to sustain the offensive.

(AP, NYT, 5/13/72)

"Within two or three months North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. . . All the war's essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event imports by sea were successfully denied."

(Morton Kondracke and Thomas Ross, Star, 5/10/72, quoting CIA, NSSM 1)

"It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. . . Even at this level of effort the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines. . . if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair. . . Interdiction of the road system would be still more difficult. . . We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing through traffic. . . The road network from China has seven to ten principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally the monsoonal weather in North Vietnam would make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visibility would prevent air strikes during 25-30 percent of the time during good weather months and 50-60 percent of the time during bad weather months."

(DoD, NSSM 1)

Note: This suggests the need for 34,000 sorties a month or 1,100 a day for serious interdiction,

compared to the current level of 200 sorties a day (5/13). In Pentagon Papers Document 118 McNamara estimated that in heavily defended areas the cost of bombing is "four men and aircraft and \$20 million per 1,000 sorties." Thus a serious land supply interdiction effort in North Vietnam would be over \$600 million and 120 men per month.

"It is clear that to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi's political, economic, and social structure would require an effort which we could make but which would not be stomached by either our own people or by world opinion."

(Secy. McNamara, Pentagon Papers Doc. 118)

"President Nixon's move to cut off supplies to North Vietnam is unlikely to have a major impact on the ability of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front to carry on fighting in South Vietnam. . .

"The Chinese . . . can supply 90 percent of what the North Vietnamese need. The rest can probably be done without. . .

"U.S. military intelligence analysts seem preoccupied with the North Vietnamese supply problems. They don't seem to realize that all armies are not supplied on the grandiose scale of their own. The North Vietnamese and NLF supply network functions throughout Vietnam because the equipment is for the most part not sophisticated and can easily be replaced or done without."

(Capt. J.J. Brown, former chief U.S. night photo intelligence officer for Laos and North Vietnam and senior photo intelligence officer for Laos, DNSI, 5/9/72)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES - North Vietnam

57,000 North Vietnamese civilians were killed by U.S. bombing under Pres. Johnson, when there were restraints not in effect now.
(NSSM 1)

December, 1971 raids:

"The bombing of the hospital completely destroyed two of the buildings and heavily damaged one other. . . I saw and photographed the dental clinic flattened by the blast. . . I then went through the wards of the hospital from bed to bed and examined the patient records. They included the following:

Girl, Xuong, aged 8 -- lower spinal cord cut by a pellet from a fragmentation bomb. Lower body permanently paralyzed . . .

Baby girl, Thao, 3 months old -- she was being held by her grandfather. . .

Young male, Manh, 20 years old -- open skull wound with some brain damage, bone fragment in forearm, pellet in chest, all results of a fragmentation bomb. . .

Boy, Hung -- His big brother was killed instantly in the raid, head blown off and body disemboweled. Blast wound on arm. His sister had one buttock torn off."

(Nobel Prize-winning biologist George Wald in Hanoi, Congressional Record, 4/72)

"As soon as the alert was over M. Hoang Thao, in charge of information for the city, joined us and took us to see the city which had been bombed in several places. I can state that among these was the Ang-Duong market, in the center of the city, far from any military objective, as well as by Thuong Kiet street and the Chinese quarter of Minh-Khai.

"250-pound bombs had dug deep funnel shapes and devastated houses. Steel cubes from Shrike air-to-ground missiles from F-4's had broken roofs and facades of buildings.

"In some streets cement poles holding electric wires had been sliced by the explosion of the bombs. There were civilian victims.

--Haiphong

"A Shrike missile fell in a street in the quarter of Ba Dinh, north of the city. There were several civilian victims. In exploding, the rocket launched thousands of steel cubes in all directions, slashing nearby trees, blowing out roofs, spattering walls and cutting down the customers of a small cafe as they drank beer, coffee and Chinese soup.

"Arriving a few instants later I saw the puddles of still fresh blood of those killed and wounded who had just been taken to the nearest hospital. The rescuers, covered with the victims' blood, explained to the press the suddenness of the attack which took the people by surprise as they were strolling on this first warm Sunday of the year, after a very long winter."

--Hanoi

(Le Monde, 4/18/72)

North Vietnam prepared for the worst by calling Alert No. 1 ("arms should be kept at hand") and evacuating the young and the very old from Hanoi and Haiphong.

(Agence France Presse, NYT, 4/18/72)

"At the end of the tour was the Thanhua provincial hospital, some 75 miles south of Hanoi, which was hit on April 27.

"The hospital was showered by 36 bombs--12 of them giant 2,000 pounders and the rest anti-tank bombs which penetrated the concrete roofs of the hospital as well as the air raid shelters, according to the hospital's chief physician.

"In the enormous 45-foot craters and the rubble, the wreckage of operating tables and x-ray equipment could be seen.

"At one stop six miles to the south, five U.S. planes had hit the Dongyen primary school during morning classes. Five bombs fell, leaving 20 dead and 25 wounded.

"The press party could not see any military targets which might have justified the raid. The only 'radar' here, which gives only a few seconds warning of an approaching raid, is supplied by children perched in the branches of trees, who bang drums and blow whistles to sound the alert."

(Agence France Presse account of press tour in North Vietnam, Post, 5/8/72)

"The North Vietnamese called their worst day Sunday, April 16, when heavy attacks were re-

newed on the Haiphong and Hanoi areas. Haiphong was hit by B-52's and other planes. City officials said today that 244 persons were killed that day, 513 were injured and nearly 2,000 homes were destroyed. After one inspects the damage, these figures seem quite possible. "A large series of apartment blocks called Cau Tre Workers' Housing is almost completely smashed. . .

"Across the road is the Thai Phien school. . . The three buildings that made up the school are now a total wreck. There is a large bomb crater in the courtyard. . .

"A hospital hit by the recent bombing is not near any visible military target. It is the 600-bed Vietnam-Czechoslovak Friendship Hospital. The director, Dr. Nguyen Duc Lung, said a bomb struck at 9:20 a.m. on April 16, wrecking the staff quarters. . .

"The blast of the bomb wrecked a nearby operating room and about 15 rooms nearby. Doctor Lung said that a boy of 13 who had been wounded in the earlier bombing and was being prepared for surgery was killed.

"Some North Vietnamese insist that the Americans aimed at hospitals to terrorize the populace. In the renewed bombing of last month, according to highly reliable accounts, bombs fell on this Haiphong hospital, on one in Hanoi, and on one in Thanhhoa. . .

"Hundreds of acres are virtually flat with just a wall standing here and there. Officials said the area was subjected to carpet bombing by B-52s."

(Anthony Lewis, NYT, 5/18/72)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES - Closing the Ports

"At least two-thirds of North Vietnam's non-military imports . . . arrive by sea," including 15-25 percent of its food supply. Fertilizer is another key import.

(Flora Lewis, Post, 5/11/72)

"Food was described by [Admiral] Zumwalt as a material 'which helps fight the war' and was listed . . . as one of the items the U.S. will try to prevent North Vietnam from receiving."

(Orr Kelly, Star, 5/11/72)

"Destruction of locks and dams . . . offers promise. It should be studied. Such destruction does not kill or drown people. By shallow flooding the rice, it leads after time to widespread starvation . . . unless food is provided--which we could offer to do at the conference table."

(John McNaughton, an assistant to Secy. McNamara, Pentagon Papers, 1/18/66)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES - Refugees

Over 700,000 have been made refugees between March 30 and May 7 in South Vietnam.

(Warren Nutter, Asst. Secy. of Defense, 5/8/72)

"Scores of refugees interviewed in Quang Tri city, Hue, and Danang said they fled the countryside for fear of getting hit by bombs." (George Wilson, 4/9/72, Post)

"What limits the Communists politically, of course, is that most places they go, they are pursued by American warplanes, which of course means a hasty evacuation of the civilian population."

(Peter Osnos, Post, 4/26/72)

"What the group of people in the market fear most, they said, is that North Vietnamese will capture Kontum and then American planes will bomb the city, killing communists and civilians together, destroying the city."

(Lee Lescaze, Post, 5/11/72)

"The northern section of the city [An Loc] has been leveled by 500-pound bombs dropped by allied planes."

(UPI, Post, 4/21/72)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES - Laos

"[In the guerrilla zone] Everyone wanted to tell me how his village had been bombed. I was lectured by women, children, officers, everyone, about bombing their village. . . I saw no traditional Lao villages. All of them had been bombed and the people were living in the forest."

(John Everingham, a correspondent, on release, after travelling four weeks as a Pathet Lao prisoner, Post, 3/10/72)

SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE

"The escalation has just begun,' one official said. 'Nixon can go on up other rungs of the ladder. Maybe this building will cease to exist. . . This is the seventh year of the war of destruction,' he went on. 'It could last 10 more years and we are still sure we would be victorious. . . We have anticipated the worst and have all the means to face it. Ho Chi Minh said that Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities would be destroyed but that we would not be defeated--he predicted it.'" (Anthony Lewis in Haiphong, NYT, 5/18/72)

POWs

"Nine prisoners of war have been returned to the U.S. . . With obvious logic they [the North Vietnamese] have asked the United States government not to use these returned pilots against them again. . . At the present time they are all in or associated with the armed forces. Some are training younger pilots to fly out again and again over that tortured country. . . Some are part of the propaganda mill that continues the air war."

(Grace Paley, NYT, 3/23/72)

ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION

"A study by U.S. agents has determined that about 10 percent of the agricultural land of South Vietnam has had to be abandoned because of the destruction wrought by bombardment and other weapons used in this war. . . It has been a war against the land as much as against armies. Indeed it appears that one of the main strategies of our military effort has been to disrupt and destroy the social and economic fabric of rural agricultural Vietnam in order to deprive the guerrilla enemy of a power base. . . [While the] targets of strategic bombing in World War II were factories, port cities, railroads and so forth . . . in the Indochina war the strategic targets are the land and forests."

(E.W. Pfeiffer and Arthur H. Westing, Scientific American, 5/72)

Based on May 13 estimates of 75 B-52 sorties per day and Westing and Pfeiffer's projections, new craters are now being created at a rate of 243,000 per month.

"Hanoi (AFP)--A 'mosquito that kills' has appeared in the region on both sides of the 17th parallel, according to reports from Hanoi.

"The new mosquito called Falciparum has never before been known in this region of Vietnam. A high fever, coma and then death are the symptoms which characterize most of those who are bitten. Quinine is ineffective against this disease and a new cure is being sought. According to a Soviet doctor, the 'mosquito that kills' is carrying a kind of 'plague.'

"This region, pockmarked with millions of bomb craters full of stagnant water, has been invaded by these mosquitoes and by rats and mice as well. In the combat zones where the air, the land and the water have become a veritable breeding ground of disease, dead bodies have become the prey of these animals while other cadavers are unearthed by the bombs and shells."
(Agence France Presse, Le Monde, 4/26/72)



Another Summit



Fourth Year Of The "Plan To End The War"



One of the most successful jet fighter designs so far is the McDonnell F4H (F-4) Phantom II. It has been produced in many models and is operational in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, as well as abroad in the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and the Israeli Air Force. Here it is shown with wings folded for parking, and making a landing approach, hook down.



MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP.



F4H (F-4) PHANTOM II

OFFICIAL PHOTO BY T. R. FOWZER, PH 3, USN





Above: F-8 flying past bomb explosion from a Crusader in search of Viet Cong mortar positions which were firing on a Marine landing zone. Right: A CH-46 carrying an external load of ammunition to a fire support base.





Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.



Additional copies of the Supplement may be obtained at the following rates:

20¢ each; 15¢ for 10 or more; 10¢ for 100 or more. Add 20% for shipping.

Write or call:

Indochina Resource Center
1322 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-3114



'Have you ever heard of anything so inhumane and uncivilized?'

MACNEILY




© 1972 by The Chicago Tribune.

Air War






SET
THE DATE
1972



AVTH

© 1971 by Chicago Tribune-N. Y. News Synd. Inc.
World Rights Reserved



AVTH

L.A. News Advocate


Vietnam escalator.





Troop replacements


Szep—Boston Globe



"Here come our replacements."



Winding down the war





I myself studied in this school many years ago. But then it came to the year 1967, and the school was struck by the airplanes until it was level. Nothing was left. Many planes had shot around it. It made us lack for a school in which to learn our lessons.

Author: Lao man, age 23



One friend of mine went to the village to get rice for his mother and father to eat...He crossed the field to the hill and the airplanes saw him and shot and killed him so that you couldn't even find his body. It was scattered all over the field.

Author: Lao child, age 12



The person in this picture was hit by napalm and burned...If someone is hit by napalm, you can't go to help him. If someone went to help, he also would catch on fire. I thought about this when I was in the hills: in our lives now we didn't know which day we would be troubled or which day we would die. Every day we just stayed in the holes in the forest without seeing sunlight.

Author: Lao child, age 12



In my village there was one man who was 22 years old. He went to graze his buffalo in the forest. The airplanes dropped bombs and killed the buffalo. He ran away from that place, but not in time. He was hit in the waist - cut right in two. For two days you could see him like that.

Author: Lao man, age 22



There was a wat on the hill right next to my village. The airplanes shot it and started a fire. Two monks were killed there together. On account of the war. The planes thought that there were soldiers in the wat, so they shot it. But there weren't any. Only the monks died.

Author: Lao man, age 29



Three jets came, dropping bombs...We went to count the bombs and the holes of the bombs that had fallen on the wat and found that there were 28. And many bullets which had also hit. The wat was lost completely...After that, we didn't know if we should build another wat. If we built again, we were afraid it would be bombed again.

Author: Lao man, age 69



My village was hit often by bombs from airplanes and anti-personnel bombs. My house was hit and I lost everything. I knew the war and was very afraid. But I could not flee.

Author: Lao school teacher, age 22



But truly at that time there were many dangers. Like when the planes dropped bombs and napalm burned the village and people died. Some people ran into the holes and were hit. No one had the courage to help the people who were hit by napalm. They just screamed until the end, and died. I am overcome with pity and my tears fall. I do not lose the thoughts of those people who lost their lives. That is when we had to flee our villages.

Author: unknown



This was another occasion of lakes of blood from the war planes' coming. These people were going together into the cave, but at that moment a bomb came without any knowledge of its having been dropped... Anyone who knows these things is filled with pity or empathy by the hundreds.

Author: Lao artist, age 20

Sao Doummaa's Mother:

Sao Doumma was my youngest daughter, the one I loved the most. She was 25, married, and had 2 children. One day in July, 1969 we were in our shelter when the planes came over. Sao Doummaa was nursing her 7-month old. She jumped up to try to make it to a trench. But she was hit at the door by the bombs, and fell to the ground crushing her baby beneath her...One other thing. This is a wedding photo of my daughter. She was 18. It's all I have to remember her by. I want to make a copy for her husband. Could you help me?

Sao Toun's Mother:

Sao Toun was one of my two daughters. She was 12 years old. One morning, about 10 a.m., in July 1969, a group of "T" planes came over our village. Sao Toun was hiding in a trench. But when she heard the noise of the plane she became afraid. She jumped out of the trench and began running. Then the planes dropped their bombs and she was killed. I only have one other daughter left. I...I...I...

(N.B. The interview could not be continued as Sao Toun's mother broke into tears.)



Wedding photo of Sao Doummaa and her husband.

Nang Khammaa's Mother:

Nang Khammaa was 20 years old. She was married and had two children. One day in June, 1968, about 5 p.m., Nang Khammaa went out to fetch our buffalo. Suddenly she heard the jets coming. She dropped to the ground and began trying to crawl back into a trench about 10 meters away. But before she could make it a bomb fell near her and she died from the explosion. The bombs were dropped by American jets. I don't know where the two children are now. Perhaps they are with their father on the other side.



A Mother:

I lost two daughters in a bombing raid in August, 1969. They were in a shelter a few hundred meters outside the village. The jets came overhead and dropped their bombs all around us, about 11 a.m. Some of the fragments from a bomb hit one of my daughters, aged 9, in the head. Other fragments hit another of my daughters, aged 4, in the side. They both died soon after.



Neighbors:

This is a 13-year old novice monk. He is from Ban Na O. He was playing around near his home about 5 p.m. one day in 1968. Suddenly planes came over and dropped napalm. He was burned.



Village Chief:

This girl is 3 years old. In March, 1969, jets came over our village. This girl was being carried by her 9 year old sister. It was about 9 a.m. The jets came over suddenly. The older sister began running for a trench carrying her little sister. But she didn't make it. A big bomb exploded and the little girl was hit by the fragments. She was wounded in her chest, stomach and abdomen.




Thao Siphon's Father:

This is my son, Thao Siphon. He is six years old. He lost the fingers of his hand in a jet bombing raid on July 1, 1969. We were hiding in a shelter out in the forest. The jets, four of them, bombed about 11 a.m., dropping 24 bombs. Some of the bombs fell nearby and my son was hit, together with four others. Two of them were wounded. And two, a 56-year old man, and a 7-year old girl, were killed. My son is still terribly scared of Americans. He's afraid they'll hurt him again.



An elementary school in a cave in Laos.



Damage from U.S. bombing in Laos.



Fitting of a new engineering workshop in a cave, Sam Neua province, northern Laos.



The result of U.S. saturation bombing along the Ho Chi Minh trail.



North Vietnamese anti-aircraft gun.



Part of a U.S. warplane shot down over North Vietnam.



U.S. B-52 Stratofortress capable of carrying 30 tons of bombs.

"It is not we who use the prisoners as pawns. It is Mr. Nixon who uses the prisoners as pawns in the political aims. But we should wonder why Mr. Nixon still uses the political problems for his aims. Why does he not make a statement: Now we stop any commitments to the Saigon administration...and we will no longer maintain this administration. And then the Vietnamese problems will be very rapidly settled--both military questions and political questions. And then all prisoners, all American servicemen, will go home."

(Xuan Thuy, North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks, NYT, 2/7/72)

TREATMENT OF POWS

An interview with a POW (Lt. Commander David Hoffman of San Diego) captured during the recent Christmas raids revealed the conditions of his confinement:

"How did they treat you, the people who captured you?' I asked.

"I was treated very well. I was taken to a village, their village, and was given dry clothing, food, and medical attention for my broken arm right away, and I was given a place to rest.'

"Lt. Commander Hoffman appeared to be in good health and was amazingly cheerful considering the fact that he was a prisoner. He went on:

"Since being brought to the detention camp here I have been treated very well. I was taken immediately to the hospital, the doctors examined my arm and started treatment so that it would heal properly. I have been well-fed and clothed and provided good shelter. My treatment has been very, very good.'

"Vietnamese in Hanoi had told me that captured American pilots are fed more than North Vietnamese soldiers simply because of the difference in their accustomed diets and body size. One senses from the Vietnamese that they recognize the political importance of the pilots and make considerable effort to provide for them within their means. Spokesmen at every level in Hanoi repeatedly stressed that they were committed to repatriating all U.S. pilots, but only after a reasonable settlement of the war, which they insist is contained in the PRG's Seven Point Peace Plan..."
(Banning Garrett, PNS, 2/9/72)

"We are checking every possible lead' and 'run out' every indication that POWs might be released, Mr. Nixon said. But he cautioned against soaring hopes, charging that 'we are dealing with a savage enemy, one with no concern for humanitarian ideals.'" (Post, 9/29/71)

"If I was a prisoner of war, I would rather be captured by the Viet Cong than by the United States Marine Corps. The Viet Cong need prisoners for bargaining purposes and we don't. After beating our prisoners, and torturing them, and having a good time, we killed ours." (Scott Camil, former Marine sergeant with 20 months combat experience in Vietnam and nine medals, AmRep, 2/18/72)

"The \$13,168,000* requested (FY 1972) for 'Missing in Action and Prisoners of War' covers the pay and allowances of the Air Force officers who are missing in action or prisoners of war..." (Gen. Kidd, FY 1972 DoD Air Force Appropriations Hearings)

* Note: Total covers only Air Force personnel, not Navy or Marine airmen.

THE LARGE MAJORITY OF POWS ARE PILOTS AND CREWS OF THE AIR WAR IN INDOCHINA.

U.S. TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE PRISONERS

The treatment of American POWs by the Vietnamese may be a legitimate question. It is highly debatable, however, whether any American has the right to raise it. American torture and murder of Vietnamese prisoners has been well-documented for years.

"The commander of the A team, had conjured up a system of electrical torture...the captain asked questions of a prisoner, who was stripped naked, and electrodes from these field telephones were attached to the back of his neck, to his armpits, to his genitals, and his feet... when the captain didn't like the answer, he gave some kind of signal to the sergeant who gave him an electrical charge and the fellow would jump and scream." (Steve Noetzel, testimony at first Winter Soldier hearings, CR, 4/6/71)

"At another point, I had identified one of the members of the village committees for VC logistical supply, as I remember. In any case, he was picked up and brought in...as a detainee, not a POW, but a detainee. The fellow was put in the same hootch with the four cages...and he was forced to lay on the floor with his hands tied behind his back and they would insert...a wooden peg, a dowel with a sharpened end, into the semicircular canal of the ear, which would be forced into the head little by little as he was interrogated. And eventually, did enter the brain and killed the subject, the detainee..." (Bart Osborne, Veteran, testimony before Dellums War Crimes Inquiry, CR, 3/1/71)

Secrecy - Executive Dictatorship

The air war in Indochina is a Presidential war, initiated and directed from the White House. For a period of five years, from 1964 until 1969, U.S. aircraft bombed northern Laos without even the awareness of the Congress, much less its consent. The President has continued to execute the bombing campaigns without once seeking the advice and consent of the Congress.

Traditionally the ultimate power of the legislature has resided in its power of the purse. However, the air war's funding is non-specific, buried in the general budget of the services and so eludes effective control.

The secrecy over the nature and the extent of the war is maintained by restricting newsmen's movements and access to information. Newsmen are not allowed to go out on bombing raids outside of Vietnam where, since 1969, 2/3 of the tonnage has fallen. All information about the air war except gross tonnages and sorties remains classified.

Although many of the real facts about the bombing have filtered out to a small segment of the public, the Administration's news management of the air war has proved largely successful. The devastation has been taken off the front pages and TV screens. This modus operandi of secrecy has ineffectualized Congress' role in foreign policy decisions, and muffled public dissent, while placing control over the conduct of the war into our nation's privy council.

.....

"The Air Force says that only five men, three of them military officers, are in the regular operational chain of command that selects bombing targets in Indochina: Pres. Nixon; Defense Secretary Laird; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Adm. John S. McCain, Commander of Pacific Forces; and Gen. Creighton Abrams, U.S. field commander in Vietnam."

(Post, 1/17/72)

Symington: "Are you saying that the President of the United States...[by himself] has the right to put U.S. military troops in airplanes over a foreign country over a period and direct the bombing of that country..."

Ambassador William Sullivan: "...yes, sir."
(SSAC, 12/70)

"The carrier is a particularly appropriate instrument of presidential power. Movement of a carrier requires no prior consent of Congress. It also costs very little, in extra money, so such a movement is virtually outside the congressional control over the purse strings."

(Star, 12/21/71)

[Sen. J.W. Fulbright complains about Congress not being informed for 5 years about the U.S. bombing in Laos.] Ambassador William Sullivan: "But if there were any direct questions asked of me about U. S. air operations..." Sen. J.W. Fulbright: "You see, we did not know enough to ask those direct questions...we were not aware of these activities [the bombing] though we had had some hearings on it."
(SSAC, 12/70)

"Since February, 1970, we have been using B-52s in northern Laos on a regular basis, a fact the Committee had not been told and that was not made public until...May 3, 1971."

(James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, staff assistants, SSAC, 8/71)

"...there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

(Sen. Stuart Symington, SSAC, 12/70)

"...the United States is reluctant to place on the public record through the statements of officials precise definitions of what the U.S. involvement or operations in Laos have entailed."

(Ibid.)

"We made a big thing...about stopping the North Vietnam air strikes. But at the same time, we were increasing in secret the air strikes against Laos."

(Ibid.)

"There is an evident determination among us officials in Laos to prosecute the war with only gradually reduced secrecy..."
(SSAC, 8/71)

"There is considerable doubt in my mind," Sen. Symington told his colleagues, "whether the Congress, if presented with a straightforward proposal to spend half a billion dollars to carry on such activities [within Laos] would have agreed to do so; but insofar as we can

determine, no congressional committee, before this year, was ever given any comprehensive picture of our operations in Laos."
(Sen. Stuart Symington, SSAC, 12/30)

"Because of the Vietnam experience, Congress is keeping a tight purse string on Cambodian aid. The Nixon administration has gone behind congressional backs, however, to sneak military supplies into Cambodia through South Vietnam and Indonesia."
(Post, 1/11/72)

"The only figure the people of the United States know we are putting into Laos is some 50 million in economic aid, but when you add up the figures...it is over a billion and a half dollars annually that we are spending."
(Sen. Stuart Symington, SSAC, 12/70)

"A strict gray-out is imposed on U.S. operations...with little information besides official reports available to the press. Reporters are not permitted to accompany attack and spotter planes as they are in Vietnam. Pilots are under instructions not to talk to newsmen. The Air Attache in Vientiane is similarly inaccessible..."
(Sen. Mike Gravel, CR, 10/5/71)

"American reporters are not permitted to film air bases in Thailand primarily because the Administration does not want the vast installations publicized."
(Phil Jones, CBS News, 12/21/71)

"Requests to go to other places were turned down...The U.S. still does not admit to all American casualties in Laos. It will give air casualties on U.S. missions originating in Laos, but not from the 7th Fleet, Vietnam or Thailand, and downed in Laos. U.S. air attaches here refuse to talk to the press. Saigon gives some of the U.S. air losses but no details of the sorties. U.S. forward air controllers and combat airmen continue to fly in unmarked aircraft on Laos missions. Skyraiders from Thailand with U.S. pilots, Lao air force TTT 28s sometimes flown by Americans, and Ravens, the forward air controllers, do not carry American markings..."
(Tammy Arbuckle, Star, 2/6/72)

"...Asked about this change in U.S. air policy, a U.S. Embassy spokesman here said he had 'no information and no comment' on the report... Guzowski's statement is the stock answer the U.S. Embassy gives here for any questions on the U.S. air war in northern Laos. U.S. Air Force attaches in the office here with over 90 Americans refuse to give press statements or see the American press...The aim of this press policy apparently is to cover up U.S. air

involvement in close support actions with Lao, Thai and Meo troops in Laos."
(Tammy Arbuckle, Star, 12/23/71)

"Military briefings give little or nothing in the way of details. No news reporters accompany the flights. And even the statistics on number of sorties and tonnage of bombs dropped are withheld or lumped together with the figures for Vietnam..."
(Richard Dudman, St. Louis Post Dispatch)

"...76% of 96 small villages in northern Laos were destroyed by bombing in 1969. Cluster bombs and white phosphorus were used against the civilian population of a country against whom the United States is not at war. The bombing was done under the direction and control of the State Department, not the U.S. Air Force. Both the extent of the bombing and its impact on the civilian population of Laos have been deliberately concealed by the State Department for at least the past 9 months which have elapsed since the July 10 report."
(Rep. Paul McCloskey, SRS, 4/71)

"By 1967 the CIA had become a forceful advocate of bombing population centers in Pathet Lao territory. Unlike Vietnam, where its main function was intelligence-gathering, the CIA has been intimately involved in operations here. It directs the 30,000 man Armee Clandestine, which does the bulk of the fighting. And with its own team of photo interpreters, control of reconnaissance aircraft, and teams of local ground observers, the CIA plays a key role in targeting sessions as well. As the Armee Clandestine began suffering reverses on the ground, the CIA held that heavy bombing of the Pathet Lao civilian infrastructure was necessary."
(Fred Branfman, Boston Globe, "Air War: Laos", 12/70)

"The Pentagon is concealing essential facts regarding its expenditure of more than \$3 billion on the electronic battlefield."
(Sen. William Proxmire, CR, 5/23/71)

Ineffectiveness

The bombing does not stop guerrilla advances on the ground or significantly impair the flow of supplies. It is militarily and politically counterproductive because of its tendency to alienate civilians and assist insurgent recruitment.

The guerrilla nature of the fighting neutralizes much of the traditional combat role of air power. American planes can rarely locate enemy forces who move in small groups by night under the cover of the forest. The number of stationary "military" targets in a guerrilla war are relatively few and strategically unimportant. Those that are struck are quickly repaired. DoD statistics indicate that less than 10 percent of all sorties are flown in close air support of embattled troops. The vast majority of the raids involve "harassment and interdiction" missions against an unidentifiable enemy and elusive logistical networks.

Efforts at interdiction have proven extremely costly and ineffective, undermined by the very low level of externally supplied materials necessary to fuel the insurgency and by the willingness of the Russians and the Chinese to provide the level of aid necessary to replace any losses. The DoD has estimated that the insurgency requires only 15-30 tons daily of imported material to maintain a moderate level of activity. This amount of supplies can be transported in 10-15 trucks or on 75-150 bicycles each fitted with an A-frame. As Dr. Marvin Golderberger, director of the 1966 DoD evaluation of the air war, has pointed out, it is impossible to prevent 150 bicycles from moving through the jungle.

GENERAL INEFFECTIVENESS

"Half of the bombs dropped miss their target areas for purely technical reasons." (Cornell study)

"These strikes provided the enemy with about 27,000 tons of dud bombs and shells, more than enough to make all the mines and booby traps which were thought to have killed over 1,000 U.S. soldiers that year [1966]." (Ibid., p. 4-8)

"Just as the senseless brutality of the Battle of Britain, designed to break the British will, was psychologically counterproductive, so the use of air power in Indochina may have a similar consequence. Such a reverse effect, though difficult to determine with certainty, has been attributed to U.S. air power in Indochina by several studies. . . As one civilian strategist put it, the best weapon for fighting a guerrilla is a knife, the worst a bomber." (Ibid., p. 1-8)

"All bombing does is chain you deeper to the war. Bombing doesn't work. There is not a shred of evidence that it works." (Leslie Gelb, director of the DoD task force that prepared The Pentagon Papers, 2/4/72)

Hansen: "F-105s dropped 654 bombs and 32 Bullpup missiles in over 100 sorties against a bridge in North Vietnam [Thanh Bridge]. . . Five aircraft were lost and the bridge never did collapse."
Sen. Young: "With all those bombs they never got near the bridge?"

Hansen: "That is correct. The delivery accuracy was so poor that even though a large number of bombs were dropped and several planes were lost in the effort, there were not enough bombs that were put on the precise points that they had to be to blow out the bridge."
(Asst. Secy. of the Air Force Grant Hansen, Senate DoD Appropriations Hearings, 4/27/71)

Gen. Tompkins: "Most H. & I. [harassment and interdiction] fire is utterly worthless. What you are doing is map-type fire at likely assembly areas, crossroads and trail, and you hope you will bong somebody. It is a great waste of ammunition."
Sen. Cannon: "Is there any way you could provide us with the cost effectiveness of H. & I. fire, or is that impossible?"
Gen. Tompkins: "Unless you are blessed with the luck of the devil, I would say it is zero return on H. & I."
(Maj. Gen. R. McC. Tompkins, former commanding general, Third Marine Division, Vietnam; Electronic Battlefield Hearings, Senate, 11/19/70)

HO CHI MINH TRAIL INTERDICTION

"The air war is not even militarily effective. Secretary of Defense McNamara revealed in 1968 that it could at best reduce the flow of supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by only 10-15 percent, at a cost over \$100,000 per truck destroyed. Former Undersecretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes has pointed out that in the history of bombing campaigns, only when the sources of production are attacked can the logistical flow of

supplies be effectively impaired. In this case that would involve strikes against China and the Soviet Union."

(Sen. Mike Gravel, CR, 10/5/71)

"The North Vietnamese continue to be able to get the supplies to Cambodia and South Vietnam they require."

(Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report, 4/71)

"One reason why there is some skepticism about truck kills claimed by the Air Force is that the total figure for last year greatly exceeds the number of trucks believed by the Embassy to be in all of North Vietnam."

(Ibid.)

"I don't care how many trucks they [the Air Force] claim, they just aren't doing it. . . We're getting about 10 percent, maybe 20 percent; we can't stop them. Never could. This goes back a long way too. You just cannot stop an army by air bombing."

(an American military intelligence officer "with long experience monitoring supplies over the Ho Chi Minh Trail," in a dispatch from Vientiane, DNSI, 10/11/71)

INEFFECTIVENESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

"The U.S. bombing effort in both North and South Vietnam has been one of the most wasteful and expensive hoaxes ever put over on the American people."

(Former Marine Commandant David Shoup, The Atlantic, 4/69)

The U.S. has dropped over 4 million tons of bombs on South Vietnam, two times the tonnage that was absorbed by Europe and the entire Pacific theater during World War II. Yet there is no evidence that the bombing has achieved any significant objectives. The most dramatic example of this was the 1968 Tet offensive in which massive bombing throughout the country failed to offer any barrier to free NLF movement around the country, including the American Embassy. While wholesale flattening of South Vietnamese cities and towns is considered a factor in American re-trenchment after the offensive, the overall effect of the bombing was probably counter-productive to American ends by hastening disaffection in the cities.

(PAW)

NLF recruitment rates:

1961: 35,000

1962: 31,000

1963: 30,000

1964: 46,000

1965: 120,000 (first year of intensive U.S. bombing)

(Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 1969)

INEFFECTIVENESS IN NORTH VIETNAM

"Thus in spite of an interdiction campaign costing at least \$250 million per month at current levels, no significant impact on the war in South Vietnam is evident."

(Secy. of Defense McNamara, Pentagon Papers, 11/17/66)

"I don't believe that any amount of bombing within practical limits would have substantially reduced . . . infiltration." (McNamara, Quotations, Vietnam: 1945-1970, ed. by William Effros, 1/67)

"Twenty-seven months of American bombing have had remarkably little effect."

(CIA bombing study, 5/67, in NYT account of the Pentagon Papers, p. 535)

"We do not believe that renewed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (short of unthinkable massive civilian attacks) will have any measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South at past or current levels."

(twelve spokesmen for the Federation of American Scientists, including Leslie Gelb, director of DoD task force that prepared the Pentagon Papers; Morton Halperin, former Deputy Asst. Secy. of Defense 1967-69; Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Asst. Secy. of Defense, 1966-67 and Undersecy. of the Air Force, 1967-69; Dr. Marvin Golderberger, Chairman JASON Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and director of 1966 DoD review of the bombing; 2/4/72)

"The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of the North Vietnamese to continue fighting, and on their leaders' appraisal of prospective gains and costs of maintaining the present policy have not shown themselves in any tangible way. The bombing clearly strengthened popular support of the regime by engendering patriotic and nationalistic enthusiasm to resist the attacks."

(Institute for Defense Analyses study for DoD, 1966)

LAOS AND CAMBODIA

In Cambodia, guerrillas now control from 70-90 percent of the territory, despite a bombing campaign of some 150,000 tons since May, 1970.

(PAW)

In Laos, the bombing campaign since May, 1964 has included over 500,000 sorties, 1.5 million tons of bombs, and installation of a \$3-5 billion electronic targeting network in the south. Restrictions on bombing of civilians have been lax. Yet guerrilla forces control more territory than before the bombing began.

(PAW)

SECRET JASON STUDY CONCLUSIONS

"Despite the application of massive U.S. air power, the Pathet Lao now control more territory than ever before. . . We can only conclude that the widespread American bombing has on balance had a clearly counterproductive effect."

(Cornell study, p. 11-5)

"As the bombing increased the Pathet Lao forces started getting more volunteers, whose attitude was 'better to die a soldier than to stay home waiting for the airplanes to kill you.'"

(Monitor, 3/14/71)

"The bombing raises enemy morale and alienates civilians. Pathet Lao defectors indicate that before the heavy bombing of Laos the communists managed only a 30 percent rate of voluntarism among their forces. However, after the massive attacks of late '68 the figure jumped to almost 100 percent."

(Sen. Mike Gravel, CR, 10/5/71)

"Life in the caves has its inconveniences for the peasants. It is even more serious for the political and administrative people who have to rule an immense mountainous country, stretching from China to Cambodia, where distances are counted less in kilometers than in days and nights of marching. Nevertheless, the people work on without any sign of giving in. 'Owls by day, foxes by night' goes the Laotian proverb. During the day the owl goes to earth in the shadow, but, at night, the fox comes out."

(Jacques Decornoy, 'Owls in the Grotto,' Le Monde, 7/4/68)

CHRISTMAS RAIDS

"What disturbed some pilots most about the decision to go back over North Vietnam was the feeling that political rather than tactical considerations governed the timing of the strikes. A solid cloud screen laid by the northeast monsoon blanketed North Vietnam. Phantoms without remote bombing systems were as reliant on planes with target-acquisiting radar as blind men are on Seeing Eye dogs. And the overcast, the pilots claimed, left them especially vulnerable to SAMS, a costly lesson learned five years ago at the price of many lives. Said an angry veteran, 'If you can see the ground you can pick them up easily at launch. When they come through cloud the booster is burned out and they're almost impossible to see. In 1967 we stopped bombing through overcast because there was no way of avoiding a fast-moving SAM. It's crazy to go through it all again.'"

(John Saar, Life Magazine, 2/4/72)

"As of October 1967, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam has had no measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in the South. North Vietnam supports operations in the South mainly by functioning as a logistic funnel and providing a source of manpower, from an economy in which manpower has been widely under-utilized. Most of the essential military supplies that the VC/NVA forces in the South require from external sources are provided by the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Communist China. Furthermore, the volume of such supplies is so low that only a small fraction of the capacity of North Vietnam's flexible transportation network is required to maintain that flow....

"Despite heavy attacks on NVN's logistic system, manufacturing capabilities, and supply stores, its ability to sustain the war in the South has increased rather than decreased during the Rolling Thunder strikes. It has become increasingly less vulnerable to aerial interdiction aimed at reducing the flow of men and materiel from the North to the South because it has made its transportation system more redundant, reduced the size and increased the number of depots and eliminated choke points.

"The second objective of the bombing, to raise South Vietnamese morale, had been substantially achieved. There had been an appreciable improvement in South Vietnamese morale immediately after the bombing began and subsequent buoyancy always accompanied major new escalations of the air war. But the effect was always transient, fading as a particular pattern of attack became a part of the routine of the war. There was no indication that bombing could ever constitute a permanent support for South Vietnamese morale if the situation in the South itself was adverse.

"The bombing campaign against NVN has not discernibly weakened the determination of the North Vietnamese leaders to continue to direct and support the insurgency in the South. Shortages of food and clothing, travel restrictions, separations of families, lack of adequate medical and educational facilities, and heavy work loads have tended to affect adversely civilian morale. However, there are few if any reliable reports on a breakdown of the commitment of the people to support the war. Unlike the situation in the South, there are no reports of marked increases of absenteeism, draft dodging, black market operations or prostitution. There is no evidence that possible war weariness among the people has shaken the leadership's belief that they can continue to endure the bombing and outlast the U.S. and SVN in a protracted war of attrition."

(Pentagon Paper summary of 1967, Gravel edition, reprinted in F.A.S. newsletter, 2/72)

Impersonality - Warfare from a Distance

The United States in Indochina is attempting a revolution in warfare, massively increasing firepower while placing the individual fighting man far from the consequences of his actions. The gun-toting foot soldier of yesterday is being replaced by the technician who monitors computer print-outs of enemy troop movements hundreds of miles away and by the bomber pilot who programs strikes on an unseen "enemy" thousands of feet below. Killing becomes impersonal. The new soldier need not confront dying men and mangled corpses. Instead, he fills out damage assessment reports and computes "kill ratio" probabilities.

.....
"Some pilots may have occasional qualms about dumping thousands of pounds of bombs, rocketry and napalm on an unseen enemy, but these doubts appear to be easier to overcome. . . . Aboard ship there is nothing that distinguishes the identity of the allies or the enemy. The maps would be different, but the carrier might as well be off the coast of Nicaragua or New Guinea."

(Peter Osnos, Post, 3/2/72)

"When I was bombing the North, I knew there were houses down there. I could see buildings and houses and structures. You know there are people in those things. But at the same time I see them shooting at me and you see all this stuff coming up at you and it's a matter of survival."

(Lt. Cdr. Bill Townsend, F-4 pilot on USS Constellation, fourth combat tour, quoted by Peter Osnos, Ibid.)

"Sometimes, when you're not flying you can sit down and think about the morality of the war, the morality of killing. But you've got to recognize one of the big differences between what we do and what your standard Joe Smeddley, a private in the Marine Corps does.

"He's down there on the ground slogging around with these guys. He's sitting there with somebody maybe 15 feet away from him and they're both emptying their guns at each other.

"He sees much more, as far as killing each other or being injured or whatever, than we ever see. It's an antiseptic situation in that airplane. You never get closer to the ground than maybe 5,000 feet."

(Lt. J.G. Bart Flaherty, F-4 pilot on USS Constellation, to Peter Osnos, Post, 3/2/72)

"Several of us went to the roof about 3 a.m. The Americans unleashed the terrifying 'Puff the Magic Dragon,' a DC3 that spews forth 5000 machine gun bullets a minute. As I watched it circle overhead last night, silhouetted against the low clouds in the light of the flares, flinging indiscriminate bolts of death earthward, I could vividly visualize the scene below. Men, women, children and animals, caught like rats in a flood. No place to hide, no way to plead their case of innocence

to the machine in the sky, no time to prepare for death. The beating the civilians are taking in this war is beyond adequate description. . . .

"The cold, mechanical, compassionless way that monster circled around and around and around, ruthlessly pursuing an unseen 'enemy,' stabbing viciously earthward again and again, probing, searching, killing and maiming all in its path. . . . Man's inhumanity to man has reached its climax in Vietnam."

(A Quaker worker in Quang Ngai, 2/69, in "Vietnam 1969," quoted in NARMIC, Weapons for Counterinsurgency, 1970)

[Note: The newest version of Puff the Magic Dragon, the A-130E "Surprise Package," fires 24,000 rounds per minute.]

"They seemed to fire whimsically and in passing even though they were not being shot at from the ground nor could they identify the people as NLF. They did it impulsively for fun, using the farmers for targets as if in a hunting mood. They are hunting Asians."

(Description of helicopter gunship attack in Quang Ngai by Asahi correspondent Katsuichi Honda, quoted in CCAS, The Indochina Story, 1970, p. 99)

"He learns how it feels to drop bombs on human beings and watch huts go up in a boil of orange flame when his aluminum napalm tanks tumble into them. He gets hardened to pressing the firing button and cutting people down like little cloth dummies, as they spring frantically under him. He gets his sword bloodied for the rougher things to come."

(Harvey)

"Decision makers in Washington remain isolated, both geographically and imaginatively, from the effects of their decisions. The culture and traditions of Indochina remain strange and remote, as does the historical and political background of the present conflict. The people themselves are pictured as pawns who count their own lives cheaply and respond like marionettes to manipulation from Peking or Moscow. . . .

"The U.S. has never suffered aerial bombardment. Suppose the North Vietnamese had been in a position to carry out occasional air raids in retaliation for the bombing of their country, say against Seattle, who can doubt that the tenor of the bombing discussions would have changed radically? The decision to bomb or not to bomb would have quietly taken on an added dimension of reality." (Cornell study, p. 11-7)

"The technology of the war has changed dramatically. Our planes now kill, from 30,000 feet, the brothers and sisters of the same civilians Lieutenant Calley gunned down from thirty feet." (Harvey Cox, NYT, 12/2/71)

"Gunship pilots were absolutely the most gung ho killers. 'You killed 24? Well, I got 28.' This sort of competition was rampant. They were gung ho to get as many as they could. They reminded me of the Nazi SS, the stories we heard in the sixth grade, homicidal maniacs. . . The services encourage them by not acting to stop them." (An American pilot to Fred Branfman)

"In those 61 missions in which I flew, all my targets were listed as 'suspected' troop concentrations, 'suspected' truck farms, 'suspected' bunker areas. Always 'suspected.' I never saw any of my targets." (Capt. Ron Knappy, former B-52 crewmember)

"This little beauty here will deliver 6,000 rounds per minute. What I do is I roll in there with guns blazing, hose down the place, jinking and rolling around, then I release the CBU's out the back, pull out of my dive. So I get them from the front with my guns and the back with my CBU's!" (Pilot of Detachment 2, 56th Special Operations Wing, Danang Air Force Base, to Fred Branfman, 11/70)

"I'll be frank. I'm trained to kill people. I don't like it particularly--but when the time comes I'm prepared to do it. It's just like your experts in the political or economic field are allowed to do their specialties. When it's in the military phase I feel I should be allowed to employ my expertise. I mean, I guess you could say I want to be allowed to employ my expertise just like Eichmann or something." (F-4 pilot, Saigon, to Fred Branfman, 11/70)

"The overall mood is hard to gauge precisely since, whatever their personal feelings, most fliers feel obliged to obey commands from above with maximum efficiency and minimum discussion. In the presence of outsiders they button up tighter than a self-sealing fuel tank...Still...years of confusion, compro-

mise and ambivalence over the Vietnam war have sapped the gung-ho spirit which flowed from the conviction of right and might.... The dangerous missions go on, but the motivation to defeat a detestable enemy is gone. The fliers find their satisfaction in the superlative execution of flying, which is both passion and profession for most of them, and perhaps the chance to test their skills against a MIG. Of anger or vengeance I found none." (John Saar, Life Magazine, 2/4/72)

"At breakfast a lone Phantom pilot is scaling a mound of grits with a fork. 'Going back and bombing the North? There are strong feelings for and against. I think it was dumb, but I'm not going to tell you what I really feel because I signed on. Either you do what they want,' stabbing the air with the fork, 'or you go turn in your wings.'" (Ibid.)

"The distance technology places between the killer and his act has resulted in a basic psychological change in the nature of warfare. . . Navigators plot bombing raids on coordinates, not villages; pilots pull levers from 5,000 feet up, not triggers at human forms 100 yards away; photo interpreters see bomb craters and destroyed 'enemy structures,' not headless children or napalmed grandmothers; and to the extent the general public is informed, it is to read of 'tactical air support' against enemy fuel dumps, arms depots, and troop concentrations. . . . 'Men are freed from the hatred, doubts, greed or rationalizations that killing usually entails. The issue of guilt becomes meaningless. Conscience and morality are irrelevant. One does not set out to kill and therefore, psychologically, one does not.'" (Fred Branfman, Liberation, 2/4/71)

"'No, I mean, you can't let it get to you, or you couldn't go on,' Major Billings objected. 'It gets completely impersonal. After you've done it for a while, you forget that there are people down there.' 'Yeah, everything looks so calm up where we are,' Major Nugett said. 'We can't even tell when we're getting shot at. We forget what's going on down on the ground...'" "...Captain Reese sang rapidly; 'Strafe the town and kill the people, drop napalm in the square, get out early every Sunday and catch them at their morning prayer.' At dinner... that evening... the pilots began to make jokes in which they ridiculed the idea that the bombings they guided were unnecessarily brutal... The joke-tellers appeared to bring out their remarks with considerable unease and embarrassment...All the jokes seemed to deal, indirectly with the conflicts of conscience that had arisen in the conversation..." (John Saar, Life Magazine, 2/4/72)

Life under the Bombs

Right now tens of thousands of Indochinese peasants are huddling together in caves, holes and trenches, hiding from the 2,000 tons of bombs which continue to rain down upon Indochina daily.

Most of the air attacks are currently occurring in the guerrilla-controlled portions of Indochina, subjecting several million people to bombing at any time of the day or night. By American Embassy estimates, 800,000 people in Laos and 1.4 million people in Cambodia inhabit these zones. Project Air War estimates that over a million people from both Vietnams live under less intense attacks.

The bombing has been responsible for the complete disruption and breakdown of civilian life in many areas under bombardment.

.....

"During 1967 and 1968 most moved into the forest in the vicinity of their villages. They constructed small bamboo shelters near caves, dug trenches into hills or camouflaged holes by sticks and leaves...It took four people about a month to dig a trench or hole suitable for a family...Older people and children form an unusually high percentage of the victims. This was because the children were the most likely to become afraid and fail to find shelter during a raid. Older people 'could not run fast enough' or did not react quickly due to the disabilities of age...They worked on their fields mainly at night, with the aid of small kerosine lamps...The danger of lighting fires is also often mentioned. Smoke by day or firelight at night tended to attract the bombers. People were often afraid to cook, and found it difficult to bear the cold during the freezing dry season nights...The refugees interviewed are in some ways relatively fortunate--they are out of the firing line." (Fred Branfman, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2/27/71)

Fruit of War
by Huy Can

*Give me the pellet-bomb "fruit",
A militia woman says softly.
--Why is it you seem beautiful as
a sparrow
Yet kill people so terribly!*

*Her eyebrows wrinkle, frowning.
--It is like this, isn't it:
You are really ghouls,
Savoring the fine taste of death!*

*You've become so refined--
Guava bombs, then pineapple bombs.
Death: it's a profitable business,
It, too, needs a beautiful facade.
(We Promise One Another, poems from an Asian
war. Published by Indochina Mobile Ed. Proj.)*

"The refugees commonly described the killing of their water buffalo, and the fact that they had to live in holes or caves, farming only at night when the bombing became so intensive in 1969."

(Rep. Paul McCloskey, SRS, 4/71)

"...During the bombing, her [Ban Na Ngu] life was difficult. She had to live in a small hut in the forest and did the cooking only one time a day in the early morning."

(USIS Laotian interviews, SRS, 4/71)

"99% of the people [interviewed] said bombing made life difficult for them; two thirds holding that it made earning more than a bare subsistence living impossible in its intense periods."

(SRS, 4/71)

"Due to the bombing, the PL [Pathet Lao] advised the woman ...to move to a shelter in the bush...Cooking was a problem: she had to make a stove and no smoke from it could be allowed to be seen. Clothes had to be dried inconspicuously lest they become bomb targets."

(SRS, 4/71)

[Tens of thousands of inhabitants from the Plain of Jars were forced by the bombing]... "to move out of their homes and into trenches, caves and bunkers,...by all accounts the situation has been somewhat similar for the estimated 192,000 people living in Sam Neua Province...One Western diplomat reported whole communities living underground."

(Daniel Southerland, Monitor, 5/14/70)

"Refugees from the Pathet Lao zone all tell harrowing tales of entire villages living in caves and holes in the ground, farming their rice by night in order to escape the bombing." (Hugh Greenway, Life, 4/3/70)

"In talking to refugees we heard what days and nights under bombardment are like. Refugees tell of being forced to live in holes and caves, of having to farm at night, of the systematic destruction by U.S. war planes of the human basis for society."

(James Malia, former IVS volunteer in Laos)

"On each side of the road there are heaps of scrap metal, pieces of aircraft, the containers of anti-personnel bombs, empty munitions casings, detonated anti-personnel mines...You sink up to your knees in an impalpable dust, the earth having become dust under the impact of bombs and incendiary weapons...nothing lives in this dust, not even crickets. Only men resist."

(Jacques Decornoy, Le Monde, 3/13/71)

REFUGEE STORIES COLLECTED BY FRED BRANFMAN, PROJECT AIR WAR. Graphic section contains sketches by the following five story-tellers.

"The person in this picture was hit by a napalm bomb and burned. This was the first time I had seen such a bomb; at that time no one knew that there were firebombs. We hadn't been very careful. In all the years of my life, up to now, I only have seen bullets from the planes. But never burned like this. If someone is hit by napalm, you can't go to help him. If someone went to help, he also would catch on fire. I thought about this when I was in the hills. In our lives now we didn't know which day we would be troubled or which day we would die. Every day we just stayed in the holes in the forest without seeing the sunlight. It was like that until there weren't so many airplanes. Then I fled to live on the side of the government which helps us get food. But forgetting the village of my birth is impossible. All the time my thoughts go back to my home."

(Male: 32 years old)

"One friend of mine went to the village to get rice for his mother and father to eat. He crossed the field to the hill and the airplanes saw him and shot and killed him so that you couldn't even see his body. It was scattered all over the field."

(Boy: 12 years old)

"In the earlier time my village had a school which was built by the strength of the villagers. But it was really just an ordinary school. This school was built in a level field. There were students who would assemble there to study. I myself studied at this school many years ago. But then it came to the year 1967, and this school was struck by the airplanes until it was level. Nothing was left. Many planes had shot around it. It made us lack for a school in which to learn our lessons."

(Author: 23 years old)

"In my life it was the first time I saw a person die. One time in the year 1967, as was her custom, my old aunt prepared things to sell in the market. That day she arose at six in the morning, put fruit into her basket, then walked out of the village on her way to the market. Just as she arrived at a place where there was a small stream, and she stopped to rest, an airplane saw her and shot a smoke bomb at her. She was afraid but before she could run away, her body was hit. Blood came out everywhere. She tried to return to the house but just as she arrived, she died. Before she could say any last words. Her children and her husband were most angry that they had lost her so. Everyone was disconsolate. After that day no one went to the market anymore.

But truly at that time there were many dangers. Like when the planes dropped bombs and napalm burned the village and people died. Some people ran into the holes and were hit. No one had courage enough to help the people who were hit by napalm. They just screamed until the end, and died. I am overcome with pity and my tears fall. I do not lose the thoughts of those people who lost their lives. That is when we had to flee from our villages."
(Author: 20 years old)

"In my village there was one man who was 22 years old. He went to graze his buffalo in the forest. The airplanes dropped bombs and killed the buffalo. He ran away from that place, but not in time. He was hit in the waist - cut right in two. For two days you could see him like that."

(Man: 22 years old)

REFUGEE COMMENTS COLLECTED BY FRED BRANFMAN, PROJECT AIR WAR

"The planes came like birds and the bombs fell like rain"

"...just stayed in my cave. I used to repeat, please don't let the planes come, please don't let the planes come, please..."

"When I left my village all I saw were the holes of the bombs and the burning houses and the people who had died so pitifully."

"Our lives became like one of the animals who search to escape the butcher."

"We would try and find places where we thought the planes wouldn't bomb but in the end they bombed everywhere."

"I asked the Major how he distinguished members of the Vietcong from the rest of the population. 'If they run is one way,' he said. 'There are a lot of ways. Sometimes, when you see a field of people, it looks like just a bunch of farmers. Now you see, the Vietnamese people--they're not interested in the U.S. Air Force, and they don't look at the planes going over them. But down in that field you'll see one guy whose conical hat keeps bobbing up and down. He's looking, because he wants to know where you're going. So you make a couple of passes over the field, and then one of them makes a break for it-- it's the guy that was lookin' up at you--and he's your V.C. So you look where he goes, and call in an air strike.'" (Jonathan Schell, The Military Half)

"Sometimes you see the V.C.s hiding by plastering themselves against the wall of one of those paddies. One trouble is, aside from these rockets, we don't have any weapons. But once I about ran a guy to death. I caught him out in the open, and I'd make a pass and he'd run for it, and then I'd make a pass in the other direction and he'd run the opposite way. Then he'd hide in some trees, and when I'd make a pass at him he'd make a break for it. I must have chased him for about an hour before I got some planes to put in a strike." (Ibid.)

"'Say, do you want those two churches down there?', Major Billings asked the ground commander. 'That's affirmative,' the ground commander replied. 'O.K., here goes,' said the Major...a bomb hit the back of one church directly--the church with the white flag on the pole in front...When the smoke cleared, the church was gone except for its facade, which stood by itself, with its cross on top. The white flag still flew from its pole...Several of the rockets from the next volley hit the other church, obliterating its back half and leaving two holes the size of doors in the roof of the front half...On my way back [days later]...I had an opportunity to talk for fifteen minutes or so with several members of a group of about a hundred civilians...I discovered that a group of people who had lived around the two bombed churches in Thanh Phuoc were present...I asked the group around me where they had gone when the bombing began, and I received a hail of answers. 'We went in our caves.' 'We didn't come out for three days. We ran out of food.' 'I want to go back to find my sister.' 'My house was bombed.' 'We don't have anything to eat here.' 'Three people were killed.' 'Can I have some rice?' 'We don't have any blankets here.' 'All the houses were bombed.' 'We hid in the caves and brought the children.' 'We couldn't bring any possessions.' I asked whether they had been able to reach the camp with their families intact. 'I am thankful to say that all my children are here.' 'I don't

know where my daughter is.' 'My daughters are here, but my son is gone.' 'My husband isn't here.' 'We couldn't bring anything.' 'I want to go back and find my father.'" (Ibid.)

Q. In Sub-district Khat, how many villages are there?

A. ..., there are 21 villages total....

Q. ...among those 21 villages, are there still any houses left?

A. Now, among those 21 villages, there is not a single house left.

Q. Why is there not a single house left?

A. The airplanes bombed them....

Q. Now, the airplanes came since 19 hundred and what?

A. The airplanes bombed from 1965 until 1967; they didn't bomb much. But from 1968 until 1969 the airplanes bombed heavily....

Q. During the day they came?

A. Yes. During the day a lot came, at night a few came. And in 1969 during the day a lot came and during the night a lot came also....

Q. Now, in 1968-9 were the villagers inside the village, or did they go outside?

A. During 1968 and 1969 the villagers went out to live in the forest in holes... 1969 the villagers were no longer in the villages, they all went out to live in the forest....

Q. When they were out in the forest, were there also villagers who died?

A. While they were out in the forest, there were also villagers who died...the airplanes bombed and hit villagers....

Q. When the airplanes came, how did you feel?

A. When the airplanes came the people felt that they were afraid the airplanes would see and bomb them; were afraid the airplanes would think they were soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army. For that reason, the people wanted to save their lives, so they entered into the trenches to hide in order to protect themselves.

Q. Now, when the airplanes came to bomb you what kind of bombs did they use?

A. They used 100 kilo bombs; 1000 kilo bombs; anti-personnel bombs; small bombs; and 250 kilo bombs.

Q. Only those bombs?

A. No. There were also napalm bombs, burning bombs, as well as destructive bombs.

Q. Which kind of bomb were there the most of?

A. The anti-personnel bombs were the most, together with the 500 kilo bombs. There were also many napalm bombs....

Q. Did they ever drop napalm in villages?

A. They did drop napalm in villages....

Q. Now, as you said, 'villagers died': the majority were of what age?...

A. ...The majority were old people and children.

Q. Why?

A. They moved too slowly. When the airplanes came, they couldn't run quickly, they couldn't make it.

(Tape transcript of interview with refugee Sub-district chief, from Sub-district Khat, on the Plain of Jars. SRS, 4/71)

Civilian Casualties

THE AIR WAR CAUSES A HIGH DEGREE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

The heavy civilian toll taken by the bombing in the past has been well-documented, though the Department of Defense said in April, 1971 that it had never attempted to study the number of civilians wounded or killed by American bombing. Although there is no way of knowing actual numbers of killed and wounded at the present moment, we may assume that they are quite high. There are still several million civilians living in areas under bombardment, and still 50,000 tons of bombs falling monthly. The drop in monthly bombing tonnages which has taken place under Nixon does not reflect a decline in civilian casualties. His Administration has switched the focus of the bombing to Laos and Cambodia, where there are even fewer military targets than in Vietnam.

A recent Government Accounting Office report shows that the air war has been a major factor in producing nearly 2 million refugees in Cambodia, or one-third of the population. The Cornell study shows that the U.S. has dropped 140,000 tons on Cambodia, compared with over 1.5 million tons on Laos, where nearly a fourth of the population, or 700,000 have been refueged.

THE AIR WAR CAUSES FAR MORE CIVILIAN THAN MILITARY CASUALTIES

U.S. bombers cannot locate guerrilla soldiers who sleep by day and move through the forest at night in small groups. Bombers usually wind up striking at the only signs of human life they can see from the air: fires, cultivated fields, footprints, cut or trampled grass, etc. These are located in and around villages. They are most often produced by civilians, who are tied down by their families and cannot live a life on the move. Those fixed targets designated as "military"--roads, ferry crossings, bridges--are precisely where the highest concentrations of civilians are. In rural lands such as Indochina, it is the roads, bridges and ferry crossings which attract civilian concentrations.

.....

"The Defense Department maintains that air activities are conducted under a rigid policy of avoiding civilian targets. All the same there is ample visual evidence of the civilian toll--even though our own authorities don't include them in the body counts. And we know that one purpose of the bombing has been to accomplish economic and social destruction in areas deemed controlled by the enemy. But I fail to see how such debates are relevant to the victims. Their suffering is no less if we explain that they were hit by accident instead of design. Their injuries are no less painful if we tell them we tried to avoid them but could not, because our sophisticated weapons just are not that discerning. It makes little difference to the dead that they happened to be living in a militarily important part of their own country."
(Press release from the office of Sen. George McGovern, 12/14/71)

"Our studies indicate that for every military casualty we get [from the bombing], we cause 50 civilian casualties."
(Sen. Mike Gravel, CR, 10/5/71)

"Most Lao civilians learn very quickly that

bombing necessarily follows the North Vietnamese."
(Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, written reply to SRS question)

"The weight of air-drop munitions deployed by the U.S. in the years 1965-69 was more than 200 times the total weight of all types of munitions used by the insurgents during the same period."
(Cornell study)

An American once intimately involved in U.S. bombing operations in Laos says an erosion of safe-guards against indiscriminate bombing there has taken place during the Nixon Administration. According to Mr. Jerome J. Brown, a reserve Air Force Captain and former Senior Air Force Photo Reconnaissance expert attached to the Vientiane Embassy, 1966-68, restrictions on American Air Force operations have been quietly relaxed while control over the air war by the American Ambassador in Vientiane has been reduced.
(PAW)

"The rules of engagement were strictly adhered to from 1966 to 1968, but for all practical

purposes after Ambassador William Sullivan left (in March, 1969) they appear to have been discarded and are only cited to placate congressmen in Washington," Brown said.
(Michael Morrow, Am Rep, 12/3/71)

"There just aren't any villages in northern Laos anymore or in southern North Vietnam either, for that matter."
(Aerial reconnaissance pilot in interview with Rep. Paul McCloskey, SRS, 4/71)

"A strategic target is any installation, network, or group of buildings, or the like, considered vital to a country's war making capacity, and singled out for air attacks."
(USAF ROTC Manual)

In Laos, "Cluster bombs and white phosphorous were used against the civilian population of a country against whom the United States is not at war...both the extent of the bombing and its impact on the civilian population of Laos have been deliberately concealed by the State Department."
(Rep. Paul McCloskey, SRS, 4/71)

"A hooch destroyed is a 'military structure'; a sampan is a 'waterborne logistic craft'... There are no spaces on bomb-damage forms for reporting civilian damage."
(Cornell study)

"In Indochina the flow of refugees and the occurrence of civilian war casualties continues. In Vietnam nearly all indicators--including official reports to our government--document that the situation among the people continues to deteriorate. For them the war is not winding down. The monthly flow of refugees continues at a high level, some 100,000 by official count, during the first five months of of this year. Civilian casualties are also on the increase..."
(SRS, 7/71)

"The technology of the war has changed dramatically. Our planes now kill, from 30,000 feet, the brothers and sisters of the same civilians Lieutenant Calley gunned down from thirty feet."
(Harvey Cox, NYT, 12/2/71)

"In this year, 1971, more civilians are being killed and wounded in the three countries of Indochina, and more made refugees, than at any time in history. Most of the casualties are caused, and people made refugees, by American and allied military activity."
(SRS, NYT, 4/3/71)

LAOS

"The bombing contributes to at least 75% of the refugees, who number more than 700,000 of Laos' less than 3 million population."
(Sen. Ted Kennedy, Chairman, SRS, 4/71)

"The intensity of the bombing was such that no organized life was possible in the villages... jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures...the villagers lived in trenches, holes or in caves."
(UN Advisor George Chapelier, from a paper on life in the Plain of Jars, SRS, 4/71, Appendix IIA)

"There used to be about 20,000 persons living in the town (Sam Neua) and adjacent villages. Today not a soul lives in the town. Not a single dwelling was spared by the American bombing. The destruction was more than any I had seen in N. Vietnam."
(Richard Ward, UPI release, 8/2/71)

"The bombing is clearly the most compelling reason for moving. 95% of the respondents indicated their village had been bombed, 49% could not count the number of times, 61% had seen a person killed."
(USIA survey of 200 refugees from nearly 100 villages in the Plain of Jars, cited SRS, 4/71)

"Until recently the area (Plain of Jars) provided a living for a population of more than 20,000. Now it is empty and ravaged, a striking example of what less than 3 years of intensive U.S. bombing can do."
(T.D. Allman, Newsday, 1/17/72)

CAMBODIA

"The bombing is a 'very significant cause of refugees and civilian casualties.' More than 2 million of Cambodia's less than 7 million population have become refugees since the May '70 invasion and the beginning of U.S. and VNAF bombing."
(U.S. GAO Study, NYT, 12/5/71)

"Inevitably the familiar pattern of Vietnam and Laos--in the destruction of the countryside, the generation of refugees, and the occurrence of civilian war casualties--is being repeated in Cambodia."
(Staff report of SRS, 9/70)

"The town is destroyed. But you have to expect that."
(Lon Non, younger brother of Lon Nol, commenting on the use of air power to retake a Cambodian town, Star, 12/12/71)

"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."

(Pres. Nixon, 12/12/71)

SOUTH VIETNAM

"Aerial bombardment...(has) contributed significantly to civilian casualties, mass movements of people and the destruction of forests and farmlands. For the period from 1965 to April, 1971, the estimate of civilian casualties in South Vietnam is 1,050,000, including 325,000 deaths, while over 6 million of the population is thought to have become refugees. These figures mean that there is hardly a family in South Vietnam that has not suffered a death, injury, or the anxiety of abandoning an ancient homestead."

(Cornell study)

"South Vietnam has been devastated by an alien air force that seems at war with the very land of Vietnam."

(A former South Vietnamese Minister of Information, from At War With Asia by Noam Chomsky)

"More than 90% of the air strikes within South Vietnam are classed as interdiction. Guerrillas cannot readily be interdicted without assaulting the civilian population at the same time."

(Cornell study)

NORTH VIETNAM

"Despite elaborate civil defense measures taken by the North Vietnamese, the civilian impact of the bombing was very heavy. In 1966 there were more than 23,000 casualties, 80% of them civilian. In 1967 the civilian noncombatant casualty rate was quoted at 1,000 per week." (Cornell study, based on estimates by the CIA and DoD)

The bombing of North Vietnam is strategic bombing. "Targets in a strategic bombing campaign are situated near predominantly civilian areas."

(Cornell study)

"A military target is any person, thing, idea, entity, or location selected for destruction, inactivation, or rendering unusable with weapons which will reduce or destroy the will or ability to the enemy to resist."

(USAF ROTC Manual, 5/61)

"The concept of pinpoint bombing is clearly a gross idealization...to offset bombing inaccuracy many more bombs are dropped than are in principle necessary to destroy the target... (best illustrated by the saturation bombing of

the B-52s)...more than half of the ordnance delivered falls outside the intended target zones because of purely technical factors..." (Cornell study)

Before he resigned as Secretary of Defense in 1977, Robert S. McNamara warned Lyndon Johnson: "There may be a limit beyond which many Americans will not permit the U.S. to go. The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 non-combatants while trying to pound a tiny, backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."

(Clayton Fritchey, NYP, 1/10/72)

"Our pilots have never cared about being accurate in Laos. No one has any scruples except for one guy. Every strike out of here drops, but only about 1 in 10 are on target."

"The thing is the pilots don't care what they bomb. For example, in Cambodia there was this civilian caught out in the open. One of our pilots was cruising overhead with 8 CBU 46 bombs; the CBU has about a mile range. The son of a bitch just went in and dropped all 8 of them to get this one guy, who was killed. When they later told him it was a civilian, he didn't give a shit. All he had to say was 'too bad he got in the way.'"

(From a confidential interview with a pilot, PAW)

"The FAC pilots...said that we could not destroy an area until we had cleared the action with the Province Chief...[later] I asked Colonel Tho [Note: the Province Chief] what his role had been in the planning of Operation Benton...I learned that his method of giving clearance in an American military operation was not to review the targets of individual air strikes or shellings but to give the American ground commander a blanket clearance before the operation was launched...he said, 'I got a report this morning that V.C.'s blew up two churches,' I said that I had seen American planes bomb the churches. The Province Chief laughed for several seconds, and said, 'Well, in the fighting you cannot always tell what is happening, and you cannot always tell the difference between just regular houses and church.'"

(Jonathan Schell, The Military Half)

Environmental Destruction

The air war not only continues to kill human beings, but is destroying the land and ecology of Indochina as well.

The bombing continues to add to the millions of craters that have ruined much of the land surface of Indochina, and produced a multitude of malaria-breeding ponds. Millions of unexploded bombs and mines add to the difficulties of the peasants in reclaiming the land for farming.

The aerial spraying of vast areas of Indochina's crops and forests has deprived hundreds of thousands of people of their livelihoods, in Laos and Cambodia, as well as in South Vietnam. Although the spraying program has been discontinued, its effects are still felt today by those whose land has been defoliated, and even more tragically, by those who have borne deformed babies due to ingestion of chemical substances.

Today, land-clearing is accomplished by the "Cheeseburger" bomb which flattens everything within an area the size of two football fields, and the "Rome Plow," a giant tractor, in what has been called "the most intense land-clearing program known to history."

The most recent material available on ecological damage in Indochina has been prepared by two U.S. scientists who have done considerable research there, Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, zoologist from the University of Montana, and Dr. Arthur H. Westing, botanist from Windham College, Putney, Vermont. Their most recent trip took place in August, 1971.

EFFECTS OF BOMB EXPLOSIONS

A. Craters and Unexploded Ordnance

Number of bomb craters in Indochina:

20 million

(Post, 12/28/71)

Number of bomb craters in South Vietnam:

over 10 million

(Pfeiffer, Environment, 11/71)

Craters caused by the standard 500-pound bomb dropped by B-52s are 20 to 50 feet wide and 5 to 20 feet deep. "The [crater] holes alone would cover a combined area of about 325,000 acres."

(Ibid.)

"The water-filled craters breed mosquitos and other disease carriers. MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam] Information Pamphlet 6-70 stated: 'Malaria has been causing increasing concern in Vietnam... Up until recently it only affected regions of I and II Corps, but has now spread to other areas throughout the country'...

"We tentatively conclude that those cultivated areas hit heavily with conventional high explosives will be very difficult, if not impossible, to recultivate... The immediate problem of greatest concern is the vast number of unexploded mines, bombs, rockets, and so forth that must be removed if the land is to be resettled. Since the Department of Defense reports that approximately 1 to 2 percent of

our air and ground munitions fail to explode, there are several hundred thousand of these randomly buried throughout Indochina."

(Ibid.)

"Boun Than [11 year old Lao boy] stepped on a bomb while taking a bath... One or two country people are brought to Luang Prabang hospital almost every day with wounds of bombs that did not go off when they were supposed to... It is easy to understand the villagers' complaints that they can no longer tend their bananas, plant hill rice, or let their children out to play freely."

(Michael Morrow, DNSI, in AmRep, 1/21/72)

B. Cheeseburger Bomb

The power of the BLU-82/B "cheeseburger" or "Daisy cutter" bomb "is surpassed only by that of a nuclear bomb." It weighs 7.5 tons, has an 11-foot length, 4.5 foot diameter, and is dropped by parachute from the huge C-130 aircraft. It produces a mushroom cloud that rises 6,000 feet in the air.

(Westing, Environment, 11/71)

"The Daisy Cutter is, in the words of one military officer we met in Vietnam, 'a super bomb with a super punch.' MACV has been using these bombs on a steady basis for more than a year and a half now, apparently with no mention of them in the official daily, weekly, or monthly war news summaries. One senior Seventh Air Force officer explained to us, 'They have such a devastating effect that we hate to give them much publicity.'"

(Ibid.)

More than 150 cheeseburger bombs were dropped in 1971.

(Post, 12/28/71)

LAND-CLEARING OPERATIONS

A. Bulldozers

Land-clearing is accomplished with herbicides and 20-ton Caterpillar tractors with 2.5 ton, 11-foot wide "Rome Plow" blades and 14 tons of armor. The tractors have levelled over 750,000 acres so far and continue at the rate of 1,000 acres a day. This is "the most intense land-clearing program known to history."

(Westing, Environment, 11/71)

B. Herbicides

100 million pounds of herbicides have been sprayed on Vietnam.

(Impact of the Vietnam War)

20 percent of South Vietnam's forest area has been sprayed.

(Bioscience, 9/1/71)

Over 5 million acres, 12% of South Vietnam, have been sprayed with defoliating chemicals. A Japan Science Council report (1967) claimed that "anti-crops attacks have ruined 3,800,000 acres of arable land in South Vietnam."

(Stanford Biology Group, "The Destruction of Indochina")

"The AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commission that visited South Vietnam last summer concluded that an estimated 6.5 billion board feet of lumber and other forest products have been destroyed at an estimated loss exceeding \$500 million. Enough rice and other crops to feed 600,000 persons for a year were ruined in the 9 years of spraying, and soil nutrients lost after spraying will not be restored for at least 20 years."

(Pfeiffer, Science, 2/19/71)

"Herbicides can cause genetic damage. Within the last two years, there have been numerous reports of increasing birth abnormalities throughout South Vietnam, and photographs of grotesquely deformed babies have begun to appear in Vietnamese newspapers."

(The Indochina Story, p. 114)

C. Napalm

"Today, black is the dominant color of the northern and eastern reaches of the Plain [of Jars]. Napalm is dropped regularly to burn off the grass and undergrowth that covers the Plain and fills its many narrow ravines. The fires seem to burn constantly, creating rectangles of black."

(T.D. Allman, "Plain Facts," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1/8/72, p. 16)

FOREST DESTRUCTION

35 % of South Vietnam's 14 million dense forest acres have been sprayed.

6 million board feet of lumber have been destroyed, equivalent to:

--30 years of Vietnam's lumber supply
--\$500 million in tax revenue

Half the mangrove forests in South Vietnam are "totally destroyed."

(Cornell study)

"Land destruction involves 80% of the timber forests and 10% of all the cultivated land in the nation [South Vietnam]."

(Sen. Gaylord Nelson, press release, 1/29/72)

"Before the war, more than 25 million acres of South Vietnam were covered by forest, representing about 60 percent of the country's total area of 43 million acres. So far, the war has claimed at the very least 3 million acres of the forest cover. The herbicide program has accounted for somewhat more than a third of this, the bulldozing somewhat less than a third, and the bomb, rocket and shell craters (plus damage from other munitions) the remainder."

(Westing, Environment, 11/71)

"Only We Can Prevent Forests."

(Sign above Operation Ranch Hand headquarters, Tan Son Nhut Airbase, Saigon)

"...On certain days aggressor aircraft in three formations sprayed toxic chemicals over this road...The fire, consuming the dry leaves, burned endlessly for more than one month. The fire burned the branches and sometimes a fire-engulfed branch fell down...I felt [the area] was desolate, boundless and wide open... around the control point there was no longer a green leaf or an undamaged tree trunk...All hills and mountains look like immense brown shoals and everything is brown, from high mountain crests to the bottoms of valleys... Resin from bombs was spread over the roadway. The burned resin was as black as buffalo excrement and the unburned resin looked like dried frog saliva...a gust of wind blew. Dust flew like smoke over the hills...When we first arrived, mango trees blossomed in January and February and chestnut trees blossomed in the rainy season. How fragrant it was! Today nothing remains, nothing other than the strong odor of the overturned soil."

(Khanh Van, from 15-part series in Nhan Dan, reprinted in "Life Along the Ho Chi Minh Trail," by Robert Keatley, Wall Street Journal, 12/1/71)

War Crimes

The air war violates international law in several respects. Among the most extensively documented violations is the continued bombing of unprotected villages and hospitals, augmented by our illegal failure to aid civilian bombing victims. Similarly, there is no question about the increasing use of outlawed anti-personnel weapons specifically designed to maim their victims. Another example involves the Geneva Convention prohibition of "forcible transfers" of civilians. American bombing in free fire zones (now called "specified strike zones") offers peasants the grim choice between evacuation and life under the constant threat of death. When guerrilla forces command the support or tolerance of an area's populace, the Air Force's unpublicized policy is to treat civilians as military targets. The air war and the resulting exodus of refugees have virtually destroyed whole societies such as the Meos of Laos and the Montagnards of Vietnam in apparent violation of the international Genocide Convention.

.....

"THE ATTACK OR BOMBARDMENT, BY WHATEVER MEANS, OF TOWNS, VILLAGES, DWELLINGS, OR BUILDINGS WHICH ARE UNDEFENDED IS PROHIBITED."
(Hague Convention, 1907, Article 25)

"A military target is any person, thing, idea, entity or location selected for destruction, inactivation, or rendering unusable with weapons which will reduce or destroy the will of the enemy to resist."
(USAF manual, Fundamentals of Aerospace Weapons Systems)

"95 percent of the respondents indicated their village had been bombed, 49 percent could not count the number of times; 68 percent had seen someone injured and 61 percent had seen a person killed."
(United States Information Service survey of 200 refugees from the Plain of Jars, 1970)

"The Army Field Manual says that it is illegal to attack hospitals. We routinely bombed and shelled them. The destruction of Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army Hospitals in the South Vietnamese countryside was announced at daily press briefings, the Five o'Clock Follies, by American military spokesmen in Saigon."
(Neil Sheehan, "Should We Have War Crime Trials?" NYT Book Review, 3/28/71)

"The bombers used 500 pound bombs, CBU anti-personnel bombs and napalm for the destruction of hooches. It was not unusual to destroy villages. To my knowledge no requests for approval of destruction of villages were ever denied by higher authority."
(Veteran of 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, 504th Tactical Air Support Group of 7th Air Force, quoted by Joe Nicholson, Jr., DNSI, 1/3/72)

"PERSONS TAKING NO ACTIVE PART IN THE HOSTILITIES SHALL IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES BE TREATED HUMANELY, . . .
"TO THIS END, THE FOLLOWING ACTS ARE AND SHALL REMAIN PROHIBITED AT ANY TIME AND IN ANY PLACE

WHATSOEVER. . . :

"(A) VIOLENCE TO LIFE AND PERSON, IN PARTICULAR MURDER OF ALL KINDS, MUTILATION, CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE."
(Geneva Convention, 1949, Article 3)

"In August, 1969, the jets bombed. Nang Pha Sii, my daughter-in-law, was in a trench. A bomb landed nearby, killing her father and wounding her mother and two other villagers. She was killed, shielding her year-old baby with her body. Soldiers? Oh, they didn't come near the villages. They knew they'd be bombed."

(Plain of Jars refugee quoted by Fred Branfman in "The Era of the Blue Machine," Chronicle, 10/15/71)

"Reports from South Vietnam suggest that indiscriminate firing on civilians from helicopters is not an uncommon practice. In a letter to the New York Times (June 3, 1971), William J. Simon, an adviser to the People's Self-Defense Forces in the Mekong Delta region during 1970, wrote: '. . . it cannot be denied that individual commanders of helicopter assault units either encouraged their subordinates or turned their heads at the practice of shooting at whatever moved in many areas. Responsible military officers and civilian officials at the highest level constantly registered complaints of indiscriminate rocket fire from Bird Dog observation planes and "joyrides" by helicopter pilots that turned into massacres of peasants.' Veterans have also testified to similar practices they call 'mad minutes' during which everything that moves is fired at."
(Cornell study, p. 2-15)

"THE WOUNDED AND SICK SHALL BE COLLECTED AND CARED AFTER,"
(Geneva Convention, 1949, Article 3, Sec. 2)

"The new American aid program for Cambodia contains no funds specifically marked for

civilian medical relief."

(Neil Sheehan, "Should We Have War Crime Trials?" NYT Book Review, 3/28/71)

"The consignment of Vietnamese civilian war wounded to provincial hospitals that were little better than charnel houses has been a national scandal for the United States. The reports of the Kennedy Subcommittee [on refugees] describe the scenes of two wounded to a bed, no sheets or mattresses, no showers, filthy toilets, open sewers and swarms of flies spreading infection. In contrast the United States military hospitals are models of modern science. Given the wide publicity the deplorable conditions in these Vietnamese civilian hospitals have received over the years, would it be possible for the responsible leaders of the United States to contend that the neglect was not deliberate?"
(Ibid.)

"IT IS SPECIFICALLY FORBIDDEN--...
"(E) TO EMPLOY ARMS, PROJECTILES, OR MATERIAL CALCULATED TO CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING."
(Hague Convention, 1907, No. IV, Annex, Art. 23)

"Most of the victims of anti-personnel bombs are not killed, rather they are maimed. The pellets from anti-personnel bombs are designed to cause irregular and hard-to-cure wounds. This serves two functions. First, it means that instead of a single man dead and withdrawn from military production, six to ten people (as well as facilities and supplies) must care for him. Secondly, the sufferings of badly wounded victims tend to have greater demoralizing effect on the remaining population than the dead."
(NARMIC, Weapons for Counterinsurgency, 1/15/70)

"A recent model of the fragmentation bomblet uses plastic pellets and casings, rather than steel. The reason for this is that these pellets are 'invisible' to x-rays, so doctors cannot find them to remove."
(Honeywell Project, "Honeywell: Controllers of Peace, Masters of War," 1971)

The dragontooth mine "is purely anti-personnel. If a person steps on it, it could blow his foot off. If a truck rolls over it, it won't blow the tire."
(Maj. Raymond Anderson, Tactical Div., Air Force Directorate of Operations, before the Senate Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee, 11/19/70)

"Finally, there are the incendiary weapons, the most famous being napalm. Developments in this area include new delivery systems to involve more people, and new incendiary agents which will not wash out of the flesh but will

keep burning long after the attack."
(CCAS, The Indochina Story, 1970)

"INDIVIDUAL AND MASS FORCIBLE TRANSFERS... ARE PROHIBITED, REGARDLESS OF THE MOTIVE."
(Geneva Convention-Civilians, 1949, Art. 49)

"In Laos, the Plain of Jars, once the home of approximately 150,000 persons, has been almost completely evacuated in the course of the little-publicized war there. In January, 1970 about half of the 30,000 Laotians still remaining there were evacuated in a CIA-directed project."
(CCAS, The Indochina Story)

Plans are reportedly underway to move up to 330,000 refugees to new camps hundreds of miles away from their homes. The move is called voluntary. South Vietnam's Minister of State, Dr. Phan Quan Dan, said, "When the refugees are moved out of their camps, the Government can turn much of the land into a free-fire zone. Then it will be much easier to fight the Communists."
(John Isaacs, NYT, 1/28/72)

"THE CONTRACTING PARTIES CONFIRM THAT GENOCIDE, WHETHER COMMITTED IN TIME OF PEACE OR IN TIME OF WAR, IS A CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH THEY UNDERTAKE TO PREVENT AND TO PUNISH."
(Genocide Convention, 1949, Article 1)

"IN THE PRESENT CONVENTION, GENOCIDE MEANS ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTS COMMITTED WITH INTENT TO DESTROY, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, A NATIONAL, ETHNICAL, RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUP, AS SUCH:
"(A) KILLING MEMBERS OF THE GROUP;
"(B) CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM TO MEMBERS OF THE GROUP;
"(C) DELIBERATELY INFLECTING ON THE GROUP CONDITIONS OF LIFE CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT ITS PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION IN WHOLE OR IN PART."
(Genocide Convention, 1949, Article 2)

"Bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian society."
(U.N. advisor Georges Chapelier, "Plain of Jars: Social Changes under Five Years of the Pathet Lao Administration")

"The Plain of Jars held the first society in history to be completely destroyed by total, automated war."
(Chronicle, 10/15/71)

"The Americans are formulating, without appearing to do so, a demand which the Vietnamese cannot satisfy. They do offer an alternative: Declare you are beaten or we will bomb you back to the stone age. But the fact remains that the second term of this alternative is genocide..."

"The genocidal intent is implicit in the facts. It is necessarily premeditated. Perhaps in bygone times, in the midst of tribal wars, acts of genocide were perpetrated on the spur of the moment in fits of passion. But the anti-guerrilla genocide which our times have produced requires organization, military bases, a structure of accomplices, budget appropriations. Therefore, its authors must meditate and plan out their act."

(Jean Paul Sartre, "On Genocide," Crimes of War, Falk et al., ed.)

"I remember asking one of the most senior American generals in the late summer of 1966 if he was not worried by all the civilian casualties that the bombing and shelling were causing. 'Yes, it is a problem,' he said, 'but it does deprive the enemy of the population, doesn't it?'"

(Neil Sheehan, NYT Book Review, 3/28/71)

"U.S. Chief of Staff General Westmoreland could be convicted and hanged if the standards established after World War II were applied to his conduct of the war in Vietnam. . . . By the same logic, the top civilian leaders of the U.S. could be convicted of the same offense."

(Brig. Gen. Telford Taylor (ret.), chief U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg, in Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy)

GENERAL

"Is there any significant difference between killing a babe-in-arms by a bomb dropped from a high-flying aircraft, or by an infantryman's point-blank gunfire?...The by now voluminous reportorial literature on the Vietnamese war leaves little doubt that air strikes are routinely directed against hamlets and even single habitations...in reliance on information of varying reliability. Obviously, these tactics are a response to the nature of guerrilla warfare, and the difficulty of sifting out the 'enemy' in a society where there are many shades of inimical activity, and friend and foe are not readily distinguishable. Making full allowance for these difficulties, however, it is clear that such reprisal attacks are a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention on Civilian Protection, which prohibits 'collective penalties' and 'reprisals against protected persons', and equally in violation of the Rules of Land Warfare."

(Telford Taylor, Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg, in Nuremberg and Vietnam)

"'In the mountains, just about anything that moves is considered to be V.C.,' an Air Force major told Jonathan Schell... And so, helicopters and small observation planes go 'squirrel-hunting' for individuals observed in the devastated areas, using machine-guns

from the helicopters, and calling in air strikes- 'sniping with bombs.' This is using the aircraft for the same purposes that the infantryman uses his gun, and the pilot ought to be held to the same standards of distinguishing combatants from non-combatants...this certainly is not the method of dealing with civilians suspected of hostile activity which is required by the laws of war, and is unlawful for the same reasons that the Son My killings were unlawful."

(Ibid.)

"Other specific policies applied in South Vietnam are clearly open to question. These include the free-fire zones which would certainly have been roundly condemned by America if any other country has established them; these must be violations of the Geneva Convention.

"The use of bombing to produce refugees so as to create these free-fire zones seems an especially cruel 'deportation and other inhuman act' as referred to in the Nuremberg Principle.

"The widespread indiscriminate treatment of 'suspected' Viet Cong agents -- a term applied to virtually everyone caught up in conflict-- seems a thin effort to circumvent the Geneva Convention of 1949 ('Persons taking no active part in the hostilities...shall in all circumstances be treated humanely').

"There have been widespread reports of torture (or handing prisoners over to the South Vietnamese for torture) which would seem to violate the Nuremberg Principles and the Geneva Convention.

"The general bombing of villages and hamlets would seem to violate the Hague Convention, Articles 25 and 26 on bombardment of undefended towns and unannounced assaults. And the use of anti-personnel weapons and napalm might well violate Article 23 -- the use of arms calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.

"In Laos especially, the use of bombing to dry up the 'sea' of peasants in which the Pathet Lao 'swim' would be, if proved, especially criminal by all three standards."

(Federation of American Scientists Newsletter, 2/72)

The Spirit of Resistance

The main reason for the military failures of the air war is the spirit of resistance of the Indochinese peoples.

The Indochinese peoples' struggling against the Americans have an astonishingly uniform and strong belief in their cause. They believe that they are fighting a just war for freedom and independence from foreign domination; that just wars will be won; and that people are more important than weapons. They see the United States as an invader who has come from far away to destroy and kill and try to stop a social revolution. They believe that it is their duty to throw out the western intruders and their collaborators.

The air war, far from stemming this spirit of resistance, has intensified it. At first, a large portion of the population was simply shocked and confused by surprise bombings which occurred while they were tilling their fields or walking to market. Why would such "iron monsters" wish to annihilate them. Their confusion soon turned to anger and even hatred. The massive and indiscriminate bombing branded the Americans clearly as aggressors--with no further proof needed. A peasant's only choice was to fight or join the aggressors and their collaborators.

Blanket bombing has also forced the Indochinese to be more self-reliant, more imaginative at the local level. They have mobilized resistance from the village upward, sharing supplies, repairing roads, creating medical facilities, and dispersing children and old people to safer locations. Where the bombing is heaviest, the people overcome the threat by living and working underground in caves. In northern Laos, for example, it is common to find factories, schools, and clinics complete with electricity, underground. In all areas subject to U.S. bombing there is a strict and well-rehearsed discipline that promotes cooperation and minimizes casualties.

The Indochinese have even found ways to utilize the debris of U.S. bombing. Pots and pans are made from napalm cannisters; oil lamps from defused pineapple bombs; rings, bracelets, combs and surgical tools from the wreckage of U.S. planes.

The Indochinese do more than passively resist the air war. There is a well-planned strategy to shoot down the war planes. Peasants throughout North Vietnam and the liberated zones have small arms which have taken a heavy toll of aircraft. The small arms fire forces the attacking planes to a higher level where they are vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles. Although such air defenses are primitive and ineffective by American standards, more than 1,500 U.S. war planes have been downed and hundreds of pilots captured.

Confident that just wars can be won, and that people are ultimately more important than weaponry, millions of Indochinese have joined the struggle. Aircraft are to be feared, without question, but human ingenuity is a powerful antidote when there is adequate organization and the will to prevail. Constant movement at night, willingness to undergo severe privation, the ability to judge risks and potential, unending patience, and a near-mystical faith in indigenous traditions and culture--these are what have rendered the bombers militarily ineffective in the long run.

Out on the battlefronts of Indochina, the war today is only partially one of ideologies and national interests. For those under the bombs, it is most immediately an epic struggle of the human spirit against a barbarous and unfeeling technology. So far the human spirit is winning.

.....

"Political participation in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam...is extended to virtually all citizens...the people take part in political activities that affect their lives, such as publicly criticizing local party cadres, electing village leaders, deciding when to move to a higher stage of collectivization, coordinating the use of collectively owned tools, deciding whether to introduce a new local industry or not and how to contribute to militia training and recruitment...repeated exercise of a degree of political participation never allowed in the pre-Resistance

Vietnamese village is fairly convincing to the poor peasant that the regime is just and its rule good."

(William S. Turley, Center for Vietnamese Studies, Southern Illinois University, in Indochina in Conflict, 1971)

"Few NVA soldiers seem to regard themselves as Communists. They see themselves as defenders of their country against yet another western intruder who can be made to desist."

(Konrad Kellen, RAND corporation, in Indochina in Conflict, 1971)

"Prisoner interrogations have revealed that, despite some problems between (insurgent) soldiers and the population as a result of the long war, the bond between them has remained close enough to provide physical and emotional support to the soldiers. The explanation seems to be that despite the rigors of the war, the soldiers continue to treat the local population with respect and otherwise attractive behavior."
(Ibid.)

"The North Vietnamese government is perhaps one of the most genuinely popular in the world today. The 20 million North Vietnamese like it there, find the system just and their labor rewarding."
(Ibid.)

"They are...mistaken in thinking their bombs and bullets can shake the determination of our people."
(Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam Courier, 4/28/66)

"The war of resistance against U.S. aggression may drag on. Our people may have to face new sacrifices of life and property. Whatever happens, we must keep firm our resolves to fight the U.S. aggressors until total victory."
(Ibid.)

"The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. We are aware of the recruiting methods by which local boys are inducted or compelled to join the Viet-Cong ranks and have some general appreciation of the amount of infiltration personnel from the outside. Yet taking both of these sources into account, we still find no plausible explanation of the continued strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even approximately correct. Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidence of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet-Cong documents."
(Taylor's Briefing of Key Officials on the Situation in 11/64, Document #87, NYT Version of Pentagon Papers)

"...It is a moving, and at the same time comforting spectacle to see the children, on hearing an air raid warning, calmly slip into their shelters. Moving, because of the daily threats to their lives, and comforting, because it shows that even kiddies have learned how to defend themselves."
(Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach, Minister of Health, DRV, North Vietnamese Medicine Facing the Trial of War, 1967)

"As the bombing increased, the Pathet Lao forces in the district started getting more volunteers, whose attitude was 'better to die a soldier than to stay home waiting for the airplanes to kill you'...the bombing tended to heighten the fighting spirit of the Pathet Lao."
(Dan Southerland, Monitor, 3/14/70)

"A new wave of bombs caused heavy damage to a stretch of road. That night, an important convoy was to pass. The road ought to be mended before dusk. On hearing this, the ten girls of the fourth squad then working a long distance away offered to do the job... and the fourth squad kept its pledge. But at 17:20 hours, as soon as the road was repaired, the bombers came again and one of the block-busters obliterated the shelter where the ten girls were taking refuge. All the girls died a heroine's death just as they had fulfilled their mission.
"In memory of those who had fallen, the girls of the brigade retained their names in their squads and they worked twice as much to do the jobs of the deceased. 'One more basket of pebble, one more rock in the name of our ten girls.' This slogan was written everywhere at the road repair site, even on the road."
(DRV, Vietnam, #144)

"It is well, in this age of guided missiles and computerized war games, to recall once again what makes men fight in the Philippines, or in Indochina. What makes youth in their teens, with sharpened bamboo spears and homemade revolvers, pit themselves against French tanks? What makes a squad of guerrillas who have lived for a week on a handful of rice a day brave machine-gun fire to assault a fortified outpost?
"The State Department's characterization of Ho Chi Minh as 'the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina' did not quite ring true with young men and women who at this moment were defending their villages against French flame-throwers and napalm bombs. It is not difficult to see why."
(Arthur Dommen, Conflict in Laos)

"...earlier this year a North Vietnamese journalist named Khanh Van presented a remarkable account of life along [the Ho Chi Minh Trail] many truck trails. The account appeared as a 15-part series in Nhan Dan, Hanoi's official newspaper, and was presumably designed to rouse patriotic fervor back home...But it also tells more. It makes clear that trail workers are human beings--not just abstract targets for high-flying U.S. jets--and that they too can hurt, and bleed. It tells of suffering and pain, seemingly endless hard work and constant danger. It reminds an American that

the war is grim on both sides of the battlefield. And it prompts wonderment at the tenacity of Hanoi's forces, and questions of why they believe this unrelentingly militant road to political power is still so necessary.... the account makes clear that the men on the trail are not only mortals but, specifically, Vietnamese mortals-with a culture quite different from that of the attackers above."

(Robert Keatley, Wall Street Journal, 12/1/71)

"Elsewhere Mr. Van meets a soldier who recalls that his ninth grade teacher, a Miss Kim Chi, told his class: 'If ever you become soldiers, no matter in what armed branch you may be, you must maintain an imposing appearance and a romantic quality....For instance, a signal combatant shows his imposing appearance by braving bomb smoke in order to reconnect the wire, and he has a romantic quality when he installs the wire on trees so that birds can perch on it and sing.' It's difficult to imagine GIs getting similar guidance."

(Ibid.)

"The bombing got more and more intense. First they were coming a couple of times a week, then every morning, then twice a day, three times a day, sometimes all day long...It really began to wear on me. Every day! Every day! I'd get up and try to eat my breakfast, and the first bomber would arrive before I'd finished. I became very nervous about the whole thing...Every day was unnerving. Your adrenalin was constantly flowing. I could never figure out why they'd [Note: their NLF captors] construct a camp at ground zero of a bomb range, unless they felt that...nobody would ever suspect anybody of building a camp at the end of a dive path. On those terms I suppose it would be safe. It made me nervous as hell, but we never got hit...

"I talked with Little King. [Note: one of his NLF captors] He'd been with them about as long as I had. I asked him why he'd joined the NLF. He said that his family had been very poor, but that didn't prevent the Diem regime from coming and taking away every damned thing they had. He knew that his family was just one of many...He felt that they were the people who should be in control of the country, that they were his people. He seemed very sincere. Nobody was forcing him to stay there. He was very pleased with the life he had taken up and was very definitely motivated to winning the war....I regretted not knowing more about each of them. They'd never told us much about themselves, but then we'd never asked. We just lay on our beds feeling superior...Gradually I had changed. I had learned humility, I believe...I changed from my arrogance and nastiness to liking people, from my superiority to feeling that the Vietnamese were pretty good people. Some of the honest culture of an oppressed people must have worn off on me."

(George Smith, P.O.W.: Two Years with the Vietcong)

"Interviews with Pathet Lao defectors indicate that far from breaking the enemy's will, the bombing strengthened it. 'Before, maybe only 20-30 percent of the young men would volunteer to join the Pathet Lao army,' explains one defector. 'But by 1969, 90 percent and more wanted to join.'"

(Fred Branfman, Washington Monthly, 7/71)

"I was once up on the Iron Mountain for four months...famous throughout Pathet Lao territory...the mountain guarded the approach to the Plain of Jars. It was very important. We held it from 1964. The Americans did everything they could to get us off it. But they never could. We called it the Iron Mountain because the Americans bombed it so much. The whole top part had been leveled off...It was really desolate up there. There were no civilians, no animals or livestock, just we soldiers sleeping in our bunkers. We even had to carry our food and water all the way up. Sometimes we would go for days without eating.

"Was I unhappy? Oh no. That was the happiest time of my life. You see, we knew we were protecting the people from the Americans.

"We were proud to be there.

"The planes came over all the time. We would crouch down low until they got close, then we would let loose. It was really a good feeling to be up there on the mountain, shooting at the airplanes.

"If they had only come to shoot me, I wouldn't have cared so much. After all, I was a soldier. Also, we had our methods for hiding and they rarely killed any of us.

"But they had been trying to kill all the villagers in our region for years. The villagers are just farmers, they just grow rice. They didn't do anything against those pilots. I am a Lao man. Those villagers are Lao, my people.

"I wasn't afraid of the planes at all...when they came low we would shoot them down. When they stayed up high, they couldn't do so very much damage because they didn't know where we were.

"The man who pilots the plane is a man just like me. He eats food just like me. He has a brain just like me. If he comes to shoot me, I will shoot back.

"I wasn't afraid.

"He is only another human being, just like me..." (former Pathet Lao soldier, interviewed at Sayaboury defector camp. Fred Branfman, Liberation, Spring, 1971)

Resources

GROUPS

Following is a list of groups and other sources from which materials can be obtained.

- American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 160 N. 15th St., Phila., Pa. 19102
- American Report Radio (ARR) 1330 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm 101, Washington, D.C. 20005
- Campaign to End the Air War 339 Lafayette St., NYC 10012
- Center for the Study of Power and Peace (CSPP) 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
- Clergy and Laymen Concerned (CALC) 637 West 125th St., NYC 10007
- Committee of Liaison with Families of American Prisoners of War in North Vietnam (COL)
365 West 42nd St., NYC 10036
- Community Video Center (CVC) 1411 K St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
- Computer People for Peace (CPC) The Dolphin Center, 137 A West 14th St., NYC 10011
- Congressional Hearings (CH) Free upon written request to appropriate committee. Also obtainable through local Congressman or Senator
- Congressional Record (CR) Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
- Corporate Information Center (CIC) Office of Resource Studies, Division of Christian Life and Mission, National Council of Churches, 475 Riverside Drive, NYC 10027
- Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) 456 Greenwich Street, NYC
- Dispatch News Service International (DNSI) 1826 R St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009
- Earth Magazine (E) The Agricultural Building, Embarcadero at Mission, San Francisco, Ca. 94105
- Earthlight Video (EV) 354 Broadway, Cambridge, Mass. 02139
- Glad Day Press (GDP) 308 Stewart Ave., Ithaca, N.Y. 14850
- Honeywell Project (HP) 529 Cedar Ave. South, Minneapolis, Minn. 55401
- Indochina Resource Center (IRC) 1322 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
- Liberation (L) 339 Lafayette St., NYC 10012
- National Action Research on the Military Industrial Complex (NARMIC) 160 North 15th St., Phila., Pa. 19102
- New England Action Research on the Military Industrial Complex (NEARMIC) 48 Inman St., Cambridge, Mass. 02139
- New England Free Press (NEFP) 791 Tremount St., Boston, Mass. 02110
- New Hampshire Peace Action Coalition (NHPAC) 28 Profile Ave., Portsmouth, New Hampshire
- Non Violent Action (NVA) 2143 Market St., San Diego, Ca. 92102
- Pacific Studies Center (PSC) 1963 University Ave., East Palo Alto, Ca. 94303
- Project Air War (PAW) 1322 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
- Ramparts (R) 2054 University Ave., Berkeley, Ca. 94704
- Raytheon Project-University Christian Movement (RP-UCM) 474 Center St., Newton, Mass. 02158
- St. Louis Project (SLP) 4372 Westminster Place, St. Louis, Mo. 63108
- Stanford Biology Study Group (SBSG) Box 3724, Stanford, Ca. 94305
- Unsell (U) 637 West 125th St., NYC 10012
- War Resisters League (WRL) 339 Lafayette St., NYC 10012
- West Coast Video Project-Cosmic Productions (WCVP-CP) c/o Ed Rasen, 9 Sutter St., #300, San Francisco, Ca. 94104

ARTICLES AND REPRINTS

Abbreviations below refer to resource groups listed on page 45.

Allman, T.D. "The Blind Bombers," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1/72. (NARMIC) 10¢.

Another Mother for Peace. "Automated Battlefield Producers and their Consumer Products." (NARMIC) 10¢.

Barkan, Robert. "Domestic Electronic Battlefield." Includes two articles: "War Toys for Adults" from New Republic and "Science Fiction-or Tomorrow's U.S.?" from Pacific News service. (NARMIC) 5¢.

Branfman, Fred. "The Era of the Blue Machine." Washington Monthly, 7/71. Excellent overview of the air war. Pamphlet illustrated with drawings depicting the bombing by Laotian refugees. (PAW) 20¢, 15¢--10 or more, 10¢ bulk.

Branfman, Fred. "The New Totalitarianism." Liberation, Spring, 1971. 4 page glossy. Shorter, more general than "Blue Machine." (PAW) 15¢, 5¢ bulk.

Branfman, Fred. "Life Under the Bombs." Collection of articles from American Report based on interviews with Lao refugees. Electrostencilled. (PAW) 15¢, 5¢ bulk.

Branfman, Fred. "A Visit to a Refugee Camp." Liberation, Spring, 1971. Electrostencilled. (PAW) 5¢, 3¢ bulk.

Branfman, Fred. "A Lake of Blood." New York Times Op Ed page, 4/7/71. Electrostencilled. Air war in Laos and civilian casualties. (PAW) 5¢, 2¢ bulk.

Branfman, Fred. "Laos No Place to Hide." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Fall, 1971. 30 page essay emphasizing air war in Laos. (PAW) 35¢.

Branfman, Fred. "Air War Laos." Boston Globe, 12/6/70. Pamphlet emphasizing CIA role in targeting and air war policy decisions. (PAW) 20¢, 10¢ in bulk.

Browning, Frank and Banning Garrett. Ramparts, 5/71. "The New Opium War." The role of VNAF, RLAF, and the CIA's private airlines in transporting the opium harvest in Southeast Asia. (R) \$1.00 back issue, 40¢ bulk.

Center for the Study of Power and Peace. "Air War in Indochina Fact Sheet." 12/71. (CSSP) 20¢, bulk rates on request.

Clergy and Laymen Concerned. "Air War Fact Sheet." 1/72. 4 page basic primer, including such items as definitions of "tactical air strike," "sortie," etc. (CALC).

Chomsky, Noam. "Destroying Laos." NY Review of Books. Incisive presentation of the war in Laos and the role of air power. (GDP) 25¢.

Committee of Responsibility. "They Survived: Sample Case Histories of Victims of American Bombing in Laos." Contains 16 case histories, photos. (PAW) 20¢, 15¢ in bulk.

Corporation Information Center. "Church Investments, Technological Warfare and the Military-Industrial Complex." 1/72. (CIC) \$2.00.

Computer People for Peace. "The Technological Warlords." Specifically IBM, Litton and Honeywell; their air war electronic battlefield contracts. (CPP)

Council on Economic Priorities. "The Business of War." 523 corporate contractors for the war in Indochina. (CEP)

Decornoy, Jacques. "Laos the Forgotten War." Le Monde, 7/68. One of the few Western eyewitness accounts of the destruction and ongoing life under the bombs within guerrilla controlled zones, by the Southeast Asia Desk Editor of Le Monde. (NEFP) 15¢.

Dickson, Paul and John Rothchild. "The Electronic Battlefield-Wiring Down the War." Washington Monthly, 5/71. (NARMIC) 25¢.

Duff, Peggy, ed. "Prisoners in Vietnam, the Whole Story." (COL) \$1.00.

Falk, Richard A. "American POWs: Pawns in Power Politics." Reprint from Progressive Magazine. (COL) free.

Haseltine, William. "The Automated Air War." New Republic, 10/16/71. (NARMIC) 10¢.

Hersh, Seymour M. "POW, Withdrawal Key to Release." (COL) free.

Honeywell Project. "A Practical Guide to the Honeywell Business World." Honeywell's air war production: anti-personnel weapons and general input into the electronic battlefield. Entire packet of materials also available. (HP).

Indochina Resource Center. "Indochina Chronicle #6 & 7." Booklet containing Branfman's "Blue Machine" and "The Air Force's Secret Electronic War" by George Weiss. The latter being a pro-war account from a military magazine. Also a 2 page fact sheet. (IRC) 20¢, 15¢--10 or more, 10¢ bulk.

Indochina Resource Center. "Summary of the Cornell Air War Study." Fall, 1971. An excellent 8 page overview and statistical summary. (IRC) 20¢, 15¢--10 or more, 10¢ bulk.

Morgan, Terry. "Bombing Aircraft of the U.S." Arco Publishing Co., 1968.

McReynolds, Dave. "The Banality of Evil." WRL News, Jan-Feb, 1972. (WRL).

National Peace Literature Service. "War Crimes Bibliography and Comment." Includes Neil Sheehan's "Should We Have War Crimes Trials?" (AFSC).

NARMIC. "Ho Chi Minh Trail-Two Viewpoints." Contains 2 articles, one from a military journal and one distilled from North Vietnamese accounts of the Trail bombing. (NARMIC) 10¢.

NARMIC. "NARMIC Background Report on the Automated Battlefield." 20 page detailed overview of the automated war. (NARMIC) 25¢.

NARMIC. "The Components and Manufacturers of the Electronic Battlefield." (NARMIC) 50¢.

NARMIC. "Weapons for Counterinsurgency." Excellent 100 page booklet, well illustrated, including list of corporations involved in weapons production. Unfortunately, currently out of print.

NARMIC. Packet on the automated air war. A dozen articles on different aspects. (NARMIC) \$1.50, 40% less in bulk. Single articles also available in bulk.

NEARMIC. "The Air War in Indochina: Corporate Complicity Information/Action Packet." Contains information on the air war and corporations in New England. (NEARMIC) \$2.00.

Neilands, J.B., A. H. Westing, G. H. Orians and E. W. Pfeiffer. "Not Since the Romans Salted the Land." A collection of articles discussing chemical warfare in Southeast Asia. (GDP) 35¢.

Nicholson, Joseph. "Bombing of Lao Villages Revealed." 25 page, well-documented article. (DNSI) 50¢, bulk rates available.

Pfeiffer, E. W. and A. H. Westing. "Land War." Environment, 11/71. Excellent booklet on the ecological effects of the bombing; well illustrated. (IRC) 25¢, 20¢--10 or more, 15¢ bulk.

Raytheon Project-University Christian Movement. "Raytheon Company--Heart of the Massachusetts Military Industrial Complex." (RP-UCM).

Scott, Peter Dale. "Air America Flying the U.S. into Laos." Ramparts, 2/70. Expose on the CIA's private enterprise air force. (NEFP) 10¢; (GDP) 10¢, 6¢ in bulk.

Schell, Orville. "Better Killing Through Electronics." Earth Magazine, 4/72. Excellent. Entire magazine useful. (E) 75¢.

Schell, Orville. "Electronic Weapons Replace U.S. Troops as Killing Continues." American Report, 9/27/71. One page with WSP ITT boycott information on back. (NARMIC).

Siegel, Lenny. "Vietnam's Electronic Battlefield." Good overview. (PSC)

Stanford Biology Group. "The Destruction of Indochina: A Legacy of Our Presence." 9/10/71. (SBSG) 24¢, 20¢--21 or more, 15¢--100 or more.

Van Dyke, John. "Prisoners of War in Vietnam." (GDP) 25¢; (COL) 25¢.

Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. "Winter Soldier Investigation." Liberation, Spring, 1971. Entire issue very useful. (L) 75¢.

Watson, Will. "Attack Carrier: The Constellation Papers." (NVA).

SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS

A) Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees

May 7, 1970 Hearings
September, 1970 Staff Report
April, 1971 Hearings
July, 1971 Hearings

Very useful background material on the bombing's generation of refugees and responsibility for civilian casualties. Extremely valuable appendices ranging from dozens of selected press articles to official government documents. The material is surprisingly readable.

B) Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Impact of the Vietnam War, June, 1971
"Hearings on Chemical and Biological Warfare," 1969

Excellent summary of war statistics including refugees, cost, etc. in Impact of the Vietnam War.

C) Senate Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations

October, 1969 Hearings on Laos
April, 1971 Staff Report on Laos

Very useful material. Especially effective in revealing Congress' lack of involvement in the decision-making process surrounding the air war. Also useful for indexing the dimensions of the air war.

D) Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee

Air War Hearings, 1967
Tactical Air Hearings, 1968

The 1967 hearings contain some useful documentation of the bombing's ineffectiveness. Best source for North Vietnam air war failure, though, is the Pentagon Papers.

E) Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

November, 1970 Hearings

Though highly censored, some useful information on the automated battlefield.

F) DoD Appropriation Committee, U.S. Senate

Hearings, FY 1972

G) Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, House Committee on Foreign Affairs

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia Hearings, March-April, 1971

(Also available from Committee of Liaison; 95¢ each)

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

October 5, 1971: Senate debate surrounding the Gravel amendment to limit the bombing in Indochina. (S15874-82, CR, 25¢)

October 4, 1971: Senate debate surrounding military spending in Laos. (S15762-82, CR, 25¢)

July 12, 1971 (H6540-63) and July 13, 1971 (H6672-78): Congressman McCloskey vs. Congressman Gubser. House debate over the nature of the American air war and specifically the degree of civilian casualties in Laos. Excellent posing of the issues. (CR, 25¢)

BOOKS

- Branfman, Fred (ed.). Voices from the Plain of Jars. Harper and Row, to be published Spring, 1972. A collection of drawings and essays by Lao refugees, describing life under years of American bombardment. Introductory essay by Branfman analyzes American bombing policy.
- Broughton, Colonel Jack. Thud Ridge. Lippincott Company, 1969. A pro-war bomber pilot's account. Some insights into day-to-day operations and the minds of the men involved.
- CCAS. The Indochina Story. Bantam, 1970. Excellent background. Explores war crimes, chemical and biological warfare, antipersonnel weapons, and political context.
- Cornell University Center for International Studies. The Air War in Indochina. 200 pages. The most comprehensive and current analysis of the air war. First edition is completely exhausted. A second edition will go to press this spring. Contact the Indochina Resource Center.
- Council on Economic Priorities. Efficiency in Death: The Manufacturing of Anti-personnel Weapons. Harper and Row, 1970. \$1.50. Excellent.
- Harvey, Frank. Air War: Vietnam. Bantam, 1967. 75¢. Somewhat dated; readable, simple.
- Klare, Mike. War without End. Random House, to be published Spring, 1972. Discusses the planning and technology of future American counterinsurgency efforts.
- Luce, Don, et al. We Promise One Another: Poems from an Asian War. Approx. 100 poems. \$2 or \$1.20 in bulk. (IRC)
- Neilands, J.B., et al. Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and Cambodia. Foreword by Gunnar Myrdal. The Free Press, 1972. The most comprehensive and objective study of American use of herbicides and toxic gases.
- Schell, Jonathan. The Military Half. Vintage, 1968. \$1.65. Somewhat dated but good background. A personal account of the destruction caused by the bombing.
- Smith, George. Two Years with the Vietcong. Ramparts Press, 1971.
- Taylor, Telford. Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy. Quadrangle. An indictment by the Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg.
- Unicorn Press publications. Cry of Vietnam: poems by Nhat Hanh, drawings by Vo Dinh. \$2.00, paperback; \$5.95 clothbound. Unicorn Journal III contains reproductions of paintings by Vinh An, poems by Vo Van Ai, and excerpts from a novel by Nhat Hanh. \$2.00. Write for complete publication list to Unicorn Press, P.O. Box 1469, Santa Barbara, Ca. 93102.

OTHER

SLIDE SHOWS

The NARMIC Slide Show on the Automated Air War. Excellent. 140 slides, with numbered script carefully footnoted. Running time 35 minutes. \$50 plus \$5 shipping and handling. Can be rented from the Indochina Resource Center at \$15 for three days.

Air War Slide Show. From the New Hampshire Peace Action Coalition. 150 slides and tape soundtrack. Well done.

FILMS

"U.S. Technique in Genocide in Vietnam". Made in North Vietnam by the Commission on War Crimes. Depicts anti-personnel weapons and their effects. 20 minutes. B.W. \$25 for a 3 day rental. \$60 purchase. Add \$5 for shipping and handling. (IRC)

"Chemical Warfare". Made in North Vietnam. Depicts the extent of use and effects of herbicides and CS gas. 30 minutes. B&W. \$25 for a 3 day rental. \$60 purchase. \$5 shipping and handling. 1971. (IRC)

"The Big Bomb" DoD film. 5 minutes. Color, 16mm. Depicts the effects of the 7 1/2 ton Cheeseburger bomb. \$10 rental, \$25 purchase. Add \$5 for shipping and handling. (IRC)

Film depicting interviews with the workers laid off from McDonnell-Douglas -the contractors for the F-4. Includes footage of aerial destruction in Southeast Asia. 27 minutes. B&W. \$30 rental, \$200 purchase. (SLP)

VIDEO TAPES

Boston Winter Soldier Hearings. (EV) Overview--60 minutes. The Electronic Battlefield--60 minutes. The Air War--30 minutes. Half-inch video tape in the Sony AV or CV format. \$54 per hour, \$30 per 1/2 hour, rentals somewhat less.

Fred Branfman Air War Talk. With pictures and other visual effects. 30 minutes. \$30 purchase. Rentals possible for less. (CVC)

Honeywell War Crimes Hearings. (HP) 50 minutes, Rent approx. \$20. \$50 purchase. (flexible)

Indochinese War. Available Spring '72. Approx. 25 minutes. Possibly to be made into a film. (WCVPCP)

RADIO SPOTS

Approx. 10 short talks. Speakers include Fred Branfman--Journalist who interviewed over 1,000 refugees fleeing American bombing, Randy Floyd--former Marine bomber pilot who flew missions over North Vietnam, and air war humorist John Henry Falk. (ARR) Free

ANTI-AIR WAR ADVERTISING

Unsell

BUTTONS AND POSTERS

Campaign to End the Air War

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL AIR FORCE TRADE JOURNALS

Aviation Week and Space Technology (P.O. Box 503, Hightstown, N.J.)

Air Force Times (475 School Street, S.W., Washington D.C. 20024)

Air Force Magazine (Air Force Association, Suite 400, 1750 Penn. Avenue, Washington D.C. 20006)

PENTAGON

The DoD can be called directly for certain informational requests such as the most recent tonnage statistics, etc. (202) 697-2873

